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Abstract
Cosponsorship Networks in the U.S. Congress:
Measuring the Success of Female Legislators
By
Brian Jewett
Claremont Graduate University: 2022

Previous scholarship has demonstrated that minority group members in the United States
Congress generally are more supportive and collaborative within and beyond their respective
groups compared to their majority group counterparts (Craig et al., 2015; Rouse, Swers and
Parrott, 2013). In some cases, increased levels of collaboration positively influence legislative
success and in others they do not, the results often depending on the characteristic of the group
itself and the institutional setting within which the group operates. Additionally, prior studies
within the domains of social network analysis and legislative behavior have shown that certain
social network measures within a legislative context are associated with higher levels of
legislative activity and success. Combining these elements, along with traditional variables found
in many studies of legislative behavior, in a longitudinal analysis of gendered effects within both
chambers of Congress has to my knowledge never been explored. This research examines
chamber- and gender-specific sponsorship and cosponsorship data using the methods of social
network analysis and logistic regression models during the 102nd through 114th Congresses. The
methods used in this analysis test the hypotheses that female legislators in both chambers 1)
exhibit greater sponsorship and co-sponsorship activity rates than their male counterparts, 2)
form better social networks metrics than their male counterparts, and 3) despite these
characteristics, are less successful than men in passing their sponsored binding, force-of-law

measures through each chamber compared to male members in each chamber. I expect that
women in Congress are not as successful, despite demonstrating success-based characteristics,
because of prejudicial attitudes perpetuated by each chamber’s dominant gender group, males.
The results of my analyses confirm that female representatives and senators are more active
cosponsors than men and form better networks in the House of Representatives than men as
measured by some but not all network measures used in the analyses. However, when comparing
the legislative success of women to their male counterparts, the results were different for each
chamber; females in the House were less successful than males in achieving success for their
sponsored legislation, but in the Senate there were no statistically significant findings to support
the same conclusion. I suggest that the differences in membership size, length of terms of
service, and other institutional characteristics between the two chambers are factors contributing
to the different results.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
I think in some regards the gender biases are more profound and more central to
our culture than even the racial ones, and that to me was the surprise.
– Former Senator Carol Moseley Braun, Hidden Brain Podcast, Too Sweet, Or
Too Shrill? The Double Bind For Women, October 18, 2016

Relationships are direct means for achieving goals within an organization, whether those
goals are for an individual, a group, or for the entire organization. It is difficult for an individual
within an organization to accomplish anything in isolation, void of interaction or ties with other
members within or outside the organization. The relationships that individuals have with other
organization members are the means to an end and nowhere is this more evident than in
legislatures. Legislators are involved in a variety of relationships and connections including, but
not limited to, legislator to legislator, legislator to interest group, and legislator to constituent
relationships. Each relationship is based on something of value to each actor within the
relationship. The legislator-to-legislator relationship develops in one of two ways, either during
the course of legislative service, or it existed prior to the legislators commencing their service.
During terms of service, the legislator-to-legislator relationship can develop, and can lead to,
legislative collaboration, legislation support, information sharing, access to power, influence,
mentoring, and a variety of other things.
The connection itself, regardless of how it formed or what it is based upon or what it
signals, is a building block of social networks. A social network is a way of thinking about social
systems that focuses attention on the relationships among the individuals that make up the social
system itself (Borgatti, et al., 2013). The study of networks is called social network analysis, a
method used to describe the structure of a network or capture aspects of an individual’s position
in the network (Scott, 2013). Network analysis can be applied to the study of these legislative
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relationships, behavior, and activity to better understand the consequences of the relational ties
between legislators.
One way to operationalize relational ties in legislatures is through cosponsorship acts on
legislative proposals. Cosponsorship activity is a useful way to study both relationships and
connections between members of a legislative body and the emergent outcomes from these
connections. Studies of cosponsorship activity, using social network analysis or more traditional
social science methods, have yielded robust results related to legislative behavior and legislative
success. Cosponsoring is a signaling mechanism for support and collaboration; it can
demonstrate a legislator’s policy area of interest and expertise, and can be considered as a
predictor of a measure’s future legislative success (Fowler, 2006; Wilson and Young, 1997;
Browne, 1985).
Most legislative behavior and social network studies have aggregated cosponsorship data
based on all members of legislative bodies or all types of legislative proposals (binding, force-oflaw proposals, rules-based proposals, or ceremonial proposals). There are some studies in the
field that disaggregate the types of legislation (by legislative proposal type) or examine different
groups (e.g. gender or racial) in legislatures rather than the entire membership. This analysis is
unique in that it examines only legislative proposals that carry the force of law (binding) within
both chambers of the United States Congress. The types of US Congressional legislation that are
binding include public bills, private bills, and joint resolutions.1 I chose to focus on binding
legislative proposals because these are the types of legislation that have the greatest magnitudes
of policy implication for large numbers of people in the country (or for the entire country in
many cases).

1

Legislative proposals that are focused on the rules and procedures of each chamber or express sentiment include
concurrent and simple resolutions and are not included in this analysis.
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This analysis also disaggregates by group within each chamber by studying the
differences in legislative activity, network formations, and legislative success by gender group.
By disaggregating by gender, a primary aim of this analysis is to better understand if women are
more disadvantaged than men when it comes to legislative success. As discussed earlier, prior
scholarship has found that high levels of cosponsorsing activity can lead to legislative success for
the legislative proposal’s sponsor. However, some studies have shown that proposals sponsored
by minority groups in Congress, that is racial, ethnic, and gender groups, fail more often than
those sponsored by dominant groups despite increased levels of support and collaboration
(measured through cosponsorship activity) on these minority-group-sponsored proposals (Craig
et al., 2015; Rouse, Swers and Parrott, 2013). I extend on these prior findings using the relational
lens of social network analysis.
In addition to analyzing cosponsorship data through a relational lens by gender group and
by force-of-law legislative proposals only, this research encompasses thirteen terms (26 years) of
Congress, providing a rich database of sponsorship and cosponsorship acts by each gender
group. Research in the domains referred to in this analysis often use qualitative approaches such
as surveys, interviews, and case studies. These approaches provide unique and rich accounts of
legislative behavior and processes, however they do have limitations. One primary limitation of a
qualitative approach is gaining access to enough US Congress members to generate a significant
sample size of relational and personal account data. Thus, this approach would likely not lead to
a confident generalization of results. By analyzing secondary data over 26 years of Congress,
there is a very large sample size of data that provides rich descriptions of network formations and
of legislative activity and success patterns by each gender group. Furthermore, another
interesting event occurred during the study period: female membership in both chambers doubled
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from 10 percent of membership at the beginning of the study period (102nd Congress) and to 20
percent of membership by the end of the study period (114th Congress). This study captures the
effect of this doubling in size of female members of Congress. In addition to the data related to
sponsorship, cosponsorship, network measures, and gender, this study also controls for
traditional variables of legislative behavior that have been shown in prior research to be
influential to legislative activity and success (Talbert and Potoski, 2002; Burkett, 1997; Kessler
and Krehbiel, 1996; Campbell, 1982). These legislator attributes are seniority, party affiliation,
majority party status, party leadership positions, and committee chair and ranking member
positions.
I hope to illuminate some of the dynamics of policymaking in one of the oldest
democratic legislative institutions in the world; one that has been and continues to be
predominantly male. Despite females comprising slightly over 50 percent of the US population,
only 313 women have ever served in Congress through the last full legislative term ending 2016
(Manning and Brudnick, 2015). This gross underrepresentation of a large segment of our nation
in the national legislature has significant policy implications, particularly for female-sponsored,
and arguably female-oriented, agendas and policy issues.
This introductory chapter has set the stage for the direction of the research and analysis
described in this paper. The second chapter reviews prior relevant scholarship and theory
including those on cosponsorship activity, legislative behavior and gender, and social network
analysis. The third chapter presents the research design and methods framework and three formal
hypotheses. This chapter also presents the data and variables employed in the analysis. The
fourth chapter presents the analysis and results of the tests of the three study hypotheses. The
fifth chapter is a discussion section that provides a summary of results and their interpretation,
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the implications of this study and the policy implications of the study results, study limitations,
and suggestions for future extension of this work. The final chapter provides short concluding
remarks situating this study in the greater context of the domains of legislative activity, behavior,
and outcomes for gender-based groups as well as other segments of Congress and society.

5

Chapter 2: Review of Literature
It has been a standard rule in both the Senate and House that bills and resolutions
(hereinafter referred to as bills or measures) are introduced by only one legislator, called the
sponsor. While other Senators and Representatives (hereinafter referred to as legislators) can
submit or introduce a bill along with the original legislator, the submitting legislator whose name
appears first on the bill is officially labeled as the bill sponsor.2 The other legislators who help
introduce or submit the bill are then labeled as cosponsors. Under House rules, only public bills
can have cosponsors; private bills cannot include cosponsors (Davis, 2019; Oleszek, 2019). In
the Senate, there are no rules prohibiting the inclusion of cosponsors on a private bill. A small
minority of Senate private bills include cosponsors, and in those rare cases the number of
cosponsors is usually very small (GovTrack, 2020).
After initial bill submission, other legislators may sign on as supporters of the bill. These
legislators are also known as cosponsors of the submitted bill. Since the 1930s, members of the
U.S. Senate have been able to cosponsor legislative measures without limit; that is, a bill may be
cosponsored by the maximum number of senators and each Senator may cosponsor as many
measures in a legislative term as they choose (Fowler, 2006b; Campbell, 1982). Before 1967,
House rules prohibited Representatives from cosponsoring bills. This restriction was lifted in
1967; however, limitations were placed on the number of cosponsors a bill could secure (a
maximum of 25 cosponsors per bill). In 1978, House rules were amended to allow unlimited
cosponsorship, thus mirroring the cosponsorship rules of the Senate (Campbell, 1982; Deschler,
1979).

2

Congressional Research Service Report RS22477, Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of House Bills, October 7, 2019;
Congressional Research Service Report 7-5700, Sponsorship and Cosponsorship of Senate Bills, March 27, 2018.
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Bill cosponsorship is an integral activity within the policy stages framework, with initial
considerations in the formal agenda-setting stage and reaching its peak trajectory during the
policy formulation process (Anderson, 2015). During these stages, bill supporters will seek
cosponsors through various mechanisms, such as “Dear Colleague” letters delivered to legislator
offices in an initial effort to emphasize the highlights of a bill and why it is important to support
it through the legislative process (Campbell, 1982).
Bill supporters, including the sponsor, recruit cosponsors for a variety of reasons, ranging
from a simple show of support for another member to a demonstration of expertise in a specific
public policy area. At the initial stages of the policy cycle, legislators reveal their true policy and
personal preferences through their cosponsorship activity. Before floor voting takes place, bill
cosponsors can take a formal position on an issue with fewer constraints from party and
committee leaders (Talbert and Potoski, 2002). They can show their support for a measure that
they believe is good public policy, whether for their constituents or for the greater good (Talbert
and Potoski, 2002; Campbell, 1982).
In addition to support for a measure for policy reasons, cosponsorship can be a means of
showing support for another member or exhibiting legislative influence. According to theories of
intra-legislative signaling, cosponsorship is meant to influence other legislators (Kessler and
Krehbiel, 1996). A member’s cosponsorship act may be a means to gain influence with the
sponsoring member for future reward or to thank the member for previous support on their bill;
commonly referred to as “logrolling”. In the case of an influential member who cosponsors
another’s measure, the purpose of the act may be to signal to other members that they should also
support the measure (Campbell, 1982).
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Length of tenure can also influence the rate of frequency of cosponsorship activity. In the
House, junior members cosponsor at greater rates than do more senior members (Krehbiel, 1995;
Campbell, 1982). However, in the Senate, according to Campbell (1982), seniority is not a
prominent factor for cosponsorship frequency because junior senators have greater access to
senior senators due to the smaller size of the Senate and longer election cycle compared to the
House. Regardless of chamber, as junior members increase their tenure, they begin to establish
their enterprises and may start to cosponsor at greater rates to build their reputations in specific
policy areas and advertise their policy positions to their constituents and fellow legislators
(Swers, 2005; Burkett, 1997).
When deciding to cosponsor a bill, legislators consider party affiliation, their
constituency demands, interests, and ideologies, the sponsoring legislator’s ideology, and their
own electoral vulnerabilities within their respective states or districts (Koger, 2003; Talbert and
Potoski, 2002; Campbell, 1982; Mayhew, 1974). These considerations generally support
electoral connections theories that posit that legislators who share similar ideologies tend to
cosponsor each other more frequently than they do with those who are ideologically dissimilar
(Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996; Mayhew, 1974). However, results are mixed on the impact that
electoral vulnerability has on a member’s decision to cosponsor. Mayhew (1974) found that
those legislators that experienced a slight electoral margin in their last election or who believe
they are electorally vulnerable in the next election cycle tend to cosponsor more frequently than
legislators who enjoyed a large electoral margin or face limited competition in their upcoming
election. Campbell’s (1982) analysis showed that electoral margin influences cosponsor
productivity, but only in the Senate. The larger the electoral victory for a Senator, the fewer
times a Senator will cosponsor; this finding was not present in the House analysis (Campbell,

8

1982). Prior studies of the House found no evidence that suggests electoral margin and
cosponsorship productivity are related (Garand and Burke, 2006; Koger, 2003; Kessler and
Krehbiel, 1996; Krehbiel, 1995). In the Senate, from the years 1975 through 2000, Harward and
Moffett (2010) found a statistically significant positive relationship between electoral margin and
cosponsorship activity, however the coefficient was too close to zero to deem it of substantive
significance.
If a member’s constituency is well informed of her/his cosponsorship activity and the
content of the bills cosponsored comport with the primary ideological leaning of the
constituency, cosponsorship activity can yield tremendous benefit for the legislator, particularly
if the goal is re-election (Campbell, 1982; Mayhew, 1974). However, when disaggregating
Congress by chamber, the findings are robust for the House but less so in the Senate. In one of
the early empirical treatments of legislator motivations to cosponsor, Campbell (1982) found a
statistically significant relationship between a legislator’s ideology and the number of times the
legislator cosponsored bills. This finding was present in both chambers; however, the magnitude
of the effect for the House was almost twice that of the Senate (Campbell, 1982).
Prior research yields mixed conclusions about the effect that party affiliation has on the
cosponsorship activity of a member of Congress. Talbert and Potoski (2002), in their analysis of
the 103rd and 104th Congresses, contend that party affiliation dominates bill cosponsorship
activity in both chambers. Campbell (1982) finds a significant negative relationship between the
two variables, but in the Senate only (Senators from one party are less likely to cosponsor a bill
sponsored by a member from another party). Krehbiel’s (1995) House analysis suggests that
cosponsorship is only slightly explained by partisanship while Garand and Burke (2006) found
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no significant relationship between party affiliation and House members’ level of cosponsorship
activity in the 102nd through 105th Congresses.

Legislative Impact of Cosponsorship Activity
Clearly, there are many reasons that influence the calculus underpinning legislator
cosponsorship activity. Not only have the reasons been well-examined over the past few decades,
but there has also been considerable scholarly research focusing on the impacts that the act of
cosponsoring has on the legislative process, particularly on legislative outcomes. Some
legislative behavior researchers suggest cosponsorships are relegated to a form of “cheap talk”
and at best provide a measure of legislative signaling void of much influence on legislative
effectiveness (Wilson and Young, 1997; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996).3 Others have demonstrated
that cosponsorship activity is not without substantive meaning, in particular, that it provides
useful information regarding legislator policy preferences and can influence policy outputs. If
legislators considered the act of cosponsoring to be a meaningless exercise, they would
cosponsor any bill that is remotely of interest to them or simply not cosponsor any bills.
However, this unfettered approach is not the norm. Fowler (2006a), in his analyses of
cosponsorship activities in Congresses from 1973 to 2004, explained that the number of
introduced measures in each legislative term often exceeded 20,000 for both chambers of
Congress. However, during these terms, the average House member cosigned a paltry 3.4 percent
of the introduced measures, and the average Senate member cosigned a smaller amount at 2.4
percent of introduced measures (Fowler, 2006a). The opportunities to cosponsor are abundant,
yet Legislators are highly selective when officially signing on as supporters. This selectivity
suggests that Legislators take the act of cosponsoring seriously.

3

The term “cheap talk” implies that the act of cosponsorship is not detrimental to a legislator’s electoral security
and has little to no influence in the policymaking process.
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They also take quite seriously the act of reneging on their official support of a bill. As
bills mature through the legislative process, changes in bill language may alter a member’s
support for a bill. When this happens, a member may decide that the revisions are not aligned
with the original intent and the legislator may choose to withdraw their support. When this
withdrawal happens, it can be costly to the member. Bernhard and Sulkin (2013) found that
legislators who reneged on their support for a bill damaged their relationships with other
members who sponsored and cosponsored the bill and jeopardized their ability to form future
legislative support coalitions.
Given that legislators take the act of cosponsoring seriously, what impact does the act
have on the advancement of bills through the legislative process and ultimately to legislative
success? In an analysis of four state legislatures, Browne (1985) found that the number of
cosponsors is, when taken alone, more important for a bill's passage than the attributes of the
supporting cosponsors, such as majority party membership, committee membership, and a
member’s prior legislative success. While this research design lacked a rigorous statistical
analysis (only simple descriptive statistics were presented), it provides an early tracing of the
debate on the impact of cosponsoring on legislative outputs.
Subsequent scholarship on the effects of legislative cosponsorship activity employed
more substantive methodologies aimed at the US Congress and yield similar findings: The act of
cosponsoring signals how well legislators work together, but, more importantly, the level and
characteristics of cosponsorship activity may be general predictors of which bill will move
successfully through the legislative process. In general, this research has emphasized legislators'
interests in cosponsoring to influence the policy process and subsequent policy outcomes
(Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996). As discussed earlier, electoral motives and other legislator
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attributes influence a legislator’s decision to cosponsor. This position-taking acts as a mechanism
for chamber leaders to select bills for the formal governmental agenda that may provide political
benefit to members (Koger, 2003). As Koger (2003) notes, chamber leaders assess the nature of a
bill’s cosponsorship support often in terms of number of cosponsors as well as the diversity of
cosponsors to determine if the bill will incur more benefit than its costs to support it through the
process. In Koger’s (2003) analysis of House cosponsorship activity, his research found that bills
enjoy more success in committee and floor votes if the cosponsorship support is bipartisan and
ideologically diverse.
Wilson and Young (1997) found that bills with cosponsors received more consideration
in committee and had a better chance of getting through the committee stage than noncosponsored bills. Yet, when it comes to the all-important floor vote, the difference in passage
rates between cosponsored (approximately 11 percent) and non-cosponsored bills (approximately
8 percent) is less dramatic (Wilson and Young, 1997). Based on these findings, the researchers
contend that cosponsorship activity has minimal impact on a bill passing a floor vote in either
chamber (Wilson and Young, 1997); this study is one of the few that yields this finding. Caution
should be exercised in interpreting the results of this analysis because the authors considered the
entire population of bills in only one legislative term, the 99th Congress. Applying the same
methodologies to multiple Congressional terms and a disaggregation of the introduced bills
might yield more robust results and interpretations.

Implications of Cosponsorship Activity at the Group Level
Much of the prior research on cosponsorship activity in the U.S. Congress has largely
been aggregated to the whole chamber level or entire Congress level. However, there have been
several research efforts that examine cosponsorship activity at group levels within Congress,
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particularly with respect to racial minorities and gender. These treatments are important in
assessing both descriptive and substantive representation in Congress. The membership of the
U.S. Congress is disproportionately white and male, and it is this characteristic that has
important implications at the intersection of female representation and legislative effectiveness
(Craig et al., 2015). To be a successful legislator, relationship ties, collaboration, and coalitionbuilding are paramount. By collaborating with other legislators – both within their own parties
and across party lines – legislators can increase their influence over group decisions, shape the
outcome of legislation, and develop more efficient and effective policy (Barnes, 2016). Through
collaboration, legislators can increase the probability that a bill is passed into law (Barnes, 2016).
Analyzing cosponsorship activities is ideal for examining these processes of coalition
formation and the integration of women into the institution of Congress (Rouse et al., 2013).
Craig et al. (2015) contend that cosponsoring legislation is an effective means for minority
groups (racial and gender) in Congress to build coalitions, establish long-term influential
relationships, and enjoy legislative success. To achieve this success, members of Congress must
rely on others in their group as well as the entire legislative body. However, prior research
indicates that minority groups, despite high cosponsor activity levels, are at a significant
disadvantage compared to majority groups in building support for their agendas and advancing
their measures to becoming law (Craig et al., 2015). If minority members draw support
predominantly from colleagues of the same race, ethnicity, or gender, their small group size
might not be able to counteract majority group preferences. Past studies have demonstrated this
effect and the resulting obstruction of minority group legislation, policy interests, and
advancement to leadership and other influential positions in the legislative body (Bratton, 2006;
Kathlene, 1995; Thomas, 1994; Dodson and Carroll, 1991). These barriers are imposed by a
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dominant group. In the U.S. Congress, that group is the established white male legislators in both
chambers. The result for female legislators is that they are marginalized and are less influential in
the policymaking process. To overcome their marginalized status, female legislators are
motivated to collaborate, both with other female legislators and with male legislators (Barnes,
2016). Collaboration manifests itself through women developing professional networks and
working relationships with other female legislators (Barnes, 2016). Often, these relationships are
based on sponsorship and cosponsorship activities.
To mitigate the effects of barriers placed by the dominant group, some researchers argue
that increasing the number of female legislators in Congress to achieve critical mass will not
only achieve descriptive representation but substantive representation as well. Critical mass
theorists such as Kanter (1977) contend that individuals are not able to express their true
preferences until a critical mass of their group is achieved. Since this early research, there have
been mixed findings of the effects of increasing numbers of women in legislative settings in the
United States and throughout the world (Mendelberg, et al., 2015; Paxton, et al., 2007).
Researchers and activists contend that a membership range of 15 percent to 30 percent is the
threshold required for women to make substantive policy impacts in legislative bodies (Paxton,
et al., 2007). However, Bratton (2005) found that in U.S. state legislatures women were more
successful in floor votes when they constituted a smaller percentage of the legislative body. Not
only have female legislators struggled to influence policy decisions as their numbers increase,
but they also face increasing backlash from their male counterparts who represent the majority
groups in their respective settings (Barnes, 2016; Mendelberg, et al., 2015).
When female legislators can express their policy preferences, they often do so through
the sponsorship and cosponsorship mechanisms. Cosponsorship allows members to support bills
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that more accurately reflect their true policy preferences, in contrast to the circumscribed choices
that are offered in a floor vote (Swers, 2005). Not only does cosponsorship act as a means for
women to collaborate and build coalitions to overcome dominant group obstacles and
marginalization, but it is also becoming a more effective mechanism for women to increase
substantive representation of females in the United States, particularly with respect to femaleoriented public policy issues (Swers, 2005). In her analysis of the 103rd and 104th Congresses,
Swers (2005, 2002) found that female legislators support and advocate for legislation whose
content is primarily focused on issues largely specific to women (e.g., reproductive rights, wage
equality, domestic violence prevention) at far greater rates than do male legislators. This finding
has been supported by other scholars as well (see Barnello and Bratton, 2007; Reingold, 2000).
Standing in institutional positions is influential in the policymaking process and a
necessary ingredient for legislative success. The usual positions of power in the U.S. Congress
are committee chair seats and party leadership posts, with committee position yielding the most
influence with respect to passing legislation (Cox and Terry, 2008; Swers, 2002). Cosponsorship
activity among women tends to increase when female legislators are members of the majority
party and achieve seats on powerful committees within their respective chambers. For example,
in the Republican-controlled 104th Congress, moderate Republican women used their majority
status to pursue legislation regarding children, family, and general health care (Swers, 2005).
The relationship between members' committee positions and their cosponsorship agendas
suggests that the inclusion of more women on relevant committees could expand the openness of
the congressional agenda to proposals concerning various social welfare issues (Swers, 2005).
However, the barriers to accessing power positions are still present (Barnes, 2016). Prior
research suggests that expanding the representation of women in strategic positions of power
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should then enable women to provide influence over policy decisions and increase substantive
representation within the formal governmental agenda (Barnes, 2016; Swers, 2005).

Principles of Social Network Analysis
Social network analysis emerged as a methodological technique in the 1930s to help
explain the concept of social structure within the social anthropology field (Scott, 2013). Since
that time, an increasing number of researchers in a variety of fields, most notably sociology, have
employed network analysis to formally study the complexities of social relationships and their
antecedents and consequences. According to Prell (2012), social network analysis “involves
theoretical concepts, methods, and analytical techniques to uncover...social relations [of]
individuals and groups, the structure of those relations, and how relations and their structures
influence (or are influenced by) social behavior, attitudes, beliefs and knowledge” (p. 1). As
network analysis became more prominent, network theories and methodologies have been
formalized, its underpinnings becoming more technical, and its perspective has become
transdisciplinary as it is being applied in a wide range of social science research. Despite its
prevalence in the social sciences, the domain of political science has only recently embraced
network analysis as a method of inquiry, with it gaining prominence in the early 2000’s. The
original resistance in political science may stem from initial concerns to combine relational data
and non-relational data in the same model because relational data contain observations that are
usually not independent of each other and the data typically are scale-free.4 Ward, et al. (2011)
contend that the combination of the emergence of networking technologies and the rapid growth
in the availability of relational data “has shattered the myth upon which a lot of empirical

4

For purposes of this discussion, non-relational data are characterized as observations or cases that have fixed
characteristics or attributes, such as gender and race, or observations measured by structured scales such as
income and age.
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investigations in political science were predicated; namely, that individuals don't affect other
individuals who are being studied” (p. 247). Political scientists realized how powerful network
analysis can be when fortified with empirical data that demonstrates the presence (or absence) of
connections between actors or nodes and that these connections have measurable and significant
effects (Ward, et al., 2011).
Network theory conceptualizes the mechanisms and processes that interact with network
structures to yield certain outcomes for individuals and groups (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011).
Network analysis is a comprehensive, paradigmatic way of taking social structure seriously by
studying directly how patterns of ties allocate resources in a social system (Wellman, 1998).
Within a network paradigm, structural relations are more important for explaining and predicting
observed behavior than are non-relational data. These structural relation explanations contrast
sharply with more traditional approaches such as those in political science that emphasize static
concepts (attributes) such as gender, race, or political party affiliation (Knoke and Yang, 2008).
As network analysis, as theory and as a methodological technique, becomes more prominent
across social science fields, researchers are discovering that its dynamic perspective
complements, rather than conflicts with, traditional approaches that emphasize non-relational
attributes and independence among observations to explain complex phenomena.
The basic portrayal of a network is a set of nodes linked by a set of ties. Nodes represent
an entity of study, usually actors or agents, representing individuals or collectivities, such as
organizations (Borgatti, et al., 2013). Ties are the links between pairs of nodes and can represent
many types of things including, but not limited to, resource flows, information flows, or simply a
friendship connection. Ties are directed or undirected and operationalized as a social connection
or relationship. The entire representation of the nodes and interconnecting ties is referred to as a
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network. The pattern of ties within a network generates a structure with nodes occupying
positions within the structure; explaining the connection between the structure and network
consequences lies at the heart of network theory (Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). These ties
represent bonds that can align and coordinate action among nodes or groups of nodes, often with
greater capability than a single node or group of nodes within the entire network (Borgatti and
Halgin, 2011). Besides direct access, these ties can give nodes indirect access to others in the
network. Thus, both direct and indirect ties are used by members within the network (social
system) to search and find resources (Wellman, 1988). Because of these characteristics, ties can
yield rich information about social structure antecedents and consequences.

Social Network Analysis and Legislative Behavior
According to Bonacich (1987), status can be a function of the status of those to whom
one is connected. In network terms, this characteristic is described by “centrality” measures
indicating which situations yield an increase in power through association with powerful others
within the network, and conversely, which situations yield an increase in power through
association with less powerful others within the network. In a legislative network, where
bargaining is omnipresent, it can be advantageous for powerful legislators to be connected to
those who are less powerful because bargaining costs are minimal; that is, the less powerful are
reliant on the powerful and thus are more likely to agree with the interests and requests of the
powerful. For minority groups in Congress, including females, connections to more central
(powerful) actors allow for greater access to resources, such as influence and information, that
these less powerful actors would otherwise not be able to achieve on their own or within their
own-group ties.
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There are numerous ways to measure the connections between legislators, but not all of
them are practical. Direct observation, legislator interviews, and legislator surveys could yield
robust data on legislator relationship patterns and consequences; yet these measurement
techniques would be very time-consuming and costly to implement and are not without their
research design challenges (e.g., response bias, survey responses could vary over time, etc.).
Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect to gain access to many legislators to conduct such
activities and ensure sufficient data for the analysis. Due to these obstacles, researchers use
cosponsorship activity as a proxy measure for legislator connections and relationships given that
the activity has elements of both strategic and interpersonal influences (Kirkland and Gross,
2014). Members are tied or connected to each other in social network terms if they cosponsor a
bill sponsored by another member, or if two or more members cosponsor the same bill.
Examining cosponsor ties provides rich information about patterns of communication
(particularly intra-legislative signaling), coalition-building, and the processes by which
legislators attain leadership positions (Burkett, 1997; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996). In addition,
cosponsorship activity as manifestations of relational bonds between legislators offers interesting
insights into the access to, and use of, power within legislative networks. Another benefit of
using cosponsorship activity to study relational patterns in Congress is that there is
unprecedented access to legislative archives containing this information. These resources provide
scholars with the opportunity to compile a wealth of cosponsorship data and construct a wide
variety of network measures at both the macro and micro levels and across many points in time
(Kirkland and Gross, 2014).
Over the past twenty years, there has been active research applying social network
analysis to legislative behavior and sponsorship/cosponsorship activity within legislative
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networks. The cumulative findings from these research efforts are that cosponsorship ties
demonstrate communication, support, and collaboration links between legislators. Furthermore,
social relations matter in legislative networks; that is, they directly affect cosponsorship activity
levels and, more importantly, influence roll-call voting in legislative chambers, even after
controlling for legislator attributes (Peoples, 2008). By examining dyadic pairs of legislators,
Peoples (2008) found that the social relation aspects of tenure similarity (seniority) and
committee overlap among legislators were strong and significant attributes to how they voted in
chamber floor votes. Seniority in the Senate is also believed to be strongly associated with the
level of cosponsorship activity levels but has an inverse effect; cosponsorship activity by longertenured legislators decreases compared to more junior members (Burkett, 1997). In network
terminology, Burkett’s (1997) hypothesis that years of Senate service would be positively
correlated with centrality and prestige in the cosponsorship network was not supported in any of
the legislative terms she analyzed. This finding is unsurprising given that long-serving senators
likely exert their influence through other means (e.g., party leadership positions or high-ranking
committee assignments) and have established reputations, i.e., they do not rely as much on
cosponsoring acts to establish their reputations as much as junior senators do.
Within a social network framework, the presence of weak relational ties between
legislators, operationalized through cosponsorship connections, actually increases the likelihood
of legislative success, whereas strong ties do not correlate with success after controlling for
partisanship, seniority, and institutional position (Kirkland, 2011). In this context, weak
legislative ties are defined as intentional attempts to generate support for a measure between
dissimilar legislators; these ties yield new avenues of influence and thus support can be created
(Kirkland, 2011). Thus, diversity within the cosponsorship network, as in most networks,
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appears to promote success (here, legislative success). Kirkland’s analysis examines eight
different state legislatures from one year (2007) and applies a second analysis to seven U.S.
Congressional terms (limited to the House of Representatives only), thereby providing more
generalizable results than most of the prior research at the time.
Fowler (2006a, 2006b), and Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) embarked on the most
comprehensive analyses of the relationships between legislators measured by cosponsorship
activity to determine the impacts of these relational ties on legislative accomplishments. These
studies showed that the cosponsorship stage of the legislative process, viewed through the lens of
social network analysis, has considerable implications for legislative success. Fowler (2006b), in
an analysis of all pieces of legislation of both chambers of Congress from 1973 through 2004,
showed that, when a bill approaches a majority number of cosponsors in each respective
chamber, the marginal effect of adding the next cosponsor on the probability of passage
increases exponentially. However, once a bill achieves majority cosponsorship support, the
marginal effect of additional cosponsorship support on bill passage diminishes rapidly (Fowler,
2006b).
Using a novel centrality-based network metric measuring how connected legislators are
to each other through the frequency of their cosponsorship acts (“connectedness”), Fowler
(2006a, 2006b) demonstrated that more highly connected legislators experience higher success
rates when it comes to passing their own amendments on a chamber floor, after controlling for
legislator party and ideology. Fowler (2006a, 2006b) found that the connectedness measure
outperformed other measures of network centrality in predicting the number of successful
amendments proposed by each legislator. Continuing with the same approach and dataset, Tam
Cho and Fowler (2010) demonstrated that ‘small-world’ legislative networks in the House of
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Representatives consisting of densely connected legislators via cosponsorships are more likely to
produce landmark legislation than less-dense networks of legislators.5 While denser, stronger ties
were typically found within the majority party of the Senate, regardless of party affiliation,
highly-clustered small world networks were not influential in the Senate, likely due to the
inherent small size of the Senate and its different institutional structure as compared to the House
(Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010; Burkett, 1997).
Legislators are strategic, goal-oriented actors motivated by three main goals: (1)
increased institutional prestige, (2) reelection, and (3) good public policy (Fenno, 1973).
Legislators are also social beings pursuing these goals within a social construction (a legislature)
comprised of interdependent relationships (Peoples, 2008; Fowler, 2006a; Fowler, 2006b;
Caldeira, Clark, and Patterson, 1993). These characteristics lead to the question of how might
strategic, goal-oriented legislators make use of the relational environment (that is, the network)
they operate within to pursue these goals? Prior research on relationships in legislatures
demonstrates that a link exists between legislative relationships and legislative outcomes
(Kirkland, 2011; Tam Cho and Fowler 2010; Peoples, 2008). Craig et al. (2015) contend that
cosponsoring legislation is, in many cases, an effective means for minority groups (here, female
legislators) in Congress to achieve their goals, form coalitions, establish long-term influential
relationships, and enhance their rates of legislative success. The existing scholarship on
legislative cosponsorship suggests that the act of cosponsoring a bill is a key factor leading to the
success of a bill. Measured as a relational act, cosponsoring a bill shows support and
collaboration between legislators.

5

According to Tam Cho and Fowler (2010), small-world networks are characterized by average path lengths that
are smaller than what would be found in a random graph of the same size of network. The average path lengths in
a small-world network are so short that most nodes in the network can be reached in a relatively small amount of
steps, resulting in highly clustered groups of nodes (Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010).
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Gender, Network Analysis, and Legislative Behavior
Despite the interest and efficacy of studying cosponsorship activity in a social network
framework, there is sparse research at the intersection of cosponsorship activity and genderbased network attributes of the U.S. Congress. Much of the previously cited research relies on
full Congress or chamber network representations. Only a handful of researchers have
disaggregated congressional or chamber-based data into group-level networks such as female
and male legislative networks measured through cosponsorship ties. Clark and Caro (2013)
performed an analysis of gendered cosponsorship networks within the Arizona state legislature
that found that gender is the primary influence that shapes legislative collaboration on femaleoriented public policies.
Demographic minority groups tend to be more active cosponsors as they try to support
intra-group interests and overcome marginalization by the dominant group—in this case, white
males (Craig, et al., 2015). As a minority group in Congress, female legislators collaborate with
their colleagues on a more frequent basis (with males as well as with other minority groups),
particularly through cosponsorship activity, whether cosponsoring another female member’s bill
or a male legislator’s bill (Barnes, 2016; Craig, et al., 2015; Swers, 2005). In social network
terms, the active cosponsoring by females indicates that female legislators give and receive more
relational ties with the inference being that they have more connected networks than their male
counterparts.
The scholarship in this domain suggests that better-connected legislators achieve more
legislative success than less-connected legislators. Yet despite these measures indicating
successful networks, female legislators still do not enjoy the same levels of legislative
accomplishment as male legislators. This outcome could partly be explained by the findings that
female legislators sponsor more female-oriented legislative acts, which have generally been less
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viable for passage. However, females cosponsor more bills than their male counterparts do and
they out-produce them in the number of sponsored bills that span a broad spectrum of policy
issues, not just those focused on women’s issues (Atkinson and Windett, 2019; Volden, et al.,
2016; Anzia and Berry, 2011; Swers, 2002).
Another consideration to help explain the lack of comparative legislative success is the
party affiliation of female legislators. Are congresswomen less successful when they are not in
the majority party? It is common knowledge that the party in power in Congress is usually more
influential in the policy process, through the control of what bills will be considered in
committee and by the active coordination of floor votes. However, for female-sponsored
legislation, prior research suggests it is not a minority party issue that determines its fate.
Volden, et al. (2016; 2013) find that women in the minority party are more effective lawmakers
than their male minority-party counterparts while female members of the majority party fare no
better than their majority-party male counterparts in terms of legislative effectiveness. However,
when the proposed legislation focuses on women’s issues, only two percent of those bills
become law and those that are sponsored by women themselves have a paltry one-percent
passage rate (Volden, et al., 2016).
I contend that a major reason that female legislators in the U.S. Congress are less
successful at achieving legislative success is because of the prejudicial attitudes perpetuated by
the institution’s dominant group: its male members. This prejudice is not only evident in
Congress, but in most institutional and organizational settings throughout the United States. In a
network-based management analysis, Brass (1985) found that women are not well-integrated into
male-dominant coalitions particularly when men are in the strong majority, a membership profile
like that of Congress. Another analysis of gender-based networks demonstrated that men develop
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more, and stronger, homophilous ties across multitudes of networks than women, an
environment that leads women to form more heterophilous ties to secure access and influence
within organizations (Ibarra, 1992).6 Phelan and Rudman (2010) assert that women in
organizational settings are caught in a double bind between their gender and leadership that
poses a significant barrier to gender equality in all workplace settings. When attempting to
overcome this dilemma, women must convey their ambition and ability to lead by demonstrating
agency; however, when doing so they face prejudicial backlash, a cause and effect that men do
not experience (Phelan and Rudman, 2010).
Volden et al. (2016) found that bias against female legislators in the U.S. House of
Representatives manifests itself in the committee process. The authors find that, of the bills
sponsored by women from 1973 through 2014, only 7.7 percent receive attention in committee
compared to 11.5 percent for male legislative sponsors, and women’s issue proposals suffer even
greater reduction (Volden et al., 2016). Similarly, studies of women elected officials find that
they tend to experience discrimination in the legislature, especially when it comes to seeking
leadership positions (Craig, et al., 2015). These findings have important implications for female
legislative success in the House because committee action is more influential than floor action on
final bill decisions (O’Connor, et al., 2004). In the Senate, the influence of floor action on
legislative success is commensurate with the influence of committee action (O’Conner, et al.,
2004). Given these institutional differences, female senators may enjoy more success than female
representatives.

6

The terms ‘homophilous’ and ‘heterophilous’ are frequently used in the social network literature. In the context
of this research, homophily refers to the tendency of legislators to more frequently associate with other legislators
who share similar characteristics, such as gender, ethnicity, or party affiliation. A heterophilous tie, in this context,
would be a demonstrated relationship between non-similar legislators, such as a male legislator frequently
cosponsoring a female legislator’s bills.
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Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) find that there is considerable homophily in political
discussion networks, with men demonstrating much higher levels of segregation than women.
This segregation manifests itself in many ways in legislative institutions and networks, thus
affecting gender-based voice and authority. Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) claim that in
majority-rule legislative institutions where women are in the small minority, female legislators
experience a negative balance of interruptions when speaking. This experience leads to women
losing their influence, both in their own eyes and in others, particularly in majority-rule
legislative environments where majorities have no short-term need to consider minority opinions
(Karpowitz and Mendelberg, 2014). At the state level, Kathlene (1994) found that female state
legislators encounter more hostile speech patterns than do men. These prejudicial responses have
a significant deleterious effect in that they obstruct the ability of females to access power
positions in Congress, regardless of past legislative productivity (as noted above, these positions
exert influence in legislative accomplishment). The relationship between committee positions
and cosponsorship agendas suggests that the inclusion of more women on influential committees
(influential to policy passage) could expand the openness of the congressional agenda on
women-sponsored bills and policy outcomes (Swers, 2005). As noted earlier, this feature may be
particularly relevant to female House members given the strong control of the Speaker of the
House to affect committee assignments, agenda setting, and bill action (O’Connor, et al., 2004).
The resulting policy outcomes are of critical importance to affecting female substantive
representation in the United States.

Literature Review Summary
Prior scholarship has shown that the act of cosponsoring has significance within the
policy process. Not only does the act supply low-cost opportunities for legislators to signal their
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support for policy positions to their constituents and to their legislative colleagues, but the act
can also influence the progress of legislation from agenda setting through policy adoption.
In addition, prior scholarship has shown that female legislators cosponsor more often
than their male counterparts. They are more active because they are more collaborative in the
legislative process than are men. They use the act to elevate their status in Congress, overcome
their marginalization as a minority group, and advance their interests, whether those interests are
broad across all groups or focused on women’s issues. Viewing a cosponsorship tie as a
relational act, female legislators, by being more active cosponsors, form more clustered,
collaborative networks and these characteristics supply rich perspectives of legislative behavior.
Prior scholarship in this area has demonstrated that denser networks with high centrality
measures, such as Fowler’s (2006a,b) connectedness measure, portend positive outcomes, in this
case, successful legislative floor votes.
Yet, there is a curious lack of sub-congressional chamber analysis focusing on genderbased cosponsorship networks, their network attributes, and implications for successful outcomes
across many legislative terms, particularly current legislative terms as female membership of
Congress has currently surpassed the twenty-five (25) percent mark. Could it be that this
percentage is not meaningful enough; in other words, have we not reached the necessary criticalmass threshold? Regardless of the reasons for the paucity of research in this area, it is worth
examining, particularly within the past thirty years where female membership in Congress has
risen dramatically compared to the prior thirty years (roughly ten percent membership in 1992 to
the twenty-five percent in the current 117th Congress). Given this rise, are there trends that
would suggest that female legislative effectiveness is on the rise? This analysis will help to
answer these questions and fill a current gap in the scholarship in this domain.
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodologies
The basic premise of the prior scholarship on legislative behavior and social network
analysis is that legislative productivity and effectiveness are related not only to the institutional
rules and norms of Congress and the attributes of its legislators but also to the social dynamics of
those legislators within congressional chambers (Kirkland and Gross, 2014; Tam Cho and
Fowler, 2010). In hopes of contributing knowledge to this scholarship, my contention is that
female legislators in the U.S. Congress, despite better congressional network dynamics than their
male counterparts (e.g., higher centrality metrics, greater network clustering, and active
collaboration with the male dominant group), are less successful with their sponsored legislation
passing chamber floor votes compared to male legislators. This outcome implies that the
prejudicial attitudes perpetuated by the institution’s male legislators mute the effects of these
strong female legislator network dynamics. A complementary purpose of this analysis is to
expose any trends in female legislative behavior and effectiveness rates that may have occurred
from 1991 through 2016 as more females joined the ranks of Congress during this period.

Research Hypotheses
To study these issues, this analysis examines the relationship between gender-specific
sponsorship and cosponsorship acts, social network metrics, legislator attributes, and legislative
success for female- and male-sponsored legislation across multiple terms of each chamber of
Congress. Because this research is aimed at legislative cosponsorship activity and legislators’
consequential networks, and the success rate of legislation sponsored by female legislators, the
following hypotheses are formulated:
Hypothesis 1: Female legislators within both chambers of the United States Congress
exhibit greater rates of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity (on average) on binding,
force-of-law congressional measures than their male counterparts.
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Hypothesis 2: Female legislators within both chambers of the United States Congress
exhibit greater network centrality, cohesion, and “connectedness”7 values (on average) on
binding, force-of-law congressional measures than their male counterparts.
Hypothesis 3: Despite sponsoring and cosponsoring at greater rates and forming better
networks as measured, female legislators are less successful in passing their binding,
force-of-law measures in both chambers of the United States Congress than their male
counterparts, controlling for other variables.
Based on prior scholarship and my initial analyses in this area, I expect to find that
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 will be validated in both chambers of Congress. Yet, despite the
implications for success attributed to greater legislative activity and more collaborative,
connected legislative networks, I expect that the results of the analysis will support my inference
(through the validation of Hypothesis 3) that women are less successful, in both chambers, at
getting their bills passed during floor action due to sexist norms and actions perpetuated by the
male dominant groups in both chambers of Congress. There are three prongs of prior scholarship
that are referenced in this paper from which I base this claim: one, past empirical findings
demonstrate that legislators who are more active in sponsoring and cosponsoring are generally
more successful in achieving sufficient floor votes to pass their bills; two, past empirical findings
demonstrate that legislators who form better networks (as previously defined) are generally more
successful in achieving sufficient floor votes to pass their bills; and three, past empirical findings
demonstrate that females in organizational settings typically face obstacles presented by male
dominant groups designed to suppress female voice and authority within those organizations.
One caveat to be considered in this analysis is the different institutional characteristics
between the House and Senate and the influence this difference may have on the results. While I

7

See Fowler (2006a,b)
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hypothesize that females in both chambers enjoyed less legislative success than men during the
study period, I anticipate that the magnitude of the differences between gender groups may be
greater in the House than in the Senate. There are numerous differences between the two
chambers that form the basis of my proposition. One, unlike the House, the Senate has a long
tradition of strong bonds formed among all members largely due to the chamber’s intimate size
and greater term lengths than those enjoyed by House members (Barnes, 2016; Uslaner and
Zittel, 2011). These characteristics encourage senators to have a good relationship with each
other and work together across party lines rather than constantly considering re-election
opportunities every two years (Uslaner and Zittel, 2011). Second, the House and Senate have
different procedural rules and ways of conducting business (O’Connor, et al., 2004). The House,
with over four times the membership body of the Senate, has strict rules on how much time a
member has for floor debate; and furthermore, not every representative has the opportunity to
influence legislation whereas senators enjoy more floor debate time and can influence legislation
when they want (O’Connor, et al., 2004). Related to this point, the House elects a Speaker who
exerts a tremendous amount of control over the chamber’s operations, including agenda setting,
committee assignments, and the legislative adoption process (O’Connor, et al., 2004). The
Senate has no such position, with majority and minority party leaders often working across party
lines to influence legislative productivity. Finally, according to O’Connor, et al. (2004), it has
become more difficult to adopt legislation in the Senate due to a substantial increase in the
chamber’s workload during the 1990s and 2000s. Based on the prior scholarship that states that
members of the Senate are more collegial and have stronger working relationships than those
found in the House, I anticipate that the difficulties in passing legislation in the Senate may
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affect both gender groups. Whether this effect equally impacts women and men is something that
could be considered in future studies.

Research Design
Theories and scholarship in the fields of legislative behavior and cosponsorship activity,
gender and legislative behavior, and legislative networks and social network analysis inform the
formation for the hypotheses proposed here and the research design and methods to be utilized.
The proposed research method approach for this study is explanatory and solely quantitative; that
is, using archival data and employing empirical analyses through deductive reasoning. The study
will be an observational comparative one where the results of the analysis will be used to
compare the characteristics and performance measures of female and male legislators and their
cosponsorship networks. The scholarship in this domain has utilized similar methods for
collecting and analyzing data.
Quantitative, Qualitative, or Mixed Methods Approach?

Does a study of relational data implore the use of qualitative methods? Such methods do
help to explain phenomena through perceptions of personal experience and are frequently
utilized in studies of structural and network analysis (Stake, 2010). These perceptions and
experiences typically yield rich information about the relationships formed in Congress and their
influence on sponsorship and cosponsorship activity as well as on the policy process itself.
Given the benefits of qualitative methods and the complementary benefits of quantitative
approaches, it seems to be a logical conclusion to incorporate both methods in a mixed approach.
Where qualitative studies of legislative social networks would illuminate the relationships
between cases (legislators), quantitative studies of networks would simultaneously help
researchers understand the relationships between variables, including relational data such as
social network measures. In addition, a mixed methods approach may help mitigate potential
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omitted variable bias, particularly information related to 1) legislator personal experiences and
perspectives on the value of cosponsoring legislation thus informing the question of how
influential is the activity during the policy cycle, 2) the experiences of female legislators in
seeking successful floor votes for their legislation, and 3) the obstacles that female legislators
face as a minority group in Congress and the effect of those obstacles in legislative activity,
relationship-building, and personal advancement within their respective chambers.
Given the listed benefits of using both approaches, why is a qualitative analysis not
included in this study? As for all studies at the intersection of legislative network analysis and
cosponsorship activity, qualitative analyses suffer from three limitations: time, access, and bias.
In general, qualitative studies take more time to conduct than those that employ secondary data,
particularly during their data collection and management phases. Finding and collecting
relational information and data from legislators, when they are spread across the country or in
session in Washington, D.C., would be a monumental undertaking. There simply would not be
enough time to gather relevant data from a sufficient sample of legislators for purposes of this
study. Despite time being an obstacle, the biggest obstacle to the data-gathering process for this
type of study is gaining access to the legislators themselves. Given the stature and responsibility
of a member of Congress and the enormous demands placed on their time, it would be
impossible to interview enough legislators personally or by phone. In addition, given their
demands and responsibilities, a survey approach would likely yield little to no result. Finally,
biases are not limited solely to quantitative methods; qualitative studies also can suffer from
biases that can degrade a study’s external and internal validity. Assessing social contact among
legislators through qualitative mechanisms may enhance measurement validity, yet may suffer
biases due to potential misreporting, cognitive constraints, and politically motivated strategic
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considerations (Kirkland and Gross, 2014). Furthermore, for reasons listed in this section, lack of
sufficient time and access to interview or survey legislators would not yield a sufficient sample
size thus jeopardizing the generalization of findings to Congress in its entirety.
For this study, like many in the social sciences, internal validity is of great concern when
testing theory (Campbell and Stanley, 1963). However, external validity is of equal concern and
importance in applied social science research. To reduce threats to external validity, the design of
this study will incorporate a large sampling of the cosponsorship activity of all legislators in the
U.S. Congress with respect to binding, force-of-law legislation over multiple terms of Congress.
Working with large sample data enhances generalizability and helps to diminish the distinction
between internal and external validity (Gerring, 2012). Furthermore, larger samples reduce the
variance of model estimators thus promoting more confident inferences. To help mitigate
internal validity threats in this study, the research design and methods utilized include the
examination of the same variables of interest across multiple time periods (102nd through 114th
Congresses), incorporation of a “control” group (in this case, male members of Congress are the
control group, or comparison group), and model diagnostic testing. The following chapter
describes these techniques in greater detail.
Network Constructions

The three primary elements of network research design are social settings, relational form
and content, and level of data analysis (Knoke and Yang, 2008). To ensure proper data
measurement and analysis, this study’s network research design assesses these elements to
answer the research question, test the stated hypotheses, and guide the accompanying analyses.
The social setting for this research effort is straightforward: legislators of both chambers of the
United States Congress over multiple legislative terms. While the entire legislative body of
Congress during this time-period will be studied in this analysis, it is a relatively small setting in
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comparison to many network analysis designs. The setting characteristics of this design are
advantageous to the study because the boundaries are well-defined, the population scope is
identifiable and relatively static during the study period (generally, 100 U.S. Senators and 435
U.S. Representatives per legislative term), and cosponsorship data from each legislative term are
easily accessible and relatively error-free.8
For this analysis, relational form and content are also relatively straightforward and
stable. Cosponsorship acts are well-established proxies for relational ties in network literature
examining legislative influence, productivity, and outcomes (e.g., Kirkland and Gross, 2014;
Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010; Fowler, 2006a,b). For measuring valued ties in this study,
cosponsorship acts are enumerated to demonstrate frequency of relations between two pairs of
legislators and in some case intensity of relations if the number of ties in a particular dyadic
relationship is remarkable compared to others within a legislative term. Relational content
attempts to capture the meanings of a relational tie from a researcher’s perspective (Knoke and
Yang, 2008). This is a construct validity assessment to ensure that what we are measuring as
network analysts is appropriately represented by the tie.
According to Knoke and Yang (2008), there are seven primary relational elements in
network analysis. Of these seven, instrumental relations involve actors who contact one another
to obtain a resource for the benefit of one or both actors. In this case, cosponsorship ties
represent instrumental relations between legislators who contact each other to obtain support for
a measure and possibly to trade support at some later time. Presumably, and based on prior

8

The author notes that some errors in legislator characteristics were found in the archival data used for this
analysis. This is expected when managing large datasets. Every attempt has been made to correct those errors;
however, it is likely that some errors remain. These remaining errors, if any, are likely few in number and can be
attributed to random noise in the data.
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literature, this support often manifests itself in binding vote actions. This relational tie is the only
one studied. Consequently, this research design considers a single-layer network.9
In network studies, there are typically four levels of analysis: node, dyad, small group
(triads and cliques, for example) and whole network (Borgatti et al., 2013; Knoke and Yang,
2008). The first three levels can be characterized as micro-level units of analysis while the whole
network approach is generally considered to be a macro-level one. Network studies often focus
on one level but can describe two or more levels independently of each other if the research
questions warrant this approach. Network studies do not try to deduce knowledge from one level
to another because the structural relationships and related emergent phenomena between levels
of analysis are separate and distinct (Knoke and Yang, 2008). In this research effort, the level of
analysis is conducted at the node level (the legislator). Each node’s network outcome will be
aggregated to generalize findings about female legislators (not the group or whole network) in
comparison to male legislators. This approach is like that of Tam Cho and Fowler (2010), who
aggregate individual-level data to each chamber of Congress. Their aggregation approach likely
loses some rich information about the influence of social components on legislative
accomplishment whereas my analysis further disaggregates to the gender-based group level to
elicit information related to the effect of a legislator’s gender on legislative success, within a
social network context.
Furthermore, this analysis not only examines differences in female and male members of
Congress but also conducts the node-level analyses longitudinally (1991-2016) and at discrete
time intervals vis-à-vis two-year legislative terms. Per Kirkland and Gross (2014),
disaggregation into time intervals can yield additional information regarding legislative

9

If multiple ties or relational layers were considered in the analysis, it would involve the design of multiplex
networks.
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chambers and individual and group-level response to exogenous stimuli that higher-level
aggregation may otherwise obscure. Another benefit of this approach is that measurement of
multiple time intervals helps address threats to interval validity. By examining all legislative
terms in one interval and specific legislative terms as separate intervals, structural and other
changes in cosponsorship relations and their impact on legislative success over the course of the
twenty-six-year study period can be detected.
Variables

There are two types of variables in this study: network-based and attribute-based. The
variables are constructed and reported at the individual (also called the enterprise) level; that is,
the level of the legislator.10 Network-related variables are dynamic measurements of the
characteristics of legislator relationships measured on a continuous scale. Network variables are
based on relational data operationalized through each cosponsorship tie. This study will treat and
report these variables as raw values rather than in normalized form for the following reasons:
one, I believe that the use of raw values, compared to the use of normalized values, more
effectively demonstrates the strength or intensity of relationships between actors in a network;
and two, network analysis often reports normalized measures on scales outside the boundaries of
-1 and 1 due to the multi-relational nature of network data. This characteristic makes it more
difficult to interpret the coefficients of network variables in traditional statistical models.
Network variables are mutable and can change from one legislative term to another
depending on the frequency of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity by each legislator, while
the included legislator attribute variables are less dynamic. Legislator attribute variables relate to
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In some legislative network studies, such as Burkett (1999), individual legislators are identified as ‘enterprises’.
The term refers to a legislator’s office, including staff, but for network analysis purposes, the enterprise is
considered at the individual or node level of analysis.
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the individual characteristics of each legislator, such as gender, party affiliation, and legislative
committee membership. Some of these variables, such as majority party status, can change over
time but these changes occur less frequently across legislative terms than do network-based
measures. These network and legislator attribute variables have been identified and analyzed in
the scholarship of the field to some degree; yet this study uniquely combines most of them in
various time intervals and based on gender differences.
The dependent variable in this analysis is a binary response one; that is, for each
legislative proposal (binding proposals only), either the proposal passed a chamber floor vote, or
it failed on the floor. Legislative accomplishment in Congress can mean different things to
different scholars of congressional legislative behavior. For example, Volden and Wiseman
(2014) maintained comprehensive datasets that measure each legislator’s effectiveness in terms
of legislative productivity and accomplishment. According to the researchers, these datasets
incorporate fifteen indicators that collectively capture the proven ability of a legislator to
advance their agenda items through the legislative process and into law (Volden and Wiseman,
2014). The indicators represent different stages of the bill consideration process, not just floor
votes, as well as certain attributes of each legislator. Fowler (2006a,b) considered any piece of
legislation that passed a chamber floor vote as a legislative accomplishment, if the legislation
contained at least one cosponsor signature. Like Fowler (2006a,b), my analysis solely considers
whether a measure passed a chamber floor vote and disregards prior stages of the bill
consideration process or policy cycle because of my fundamental concern for the policy
implications of each bill on some segment or all segments of American society. Passing
committee or sub-committee hurdles, for example, has few if any policy implications for the
American public.
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The leading question after considering this approach to the dependent variable is what
constitutes a significant piece of legislation? A precise definition is likely impossible, but several
scholars have attempted to categorize and operationalize legislative accomplishment. Mayhew
(1991) defines important legislation as that which is “both innovative and consequential—or if
viewed from the time of passage, thought likely to be consequential” (p 37). According to
Mayhew (1991), the arbiters to make these judgments are contemporary journalists who
specialize in end-of-session congressional reviews and policy specialists who craft related
historical analyses of prior congressional policy. In their analysis of cosponsorship and
legislative success, Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) utilized the Mayhew definition to derive their
dependent variable. Volden and Wiseman (2014) categorize bills as being either
commemorative, substantive, or substantive and significant. In their coding system, a bill is
deemed substantive or substantive and significant if it was the subject of write-up in the
Congressional Quarterly Almanac. Like Mayhew, Clinton and Lapinski (2006) define significant
legislation as a statute or constitutional amendment that has been identified as noteworthy by a
reputable chronicler-rater of the congressional session.
This study’s definition of legislative success is situated between those of Mayhew (1991)
and Fowler (2006a,b). The focal points of this study are the hypothesized differences in
legislative success between male and female legislators and the policy implications of the
hypothesized gender disparity in legislative effectiveness consequently affecting female
substantive representation in the United States. Therefore, this analysis solely considers two
types of legislative proposals within each chamber of Congress, bills and joint resolutions,
because these forms of legislative business are the only ones that are binding and carry the force
of law within U.S. public policy development (Govinfo, 2021; Dove, 1997). The other types of

38

legislative proposals are concurrent resolutions and simple resolutions. These types of
congressional bills are largely operations-based, in that they make or amend rules for both
chambers (concurrent resolution) or to one chamber only (simple resolution) or are used to
express the sentiments of a chamber; in both cases, these legislative proposals are not binding
(Govinfo, 2021).
Bills are either public or private. Public bills have elements that affect the general public
and private bills contain elements that affect individuals and organizations (Govinfo, 2021).
While private bills may affect a certain individual (most deal with immigration and residency
requests), congressional rules prohibit private bills from including cosponsors, a main
operational element of the relational network and legislative behavior framework of this study
(Govinfo, 2021). Therefore, only public bills, rather than private bills, are considered in this
analysis. The data sources described later in this paper clearly identify each type of legislative
proposal, including information on public and private bills, so that I could select only those
legislative proposals that are binding. Table 1 provides a listing of each type of legislative
proposal as presented in the data sources, the formal coding for each type used by both
chambers, and an example proposal name. This type of coding system was an invaluable
resource for properly identifying which legislative proposals would be included in this analysis.
For descriptive efficiency, I refer to public bills and joint resolutions as ‘bills’ or as ‘legislative
proposals’ and as ‘significant’ throughout the rest of this paper.
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Table 1. Legislative Proposal Coding System
Proposal Type

Congressional Coding

Bills

H.R. - House Bill
S. - Senate Bill

Purpose
A binding legislative proposal.
Public bills affect the general public.
Private bills affect individuals or
organizations.
A binding legislative proposal that
requires approval of both
chambers. Joint resolutions are
typically used for limited matters,
such as single appropriations for a
specific purpose or for a
constitutional amendment.

Joint Resolutions

H.J. Res. - House Joint Resolution
S.J. Res. - Senate Joint Resolution

Concurrent Resolutions

A non-binding legislative proposal
that requires approval of both
chambers but does not require the
signature of the President.
Concurrent resolutions are typically
H. Con. Res. - House Concurrent Resolution
used to make or amend rules that
S. Con. Res. - Senate Concurrent Resolution
apply to both chambers or to
express a sentiment of both
chambers, such as congratulating a
country, an organization, or an
individual.

Simple Resolutions

H. Res. - House Simple Resolution
S. Res. - Senate Simple Resolution

A non-binding legislative proposal
that requires approval solely from
the chamber the proposal was
introduced in and does not require
the signature of the President.
Simple resolutions are typically
used to make or amend rules that
apply to the chamber the proposal
was introduced in or to express a
sentiment of the chamber.

Source: Govinfo website; http://govinfo.gov.

Independent Variables (Network-based)

The sponsorship and cosponsorship activities of each legislator provide information
regarding levels of legislator support, collaboration, agenda setting, influence, and prominence in
a legislative body. In social network terms, each cosponsorship act is a directed tie from a
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cosponsoring legislator to a sponsoring legislator. In this study, two legislators are linked, or
have formed a relational tie (also known as an edge), if one has cosponsored another’s bill, even
if the cosponsorship act happened only once during the legislative term between these two
legislators. While the aggregation of these ties forms a cosponsorship network, the individual ties
are useful to study the relationships between legislators and their potential effect on legislative
productivity and success. At a minimum, the cosponsorship act itself demonstrates the
cosponsoring legislator’s explicit support for the sponsor, the bill, or both (Kirkland and Gross,
2014).
From these relational ties, many social network metrics can be calculated and have been
utilized in causal inference studies. The most common of these measures are degree centrality,
eigenvector centrality, average path length, and clustering coefficient.11 In addition, Fowler
(2006a,b) developed a unique centrality measure called ‘connectedness’ which provides
information as to the frequency and numbers of cosponsorships between legislators. Fowler
(2006a,b) found that the measure helps explain legislative influence and legislator roll call votes.
Harward and Moffett (2010) utilized this connectedness measure in their study of major bills in
the Senate from 1975 through 2000 and also found the measure helped to explain legislative
effectiveness within their research design.
Of these previously employed measures, this study includes degree centrality, clustering
coefficient, and connectedness, while omitting average path length and eigenvector centrality.
Average path length has been applied in legislative network studies that focus on network size
and related implications, which are not the focus of this study. Several legislative network
studies such as Kirkland and Gross (2014) and Fowler (2006a) use eigenvector centrality;
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In addition to the explanations in this section, brief definitions of these measures and those used in this study
can be found in the Glossary section.
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however, its use is inappropriate for this study as explained later in this section. Two network
measures unique to this field of study that are employed in this analysis are Bonacich power
centrality (“beta centrality”), a special form of eigenvector centrality, and E-I index, which
measures group embedding based on the number of ties within and between groups (Hanneman
and Riddle, 2004). A final general note on these selected variables is that several of the measures
can be analyzed and displayed in their raw form or can be normalized for comparative purposes.
Later sections of this paper will describe where this process occurs in the analysis.
Degree Centrality

Various positions in a structural network can be advantageous or disadvantageous to
nodes or actors within the network (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). An advantageous position in a
network translates to more opportunities and fewer constraints for an actor within the network
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). This favorable position for the actor can yield greater network
influence, power, and prestige (Borgatti, et al., 2013; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). One way to
measure the advantage or disadvantage of an actor’s network location is to consider the number
of degrees, or direct ties, the focal actor has to other actors in the network. Figure 1 illustrates
that Actor 1 has five direct ties in the network; in network terminology, Actor 1 has degree five,
whereas Actor 2 has degree two because it has two direct ties in the network, those to Actors 1
and 3. In a cosponsorship network focusing on one bill, the sponsor will be the focal actor and if
there are cosponsors, the only ties present in the network are from each cosponsor to the sponsor.
Therefore, as demonstrated in Figure 2, Sponsor has degree five, and the Cosponsors each have
degree one.
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Figure 1. Network Illustration of Actor Degrees

Figure 2. Cosponsorship Network Illustration of Actor (Legislator) Degrees
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In general network terminology, degree centrality measures an actor’s position in the
network by considering the number of other actors this focal actor is tied to or connected to
directly (Smith, et al., 2014). Actors that have high degree centrality are well-connected to other
actors within the network (Scott, 2013). This feature is particularly important in legislative
networks as a high degree centrality value compared to others in the network often indicates that
the legislator (actor) is well-connected to other legislators which could improve access to
resources the legislator needs or could allow for the legislator to supply to other legislators in the
network. Consequently, the legislator with high-degree centrality can also constrain those
resources (Smith, et al., 2014). For example, a well-connected legislator could withhold
information, support, or others’ support for a particular legislative proposal which could be more
detrimental to the success of the proposal compared to a less-connected legislator (lower level of
degree centrality) who might try to withhold information or support. Thus, we can expect that an
actor with high degree centrality in a legislative network wields significant power. In
cosponsorship networks, a legislator with a high degree centrality value, by way of receiving a
large number of cosponsorship ties (known as in-degrees) or by giving a lot of cosponsorship ties
(known as out-degrees) possesses a great deal of influence or power within the network. For the
sponsoring legislator, a high degree centrality value signifies that the legislator, or the sponsored
bill (or both), is receiving a great deal of support (or perhaps the bill itself garnered the support
early in the policy cycle). In either case, the cosponsorship act, operationalized in network terms
as a degree, has significant meaning within the framework of this study.
With directed data, it is appropriate to separate the degree centrality measure into indegree centrality and out-degree centrality (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). As the names imply,
in-degree centrality is a measure of the number of ties an actor receives and out-degree centrality
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measures the number of ties an actor gives.12 Because this study focuses on ties (cosponsorships)
received, the in-degree centrality measure will be employed; that is, the number of
cosponsorships a sponsoring legislator receives on its bill from other legislators. This distinction
is important for studies of legislative networks, as legislators who receive many ties are not only
located in favorable structural positions in the network for resource access purposes but
receiving many ties can also indicate a legislator’s network prestige as other legislators seek to
form ties with this prominent legislator (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). This analysis reports the
raw values of in-degree centrality to demonstrate the wide range of intensity levels in this
relational measure. The formula for the raw scale in-degree centrality is:
𝑛

C1(i) = ∑

(𝑥𝑗𝑖 )

(1)

𝑗=1

where C is the raw centrality score, xji is the value of the tie from actor j (the cosponsor in this
case) to actor (sponsor) i (a value of either 0 or 1) and n represents the number of actors in the
network.
Bonacich (Beta) Centrality (in lieu of Eigenvector Centrality)

Degree centrality is based on the premise that all actors (nodes) and ties are equal. While
degree centrality provides valuable information related to general actor access to resources and
immediate contacts within a network, the importance of an actor can fluctuate based on the
relative strength and importance of the connections (immediate and peripheral) of those nodes
that the focal actor is connected to. Eigenvector centrality, as developed by Bonacich (1972),
expands on degree centrality by accounting for the “sum of an actor’s connections to other
actors, weighted by their (the other actors’) degree centrality” (Prell, 2012, p. 101). A higher
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In Figure 2, the Sponsor has a raw in-degree value of 5 while the Cosponsors have a 0 in-degree value. Likewise,
the Cosponsors in this network diagram each have an out-degree value of 1 while the Sponsor has a 0 out-degree
value.
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eigenvector centrality metric connotes greater access to (and possibly more reliance on) other
connections within a network through the adjacency of an actor to other high degree-centrality
actors. For a legislative network, access to well-connected congressmembers may enhance the
chances of legislative success. Yet, despite the use of the eigenvector centrality measure in prior
legislative network research (most notably, Fowler 2006a,b), its use in this study is
inappropriate. A significant limitation of eigenvector centrality is that it cannot adequately
measure values for directed, asymmetric data (Borgatti, et al., 2013; Hanneman and Riddle,
2005). The data matrices utilized for this study are asymmetrical due to the use of directed,
valued cosponsorship data. For example, in a situation where legislator A cosponsors five of
legislator B’s bills and legislator B cosponsors two of legislator A’s bills, symmetry in the data is
not present. Symmetry in the cosponsorship network data would be present if a cosponsorship tie
between two legislators was valued as ‘1’ regardless of the direction of the cosponsorship act
(legislator A → legislator B; legislator A  legislator B) and regardless of the number of ties
between the legislators. In other words, two legislators would be linked, in a symmetrical, nondirectional manner, if just one in the pair of legislators cosponsored the other’s sole bill during a
legislative term. Furthermore, given the cosponsorship framework approach established for this
analysis, where a relational tie is operationalized as a single act of cosponsorship for each bill,
the application of the eigenvector method would assign a zero value to all cosponsors of a single
bill since each one does not receive a cosponsorship in return, either from the sponsor or from
any other legislator. But assigning a zero value to each cosponsor in this case would imply that
no legislator has influence in this network; an implication without support from the prior
scholarship.
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A suitable alternative to eigenvector centrality in studies that incorporate directed,
asymmetrical data used for this analysis is Bonacich power (or beta) centrality (Bonacich, 1987).
A key feature of beta centrality, particularly for legislative networks, is that the presence of
peripheral (rather than immediate) actors in the network can enhance or reduce the power
centrality measure to better reflect the true power influence of a network actor (cosponsoring
legislator). Unlike eigenvector centrality, beta centrality accounts for well- and less-connected
peripheral actors in a systematic way (the measure values or devalues their network influence
accordingly). Within this systematic approach, the network researcher is afforded the flexibility
to choose the value of ‘beta’ or β to appropriately reflect the researcher’s conception of how each
tie, direct or indirect, matters within the network (Borgatti, et al., 2013; Prell, 2012). The value
chosen can be positive or negative. Positive relations or ties are not based on zero-sum
exchanges; that is, a newly-established relation or tie does not result in another actor’s loss
within the network (Prell, 2012). In many types of networks, such as communications and
influence networks, exchanged information is usually received from others; in this case, the
network would be considered positive and the researcher would design the beta-centrality
approach with a positive β (Bonacich, 1987). Furthermore, according to Prell (2012), positive
relations in influence networks, such as legislative and cosponsorship networks, are ones where
actors receive more power as they become connected with other highly influential actors.13
This structural pattern, I argue, is like a cosponsorship network where cosponsorships are
always received from other legislators (a positive system). It is true that cosponsorships can be
withdrawn, but as the prior scholarship demonstrates, reneging a cosponsorship (a potential
negative) can be detrimental to a legislator’s future relationships. Furthermore, as it has been
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In network structures where relations are considered to be negative, power rests on a zero-sum basis and actors
gain power and influence by connecting to the less-powerful actors within the network (Prell, 2012).
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referenced in this paper, minority groups in legislatures are constantly seeking connections to
other influential and well-connected legislators to further their interests and to help overcome
their marginalized status. This behavior is indicative of the inherent characteristics of positive
beta centrality. Therefore, based on Bonacich’s (1987) portrayal, this study utilizes a positive β
which allows for interpretation of legislators high in beta centrality as those tied to others who
have high degree centrality and consequently have access to influence through their powerful
(that is, well-connected) peripheral connections.
The formula for beta centrality is:
𝑛

Cβ(i) = ∑
𝑗=1

𝐴𝑖,𝑗 (𝛼 + 𝛽𝐶𝛽 (𝑗))

(3)

where Cβ(i) is the derived power centrality score for actor i, α is a parameter to normalize the
measure (the beta centrality score), β is the value selected by the researcher to reflect the amount
of dependence of actor i’s centrality on the centralities of the network actors to whom actor i is
directly tied, and 𝐴𝑖,𝑗 is the adjacency matrix using raw value data to better describe the wide
range of intensity levels of this relational tie measure.14
Clustering Coefficient

The clustering coefficient metric reveals the level of transitivity in a network relationship
(Borgatti, et al., 2013). In a legislative network, if legislator A and legislator B have a
cosponsoring relationship, and legislator B and legislator C also have a relationship, it may be
likely that legislator A and legislator C also have a cosponsoring relationship, thus forming a
triad of the actors. The clustering coefficient metric reflects this relationship, representing the
average fraction of a legislator’s number of cosponsors who are also cosponsors with one another

14

The normalization parameter (α) is automatically selected by the UCINet software so that the square root of the
sum of squares of the vertex (actor) centralities is the size of the network (Borgatti, et al., 2002; Bonacich, 1987).

48

(Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010). Higher clustering coefficients are indicators that a network is more
stable and balanced than a network with lower proportions of transitivity (Tam Cho and Fowler,
2010). The scale for the clustering coefficient metric is continuous; a higher clustering
coefficient indicates a more clustered network of legislators who have sponsored and
cosponsored with each other. Consequently, higher clustering coefficient values imply high
cooperation and support levels within a network (Scott, 2013). The formula for the clustering
coefficient measure is:
Ci =

2𝐿𝑖

(4)

𝑘𝑖 (𝑘𝑖 −1)

where Ci is the derived clustering coefficient for actor i, ki is the degree of actor i, and 𝐿𝑖 is the
number of ties between the ki neighbors of actor i. For example, using the same graph from
Figure 3, the clustering coefficient value for Actor 1 in the figure below (Figure 3) is 0.20
[(2*2)/5(5-1)] while the clustering coefficient values for Actor 2 and Actor 6 are 1.00 and 0.00,
respectively.
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Figure 3. Network Illustration of Clustering Coefficient Measures

In network research, higher clustering coefficient metrics between actors often lead to the
formation of dense local neighborhoods within a macro network structure or what are known in
the social network literature as ‘small-world’ networks (Borgatti, et al., 2013; Scott, 2013; Tam
Cho and Fowler, 2010; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). To test whether a network is a small world
one is to compare the clustering coefficient of the observed network to the clustering coefficient
of a random graph (Borgatti, et al., 2013). If the observed network clustering coefficient is large
relative to a random graph, there is evidence that the observed network is a small world one
(Borgatti, et al., 2013). In their study of congressional cosponsorship networks, Tam Cho and
Fowler (2010) found that small-world networks, measured by clustering coefficient metrics, are
more effective at passing major legislation in Congress than less clustered networks. While
Borgatti, et al. (2013) argue that the consequences of small-world networks are not well
understood, in legislative and cosponsorship networks, higher clustering coefficients, and
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consequently denser small-world networks, indicate the presence of active cosponsorship
transitivity in Congress (Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010).15 I hypothesize that female legislators will
demonstrate higher clustering coefficient values than their male counterparts, yet this outcome
may not translate to legislative success due to prejudicial barriers faced by female legislators and
the institutional rule framework of Congress as noted in previous sections of this paper.
Connectedness

The connectedness measure combines the number of cosponsors on each bill and the
frequency of cosponsorship between any pair of legislators during a legislative term, whereas
other legislative network measures consider only the number of cosponsors (Fowler, 2006a,b).
Legislators who frequently cosponsor bills sponsored by the same legislator demonstrate a
stronger relationship than those who rarely, or never, cosponsor (Fowler, 2006a,b). Through an
examination of all types of legislation available to the House and the Senate, binding,
ceremonial, and procedures-based, Fowler (2006a,b) found that the connectedness measure
outperformed other traditional social network centrality measures (degree, closeness,
betweenness, and eigenvector) in predicting legislator roll call vote choices on the House and
Senate floors.
The connectedness network measure is not limited to sponsoring many bills; it also
matters who one convinces to sign on to the legislation. Connectedness scores enable researchers
to make stronger inferences about the social distance between legislators, and ultimately their
level of influence within the congressional network (Fowler, 2006a,b). When employed in

15

In the context of cosponsorship networks, Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) state that the clustering coefficient metric
measures the average fraction of a legislator’s cosponsors who are also cosponsors with one another. Higher
clustering coefficient values in a network illuminate the presence of fully linked triads of legislators, where
legislators a and b cosponsor each other, legislators b and c cosponsor each other, then a and c cosponsor each
other (Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010).
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several bivariate and multivariate regression models, using cosponsorship data on all bills
considered by Congress from 1973 through 2004, the connectedness measure was significant in
its influence on a member’s floor vote for an amendment and a member’s chamber roll call
votes, after controlling for ideology and partisanship (Fowler, 2006a,b). In other words,
legislators are more likely to vote for final passage of bills that are sponsored by those legislators
with high connectedness scores, despite ideological leanings or party membership (Fowler,
2006a,b). Because of these strong characteristics, the connectedness score of each legislator in
this analysis is an important variable to consider. Despite its significance, the connectedness
measure in this analysis will be limited to the 102nd through 108th Congresses (1991-2004)
because Fowler stopped publishing his connectedness data as of 2004.16
E-I Index

By examining the ties between categories or groups of actors, such as by gender, the
network researcher can determine when network actors are forming homophilous ties with those
that are like themselves, or with those that are outside of their similarity preferences or group
characteristics. The E-I index, developed by Krackhardt and Stern (1998), measures the
tendencies of actors to embed themselves in macro-structures and the propensity of each
individual to have ties within their group as well as external to dissimilar groups (Hanneman and
Riddle, 2005). The E-I index is only concerned with connections to measure group closure (or
openness); thus, directions of ties are ignored. The formula for the calculation of the E-I index is:

16

While Fowler’s research provides the formula for calculating the connectedness measure, it does not fully
explicate how the components of the formula are derived. Thus, it would be challenging and time-consuming to
derive connectedness measures for the legislative terms included in this analysis after 2004. The author
acknowledges this study limitation; however, it is a minor one. Connectedness is a control variable in this analysis;
appropriate to include because of its relationship to network theory but not a central variable of interest in this
study.
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EI =

𝑏−𝑎

(6)

𝑏+𝑎

where E-I is the derived homophily value of the individual actor or group, and a and b are the
number of ties to actors in each a group and each b group.
The E-I index provides an inverse measure of homophily; that is, it controls for the
relative sizes of each group where large differences in group sizes can distort the measures of
homophily (Borgatti, et al., 2013). This feature is important for this analysis as the proportion of
male legislators in Congress is much higher than the proportion of females. For this analysis, I
use the E-I Index to determine the number of female legislator ties within their own group as
well as to the number of ties to male legislators. I anticipate that male legislators will be more
likely to have within-group ties due to their dominant group status but this effect likely
diminishes as more females are elected to both chambers of Congress. Likewise, I expect that
female legislators, as the minority gender group, will form more out-group ties compared to male
legislators to solicit as much support for their bills they can obtain and to overcome their
marginalized status in Congress as discussed earlier in this paper. However, I expect that as more
females are elected to Congress, the trend will shift as more ties are made within group.
Independent Variables (Legislator attribute-based)

The non-network variables associated with each legislator in this analysis are gender,
party affiliation, majority party status, seniority, and power position held. These attribute-based
variables are selected based on their demonstrated significance in prior research of legislative
behavior and legislative networks. Based on this study’s research question and hypotheses,
gender of each legislative proposal’s sponsor is the primary variable of interest with the other
variables serving as control variables; however, there is discussion related to other significant
variables within the context of prior scholarship. Congressional approval ratings for each
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congressional term will not be included in the model; however, these ratings will be analyzed
graphically to preliminarily determine if there are any trends between approval ratings and both
legislative activity and network structures as suggested by Kirkland and Gross (2014). Detailed
explanations of each variable, the measurement of each variable, and the reasoning supporting
their inclusion are presented in the following sections.
Gender

Gender of each legislative proposal’s sponsor is a categorical attribute and the primary
variable of interest in this study. Within a social network analysis framework, gender is placed
within the concept of homophily. Based on the literature review of legislative behavior and
social network analysis, similarities between actors have been demonstrated as influential
components underpinning the development of social connections in Congress; particularly
relationships formed through the cosponsorship mechanism. While gender identification and the
related public policy implications are burgeoning as significant issues in American society, this
study will rely on the traditional social constructs of gender (identified at birth) to identify
members of Congress: female and male. This categorical variable will be measured on a nominal
scale with “1” representing a female sponsor and “0” representing a male sponsor.17
Party Affiliation

Much of the prior scholarship in legislative behavior and cosponsorship activity uses
legislator party affiliation as a control variable due to its demonstrated significant relationship to
legislative activity and effectiveness (see Harward and Moffett, 2010; Garand and Burke, 2006;
Anderson et al., 2003; Burkett, 1999; Krehbiel, 1995; Schiller, 1995; Campbell, 1982). In some
of these past studies as well as others, legislator ideology was employed as a variable of interest

17

For cosponsorship network analyses, “1” and “0” will also represent female and male cosponsors, respectively.
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or control variable due to its demonstrated influence on roll-call voting (e.g., Poole and
Rosenthal, 1991; Schneider, 1979). For this analysis, I exclude ideology for several
methodological and demonstrated reasons. First, many ideology indices are constructed on prior
roll call voting records that have traditionally followed party lines (Lewis, et al., 2020; Jackson
and Kingdon, 1992). Second, the current definition of legislator ideology relies on left-right
categories that generally follow the current two-party (major party) affiliation framework in the
U.S. Congress (Lewis, et al., 2020; Peoples, 2008).18 Finally, prior research has demonstrated
that party usually emerges as the strongest legislative vote determinant, with or without ideology
measures (Peoples, 2008; Schiller, 1995; Weisberg, 1978).
The party affiliation categories for this analysis are Democrat and Republican. For the
Senate, registered Independent legislators are considered as Democrats as all registered
Independents in the Senate caucused as Democrats during the period of this analysis (Senate.gov,
2020). For the House, registered Independent legislators are considered as Democrats due to
their voting records and sponsorship activity on legislation that had Democratic party-leaning
content during the period of this analysis (Library of Congress, 2020). This categorical variable
is measured on a nominal scale with “1” representing a legislator with a Democratic party
affiliation and “0” representing a legislator with a Republican party affiliation.
Majority Party Membership

Related to party affiliation as an independent variable in this analysis is legislator
membership in the majority party. It seems obvious that the political party in charge of each
chamber, by virtue of its majority membership, has the upper hand in agenda setting and the

18

This characteristic may not explicitly hold in southern U.S. states where many registered Democrats have
traditionally demonstrated a conservative voting record. However, the partisan lineage of conservative Democrats
in the ‘Old South’ has been waning. Recent trends (1980s through the present time) indicate that more southern
conservative voters are registering as Republicans than as Democrats (Valentino and Sears, 2005).
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passing of legislation through its chamber. The scholarship in this domain has supported this
notion empirically. Jeydel and Taylor (2003) found that legislative effectiveness in the House of
Representatives is a function of membership in the majority party. Looking at solely one term of
Congress (103rd), Anderson, et al. (2003) found majority party status as a significant predictor of
legislative success within each chamber. Cox and Terry (2008), in their study of legislative
success in both chambers of Congress (93rd through 105th Congresses), found that majority party
membership is a highly significant predictor of which legislators would find success in having
their bills passed through chamber roll call votes. The authors argue that rank-and-file majority
party members obtain party leadership support for their legislative initiatives in exchange for
their floor and caucus votes on other pieces of legislation sponsored by the majority part (Cox
and Terry, 2008). This categorical variable is measured on a nominal scale with “1” representing
a legislator in the majority party of its respective chamber and “0” representing a legislator in the
minority party of its respective chamber. Because of the two-party system in the United States,
there may not be enough variation between party membership and majority membership which
could lead to high levels of correlation between the two variables. Therefore, tests of collinearity
for these two variables, as well as other model variables, are conducted in this analysis.
Power Position

The power position attribute variable relates to certain party and committee leadership
positions in each chamber considered by prior research to be influential in the agenda-setting
process as well as floor vote success in each chamber (Volden, et al., 2013; Cox and Terry, 2008;
Anderson, et al., 2003; Jeydel and Taylor, 2003). The question then becomes which leadership
positions are the most influential to the policy process, particularly which ones have the most
impact on the policy cycle and on successful floor votes. Cox and Terry (2008) find that majority
party leaders are more successful at passing legislation than minority party leaders largely due to
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access to more legislative resources (staff and parliamentary rights). Certain congressional
committees have a tremendous amount of influence on which bills are heard and passed through
committee before they reach a floor vote. For example, Volden et al. (2013) find that the most
powerful House committees are Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means because they
institute the funding and processes necessary for legislation to be successful both in the floor
vote stage and when signed into law. In the Senate, the power committees are Appropriations,
Finance, and Budget because these committees have the final say on the necessary funding to
implement legislative policies and related programs (Volden, et al., 2013). Leadership positions
in these committees are the chair and ranking member positions; committee chairs are chosen for
this analysis because they control all items under consideration by their respective committees
(Berry and Fowler, 2016) and ranking members assist chairs in committee regulation and lead on
matters affecting a committee’s minority membership (Congressional Research Service, 2009).
For this analysis, Senate party leadership positions include Majority Leader, Majority
Whip, Chief Deputy Whip, Conference Chair, Conference Vice Chair, Senatorial Committee
Chair, Policy Committee Chair, Minority Leader, Chief Deputy Minority Whip, Caucus Chair,
and Steering and Outreach Chair. For the House, party leadership positions include Speaker,
Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Majority Chief Deputy Whip, Senior Deputy Whip,
Conference Chair, Policy Committee Chair, Minority Leader, Minority Whip, Chief Deputy
Minority Whip, Caucus Chair, and Steering and Policy Committee Chair.
Standing committee chair and ranking member positions for the following standing
committees are included: House Rules, House Appropriations, House Ways and Means, Senate
Appropriations, Senate Finance, and Senate Budget. Standing committees are permanent panels
that have legislative jurisdiction within their respective congressional chamber (Heitshusen,
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2017). Select, special, and joint committees are not considered in this analysis because these
bodies conduct ‘housekeeping’ duties or are established for a unique and specialized purpose and
are ephemeral (Senate.gov, 2020). This power position control variable is measured on a nominal
scale with “1” representing a legislator occupying any of the above listed power positions and
“0” representing a legislator not occupying any of the listed power positions.
Seniority

The seniority variable is operationalized as the number of 2-year congressional legislative
terms each legislator has served in Congress during the study period. While U.S. Senators serve
6-year terms, congressional legislative terms are always measured in two-year increments. Thus,
a Senator serving a full term serves in three successive legislative terms in Congress. A legislator
serving a partial term is considered in this analysis as having served a full term. This control
variable will be measured on a continuous (count data) scale with “1” representing one 2-year
term (or partial 2-year term) served by a legislator, with “2” representing two 2-year legislative
terms served by a legislator, and so on.
Congressional Approval Ratings

Including congressional approval ratings by each legislative term in this analysis, as
provided by Gallup/Newsweek Congress and the Public Poll (2020), comports with prior
findings by Kirkland and Gross (2014). Their research showed that, as congressional approval
declines, legislators tend to collaborate and support each other at greater rates (Kirkland and
Gross, 2014). This finding was derived using the clustering coefficient network measure which is
also included in this analysis. Kirkland and Gross (2014) found that, when popular opinion of
Congress declines, legislator-to-legislator conflict wanes, leading to a breakdown of small,
restricted cosponsorship clusters. Consequently, legislators expand outside of otherwise stable
clustered networks resulting in declining partisanship among legislators. In these environments,
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legislators tend to work more cooperatively together, including reaching across the aisle to
conduct legislative business.
The Gallup/Newsweek Poll (2020) measures the American public’s approval rating of the
U.S. Congress. The monthly poll asks Americans who are likely voters in national elections to
assess the job that Congress is doing (Gallup/Newsweek Poll, 2020). Approval and disapproval
ratings, measured in percentage terms, are reported on the Gallup Poll’s website (2020) from
1974 through the current legislative term. Because Kirkland and Gross (2014) used only the
approval ratings in their analysis, this study will also employ only the congressional approval
ratings. The ratings will not be included in the regression models used in this analysis because
this study does not characterize Congress as a whole network as did Kirkland and Gross (2014).
Instead, this analysis will employ graphical representations of the comparison of congressional
approval ratings and gender group social network metrics by each legislative term in each
chamber. The purpose of this analysis is to determine if there are any similarities or differences
in the trend in ratings (if any) over time and the trends (if any) in mean network metrics by
gender group within each chamber.
Interaction Terms

The use of interaction terms is common in political science as well as other social
sciences as researchers attempt to understand the influence that two or more variables have on a
particular phenomenon when those variables are interacted (Berry, et al., 2010). However, the
literature directly relevant to this analysis rarely considers interactions between independent
variables of interest. One reason may be that independent variable interaction in a model
increases the likelihood of multicollinearity within the model. The presence of collinear
independent variables would then suggest dropping one of the affected independent variables.
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Another compelling reason for exclusion of product terms relates to the difficulty in the
interpretation of the interaction term outputs in a logistic regression model, which is the model
choice for this analysis. The computation and interpretation of the interaction effects are more
complicated in non-linear models than in their linear counterparts. According to Berry, et al.
(2010), Norton, et al. (2004), and Ai and Norton (2003), the coefficient of an interaction term in
non-linear models cannot be evaluated the same way as in linear models for several reasons.
First, the sign of the coefficient of the interacted term in a non-linear model may not represent
the sign of the interaction effect due to the potential for different signs associated with different
values of covariates (Allison, 2021; Berry, et al., 2010; Ai and Norton, 2003). Second, we know
that magnitude of effect of a product term and the magnitude of effect of the uninteracted
variables in non-linear models are conditional on a model’s other independent variables (Ai and
Norton, 2003; Norton, et al., 2004). However, the marginal effect of a change in both of the
model’s interacted variables is not the same as the marginal effect of changing the interacted
term (Norton, et al., 2004). Third, the interaction effect’s statistical significance cannot be tested
using simple t-tests and the significance cannot be determined from the reported z-statistic (Ai
and Norton, 2003; Norton, et al., 2004).
Due to the difficulty in calculating the correct marginal effects (and standard errors) of a
change in two interacted variables in logit analysis, applied researchers have either
misinterpreted the coefficient of the interaction term or have omitted interaction terms in their
models (Norton, et al., 2004; Ai and Norton, 2003).19 To address these interpretation challenges,
Norton, et al., (2004) developed a command in Stata (‘inteff’) that correctly computes the

19

Ai and Norton (2003) reviewed 13 economics journals from 1980 through 1999 searching for articles that
employed interaction terms in non-linear models. They found 72 articles that met this criterion. Of these articles,
only 1 study correctly interpreted the coefficient on the interaction term.

60

interaction effect and standard errors for logit models. Unfortunately, this Stata command will
not allow for time-series operators to be included in the regression model, a limitation for this
longitudinal analysis which includes the use of such operators.
For these reasons, interaction terms are not included in this analysis; their omission is not
a significant flaw. Literature reviewed for this analysis has not made a compelling case to
include such terms. The non-network independent variables included in this study’s models are
well-tested as single variables that have demonstrated statistically significant influences on the
dependent variables in the models of relevant prior scholarship. In other words, these variables,
when treated as non-interacted variables, are significant on their own and do not depend on other
independent variables. Furthermore, to this author’s knowledge, social network variables are not
included in interaction terms.
Variables Summary

While there are likely other variables that directly or indirectly influence legislative
productivity and success, the variables proposed for this analysis are specified in prior theories
and research at the intersection of the domains of congressional legislative behavior,
cosponsorship activity, and social network analysis, thus enhancing construct validity. Variables
in this analysis are measured using routine indices or levels. Table 2 presents a summary of the
designation of all variables included in this analysis. The methods section of this chapter
describes the models used in this analysis and what variables, from the list presented in Table 2,
will be employed for each model.
Congressional Data

This analysis includes data related to congressional legislation, sponsorship and
cosponsorship activity, and congressional and legislator attribute data of the U.S. Senate and
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Table 2. Variable Measurement, Scale, and Anticipated Sign Direction

Variable

Dependent (DV) or
Independent (IV) Measurement

Bill Pass: Y/N

DV

Gender

IV

A significant bill passes or fails at
chamber floor vote
Legislator gender

Party

IV

Legislator party affiliation

Majority Party

IV

Legislator in chamber majority

Seniority

IV

Party Leader (Power)

IV

Committee Chair (Power)

IV

Congressional Approval Rating
Network: In-Degree Centrality
Network: Beta Centrality

Network: Clustering Coefficient

Network: Connectedness

Network: E-I Index

Scale
Nominal (1=Pass, 0=Fail)
Nominal (1=Female, 0=Male)
Nominal (1=Democrat,
0=Republican)
Nominal (1=Majority Party,
0=Minority Party)

Expected
Sign
Directions
N/A
N/A
+

Number of legislative terms legislator has
Continuous [1 - ∞]
served (full or partial term)
Nominal: 1=Party Leader;
Legislator is a majority party leader
0=Not a Party Leader
Nominal: 1=Committee Chair
Legislator is chair of an influential
or Ranking Member; 0=Not a
chamber committee
Committee Chair or Ranking
Member

Not used in models.
Gallup/Newsweek Poll approval rating of
Graphical analysis
Congress during a legislative term
only.
Number of in-degree ties presented as
IV
raw values
Number of ties to others who have high
IV
in-degree centrality presented as raw
values
Average fraction of a legislator’s number
IV
of cosponsors who are also cosponsors
with one another
A combination of the number of
cosponsors on each bill and the
IV
frequency of cosponsorship between any
pair of legislators during a term
Not used in models. Normalized on a scale of 0 to 1, with 1
Graphical analysis indicating highest level of ties external to
only.
own-group of legislators (female/male)

Continuous [0% - 100%]

+
+

+

N/A

Continuous [0 - ∞]

+

Continuous [0 - ∞]

+

Continuous [0 - ∞]

+

Continuous [0 - ∞]

+

Continuous [-1 to 1]

N/A

House Chambers of the 102nd Congress through the 114th Congress (1991 – 2016). The database
constructed for this analysis includes more than 100,000 pieces of legislation (public bills and
joint resolutions) introduced in Congress during the study period and all cosponsorship acts
associated with each legislative proposal. All members of the House and Senate chambers during
the study period are included in the database, whether they served full or partial legislative terms.
The volume of accessible data (data sources listed in this section) and their relatively error-free
reporting status provide a great deal of confidence that the resulting study inferences are reliable
and valid.
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There are two main reasons to include the 102nd through 114th legislative terms in the
analysis. From a quantitative perspective, the 103rd Congress experienced the crossing of a tenpercent threshold of female legislators in Congress. This Congress included fifty-four voting
female legislators, the first time that more than ten percent of a US Congress was represented by
females (Manning and Brudnick, 2020).20 As described in more detail in this section, the 103rd
Congress will be analyzed to determine if crossing the ten-percent membership mark is
statistically and substantively meaningful. The trend in current Congresses suggests that female
membership in both chambers will continue to increase (Manning and Brudnick, 2020). If this
trend continues, researchers in this area should continue to study the effects on legislative
behavior and success because of greater female descriptive representation. The second reason to
start this analysis with the 102nd Congress is a purely symbolic one. The national elections of
November 1992 were deemed by many in the media as “The Year of the Woman” (Senate.gov,
2021). This election witnessed a huge jump in the number of females elected to the House (29 in
the 102nd Congress to 47 in the 103rd Congress) and an increase in the number of female Senators
from three to seven (Manning and Brudnick, 2020). Interestingly, for the first time in the history
of the Senate, two female candidates were elected from the same state (California Senators
Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer).
Data Sources

Adler and Wilkerson (2020) and Fowler (2006a,b) are the primary data sources for the
study period.21 The source datasets are organized by legislative term, legislator identification,

20

47 females in the House of Representatives and 7 females in the Senate.
On his personal website, Fowler acknowledges that the original sources of the congressional data are
THOMAS.gov, the now-defunct Library of Congress online legislative information system and GovTrack.com’s
deprecated congressional bulk raw data files. There are likely to be some discrepancies between these data
sources and the Fowler data files due to data collection and scraping errors on the part of all sources.
21
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legislative measure, and the sponsor and cosponsors of each measure. These datasets also
indicate if a measure passed a chamber floor vote or not, which is the dependent variable of
interest. These archival cosponsorship data are structured and relational; that is, the ties between
legislators are determined by the act of cosponsorship, leaving no misinterpretation of the
relational tie itself. In a social network context, archival sources of data for studying social
networks are advantageous compared to qualitative methods because the datasets are often
longitudinal in nature which allows for the study of network dynamics and outcomes (Borgatti,
et al., 2013). Legislator relationships and outcomes are dynamic across legislative sessions for a
variety of reasons, including, but not limited to, changes in national agenda interests, party
influence, and prior legislative outputs and their resulting outcomes. Any attempts to generalize
findings regarding the formation and evolution of legislative networks over time will be
particularly difficult within a survey framework (Kirkland and Gross, 2014). A richer
comparison of relationships measured through cosponsorship activity and their emergent
outcomes over time enhances the generalizability of the study results.
The following sources for this analysis provide additional data related to the variable
development in the analysis. The following sources will be accessed:
•

Congressional Bills Project. This source provides a relational database of over 400,000
public and private bills introduced in the U.S. House and Senate since 1947. The data of
interest in this database are additional sponsorship and cosponsorship data not found in
the Fowler datasets, bill topic codes, legislator committee information, and legislator
majority/minority party status (Adler and Wilkerson, 2020).

•

PIPC Roll Call Dataset, Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma. This source
maintains voting information datasets for each term of Congress that will be utilized to
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access sponsorship, cosponsorship, and other data that is not included in the Fowler or
Congressional Bills Project datasets (Roberts, et al., 2020).
•

Voteview.com. This source allows users to view every congressional roll call vote in
American history for Senators and Representatives (Lewis, et al., 2021).

•

Congress and the Public, Gallup Poll. This source provides monthly polling data related
to congressional approval ratings for the study period (Gallup, 2020). This analysis uses
the average of the monthly ratings over the course of each legislative term.

•

Congressional Committees, Modern Standing Committees, 102nd to 114th Congresses.
This source contains membership information on all congressional committees for the
periods covered in the study. The dataset is updated periodically from the Congressional
Record (Stewart and Woon, 2020).

Data Analysis and Methods
This section presents the methods used to evaluate each of the hypotheses established in
this study. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are motivated by legislative behavior theory, social network
theory, and prior research at the intersection of legislative behavior and structural analysis. These
hypotheses are evaluated by standard social network analysis software (UCINet) and standard
statistical software for descriptive statistics (Stata). Hypothesis 3 is motivated by gender and
legislative behavior theory as well as prior research findings and are evaluated with Stata (and
use variables generated via UCINet).
The study design is an observational longitudinal analysis of the thirteen legislative
terms (102nd to 114th). The dataset for the longitudinal analysis is in the format of a pooled crosssection where each bill in each term is unique and where congressmembers can differ across
terms. There are many legislators who were members of Congress during the entire study period;
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however, many others were not present in Congress due to retirement, death, or failed re-election
efforts. Longitudinal data within a pooled cross-sectional format provides researchers the ability
to control for individual heterogeneity and to identify and measure effects that may not be
detectable in pure cross-sectional datasets (Allison, 2021; Baltagi, 2008). In this case,
longitudinal data provides for estimation of the over-time dynamics of adjustment in legislative
behavior, relationships, and success within and between legislators. The multiple observations in
the full study-period dataset allows for estimates of the variation within each legislator and the
repeated measurements provides the ability to control for time-invariant, unobservable
differences between legislators. For example, legislator relationships and legislative output may
change with a change in majority party status or a change in congressional approval ratings.
These changes and their effects can be estimated within each legislator as well as between
legislators.
Common limitations of longitudinal data methods are attrition of individuals over time,
missing data, and statistical dependence among multiple observations from the same individual
(Allison, 2021). For this analysis, missing data is not an issue as all legislator cosponsorship acts
and attribute-based characteristics are present in the datasets. The attrition in legislators is
common in longitudinal analyses of legislative behavior because legislators are elected, and
many who appear at one point in time lose their seats in the future due to failed re-election
efforts. The most concerning limitation for this analysis is statistical dependence of repeated
observations on each individual; that is, they are likely to be positively correlated thus violating
the assumption of independence. The consequences of this dependence are estimated standard
errors that tend to be too low which lead to test statistics that are too high, p-values that are too
low, and an increased likelihood of committing Type I errors (Allison, 2021).
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For the network analysis process, each legislative term dataset and the full study period
dataset are constructed as matrices where each column i and each row j represents a legislator.
Valued matrices will incorporate cell entries that contain the total number of bills that legislator i
sponsors that are cosponsored by legislator j.22 The matrix format for this analysis is considered
“directed” because the direction of each tie (the act of cosponsoring) is asymmetric and proceeds
in the same direction in each case; that is, legislator j sends the cosponsoring act (tie) to the bill
sponsor, legislator i. The UCINet software package generates the network measures utilized in
this analysis based on the data contained in each matrix for each chamber of Congress in each
legislative term.
To test Hypothesis 3, I use logistic regression models because the dependent variable is a
binary outcome (each significant bill passes or fails to pass a chamber floor vote).23 Logistic
regression is an appropriate method to test hypotheses related to legislative success because the
method provides a probability measure for assessing the likelihood of a bill passing given certain

22

The other category of matrices in social network analysis is the binary matrix. In a binary matrix, each cell
contains a 1 or a 0 to denote whether a tie between actors exists (or existed) or not, regardless of the number of
times a tie formed or a relational event occurred between the two actors. For this analysis, each cosponsorship
given by legislator A to legislator B would be counted as one tie. If legislator A cosponsored legislator B ten times in
a term, the value of the cell connecting A and B would be 10. If this analysis considered the use of a binary matrix
instead of a valued matrix, only a 1 would be inputted into the cell connecting the two legislators, regardless of the
10 cosponsorship acts from A to B.
23
Other approaches for the dependent variable in this analysis would be to use legislator “hit rates” or the
percentage of bills sponsored by a legislator that had a successful floor vote, or to use count data; that is, the
number of bills each legislator sponsored that passed a floor vote. Because this analysis measures legislative
success in terms of bills passing or not passing, a count data approach could skew the meaning of the results. For
example, Legislator A might sponsor 3 bills in a term and have all 3 pass floor votes whereas Legislator B might also
have 3 of her bills pass but she sponsored 12 bills in the term. Both members experienced success by having 3 bills
pass but Legislator B was much less successful overall during the term. For similar reasons, hit rate measures are
not used in this analysis because of these inherent weighting inaccuracies. For example, if Legislator A sponsors
only one bill and that bill passes a floor vote, she would have a hit rate of 100% whereas Legislator B may sponsor
10 bills and have 8 of those pass a floor vote, with a hit rate of 80%. Given the context of this analysis in measuring
legislative success, while Legislator A had 100% of their bills pass and may, prima facie, seem to be more
successful, Legislator B was more active in sponsoring legislation, more active in securing cosponsorship ties, and
achieved legislative success 7 times more than Legislator A. For these reasons, a binary outcome on each bill a
legislator sponsors provides a more robust measure of legislative success.
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factors. Prior scholarship in this domain has used the following models: Poisson or negative
binomial regression (NBR) because they employ count data as their dependent variable (e.g. Cox
and Terry, 2008; Fowler, 2006a,b; Anderson, et al., 2003),24 logistic or probit regression due to
the use of a binary outcome as the dependent variable (e.g. Harward and Moffett, 2010; Wilson
and Young, 1997), or linear regression with ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation (e.g. Tam
Cho and Fowler, 2010; Mayhew, 1991). Linear regression with OLS estimation is the least
common method employed largely due to the prevalent use of count data with a characteristic
excess of zeroes in the dependent variable data or with studies that use a dichotomous outcome
variable.25 Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) employ the OLS method because they were replicating
Mayhew’s (1991) analysis within their analytical context of small-world properties of Congress.
This analysis uses the binary logistic regression method, as opposed to ordinal logistic
regression or multinomial logistic regression, because the dependent variable is dichotomous;
that is, it refers to a variable that is coded as either 1 or 0 and cannot take on any value other than
these two values. Due to the use of a dichotomous dependent variable, OLS estimation would not
be appropriate because of the inherent violation of several required assumptions that would lead
to inefficient estimation. Transforming the dichotomous response variable into a logit overcomes
this inefficiency (Pampel, 2000). However, the interpretation of the regression coefficients with

24

In these studies, the Poisson regression model could not be used because the data were overdispersed; that is,
the dependent variable’s conditional variance was greater than its mean. Consequently, both standard errors and
p-values can be too low (Allison, 2012). When faced with overdispersed data, researchers can employ the
alternative model, NBR, which can accommodate overdispersion by introducing a dispersion parameter. This
approach yields smaller standard errors and p-values and can mitigate the potential validity threat that a Poisson
model would otherwise introduce in these cases (Anderson, et al., 2003).
25
The data used in this analysis demonstrates the problem of excess zeroes in the dependent variable if the unit of
analysis is the legislator and is a primary factor in avoiding a Poisson model in this analysis. In the data utilized for
this analysis, a majority of legislators did not experience a single instance of a bill passing a floor vote.
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logistic regression is less intuitive than is the case with the OLS technique26 and can lead to
spurious results if caution is not exercised. The challenging interpretation elements stem from the
fact that the dependent variable is a step-function and non-linear. A key assumption of the logit
estimation technique is the estimation of the unobservable probability of the event occurring or
not occurring and can be represented as a curvilinear form. These characteristics of logistic
regression shift coefficient interpretation from changes in the original metric of the variables, or
from changes in probabilities, to changes in logged odds (Pampel, 2000). Fortunately, the raw
coefficients, measured as log odds, can be converted (more precisely, exponentiated) to an odds
ratio metric which can then be interpreted as predicted odds of the effect of an independent
variable (as a function of other variables). The ease of interpreting the tests of significance is
enhanced by statistical software, such as Stata, by dividing the regression coefficients by their
respective standard errors and evaluating with the z distribution (Pampel, 2000).
Model Characteristics

The logistic regression models specified for this analysis are appropriate for longitudinal
datasets. For the analysis, I correct for the over-time dependence on repeated observations using
two primary methods: 1) a generalized linear model (GLM) applying the generalized estimating
equation (GEE) estimation procedure and 2) a random (mixed) effects model (ME). I apply
robust standard errors to both models as they are robust to disturbances of heteroskedasticity and
non-normality. In the ME model, the use of ‘cluster id’ command in Stata employs cluster-robust
standard errors for model robustness to additional correlation between repeated observations
over time (the GEE model is also robust to serial correlation). These standard error approaches

26

Coefficients generated by count data methods, such as Poisson or negative binomial regression, can also be
challenging to interpret but certain techniques in statistical software programs can often overcome these
difficulties similar to logistic regression.
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are recommended for large datasets similar to that of this analysis (Allison, 2021). Robust
standard errors have the additional advantage over “model-based” standard errors because,
unlike model-based standard errors, robust standard errors are not sensitive to the correlation
structure of a model (Allison, 2021).
GLMs assume independence of observations; violation of this assumption will introduce
bias and lead to incorrect inferences. In longitudinal data analyses with repeated measures,
observations within each case (here, legislator) are likely to be interdependent between time
points in the data. To account for the likely similarities within cases over time, Liang and Zeger
(1986) proposed an extension of GLM which utilizes estimating equations to produce consistent
estimates of the regression parameters and their variances. This approach is called Generalized
Estimating Equations, or GEE which is a population-level approach based on a quasi-likelihood
function (rather than a maximum likelihood or ordinary least squares estimation procedure)
providing population-averaged estimates of the parameters (Wang, 2014). By using the GEE
procedure in this analysis, I model the estimated marginal effect of independent variables on bill
passage. By using the gender-based independent variable, the GEE estimates for gender will
apply to each gender group rather than to each legislator.
The ME model estimates the model’s parameters using maximum-likelihood estimation.
Unlike GEE, it is a subject-specific, or conditional, model. ME models allow researchers the
ability to estimate different regression parameters for each subject in the data. Because the ME
model has a likelihood function, it can be subjected to goodness of fit tests such as Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), whereas GEE cannot be
subject to these tests (Allison, 2021). This is a minor limitation to this study: I cannot compare
models using common goodness of fit tests; however, the primary purpose of this analysis is to
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determine the effect of gender on legislative success, considering other variables, rather than
comparing model fit.
Another critical distinction between the GEE and ME approaches is the interpretation of
the coefficients in each model’s outputs. The ME method produces subject-specific coefficients
while the GEE method produces population-averaged coefficients. The outcome from a one-unit
change in the RE model’s regressor applies to fixed individuals within the dataset while the
outcome from a one-unit change in the GEE model’s regressor is applied across all the
individuals in the dataset. Given that a primary purpose of this analysis is to test the hypothesis
that female legislators, in the aggregate, are less successful in passing their bills than their male
counterparts, in the aggregate, I am more interested in the population-based outcomes rather than
individual-level outcomes. A further limitation of this approach, however, is that subject-specific
coefficients are typically more accurate estimates of underlying causal mechanisms (Allison,
2021; Gardiner, et al., 2009).
Despite these differences, the primary model presented and discussed in the body of this
paper is the GEE model. I chose GEE as the primary method over the ME method for several
reasons, some of which were mentioned earlier. First, the GEE approach produces populationaveraged coefficients. I am specifically interested in the average outcomes for the groups of
female legislators in Congress as opposed to individual legislator effects. The datasets used in
this analysis do not include the entire population of Congress as that would require data for every
Congress since its inception, a nearly impossible task. I refer to the word ‘population’ because
my interest is focused on female legislative groups, and, within each of the 13 terms of Congress
in this study, every female legislator is included in the analysis. Second, the GEE method can
handle a large number of clusters and is computationally faster compared to the ME approach,
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which tends to generate convergence issues in statistical software packages (Allison, 2021).
Finally, the GEE method can test for different correlation structures which is an important factor
in achieving estimation efficiency. According to Hu, et al. (2015), identifying the appropriate
model correlation structure enhances both estimation efficiency within longitudinal data analyses
and valid statistical inferences for large-size clustered data. To fit the GEE model for this
analysis with thirteen (13) time points and a large number of correlations between error terms at
different points in time, I chose an exchangeable structure where all observations over time have
the same correlation (assumes a constant time dependency). As a robustness check, I conduct the
ME model analysis and report the results in the same section as the GEE results for comparison
purposes.
I chose ME and GEE models over a fixed effects (FE) model for several reasons. First,
time-invariant variables are absorbed by the intercept in FE models whereas ME and GEE
models can include time-variant and time-invariant variables (Allison, 2021). This is a critical
aspect for this analysis as the predictor variable of interest is time-invariant (gender) while all but
one (party affiliation) of the remaining regressors are time-variant.27 Second, in ME models, the
unobserved heterogeneity across individuals in the dataset is assumed to be random and
uncorrelated with the predictor variables (Greene, 2008). An FE model will control for timeinvariant characteristics of individuals, but it will not produce coefficient estimates for the
associated time-invariant predictors (Allison, 2021). In ME models, time-invariant variables are
allowed to become predictor variables in the model; this is a critical issue for this analysis as a
central aspect of the hypotheses is that there are variations across individual legislators,

27

An argument could be made that party affiliation is time-variant as legislators have been known to switch parties
from one legislative term to the next. However, only a small handful of legislators have switched parties during the
study period which suggests that party affiliation is relatively fixed.
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particularly across female and male legislators, that have at least some influence on the
dependent variable (legislative success).
Model Specifications

The conventional cross-sectional logit model as summarized by Pampel (2000) is
specified in Equation 7 as:
𝑃

L = ln(1−𝑃) = β1 + β2X2

(7)

𝑃

where L is the logit, ln(1−𝑃) is the natural log of the probability of the outcome of interest, β1 is
the parameter for the intercept, β2 is the regressor parameter, and X2 is the regressor. For
longitudinal analyses, the conventional model would incorporate a time component for each
element on both sides of the equation. Unlike a conventional linear regression model, a
conventional logistic regression model does not contain an error term because the dependent
variable is an expected value of the outcome of interest (Allison, 2021). To facilitate
understanding of the results, the analysis output tables report the odds ratio for each variable in
the models. In general, the odds ratio describes the odds of a specified outcome occurring given a
1-unit change in a regressor. In this analysis, the odds ratio describes the odds of legislative
success occurring given a change in a regressor. Most of the regressors in this model are dummy
variables; therefore, the odds ratio describes the odds of legislative success given a regressor
changing from one state (e.g., male, and coded ‘0’) to another state (e.g., female, and coded ‘1’).
The following section presents the models in functional form used for this analysis. The
GEE logistic model is presented in Equation 8 and the ME logistic model is presented in
Equation 9 as follows:
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𝑃𝑖

Lit(BillPass) = ln(1−𝑃𝑖) f (βit, Genderit, Partyit, MajorityPartyit, Seniorityit,
PartyLeaderit, CommitteeChairit, InDegreeit, BetaCentralityit, ClusteringCoeffit,
Connectednessit, LegislativeTermit)

(8)

𝑃𝑖

Lit(BillPass) = ln(1−𝑃𝑖) f (βit, Genderit, Partyit, MajorityPartyit, Seniorityit,
PartyLeaderit, CommitteeChairit, InDegreeit, BetaCentralityit, ClusteringCoeffit,
Connectednessit, LegislativeTermit, αit)

(9)

where βit is the Intercept and αit represents all the estimated observed and
unobserved causes of the response variable that vary across legislators but do not
vary across time.
Model Formats by Congressional Chamber

Tables 3 and 4 present the models for the analyses, for the House and Senate chambers,
respectively. The analyses for each chamber include the 102nd through 108th Congresses and
102nd through 114th Congresses. The reason for the different time-periods is that the Fowler
(2006a,b) connectedness measure is only available through the 108th Congress. As described
earlier, higher connectedness scores have been demonstrated in at least two published social
network/legislative behavior literature sources as an influential measure of strong relational ties
in Congress but also as a precursor to legislative success.28

28

Omitting a potentially influencing variable such as connectedness in legislative terms 109 through 114 may
introduce omitted variable bias to the analysis of the 102nd through 114th legislative terms. This is certainly a
limitation to the analysis; however, connectedness has primarily been utilized by Fowler in his studies of
cosponsorship networks in Congress and not as widely utilized in other studies at the intersection of network
analysis and legislative behavior. Its restricted use as a meaningful variable, while deemed to be significant, is not
as harmful to the analysis as the omission of other well-tested legislative variables such as majority party status
and seniority.
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Table 3. House Chamber Models
House Chamber; Logistic Regression; Dependent
Variable: Bill Pass Y/N
102nd-108th 102nd-114th
Variables
Congresses
Congresses
All Variables

X

All Variables except
Connectedness

X

Table 4. Senate Chamber Models
Senate Chamber; Logistic Regression; Dependent
Variable: Bill Pass Y/N
102nd-108th 102nd-114th
Variables
Congresses
Congresses
All Variables
All Variables except
Connectedness

X
X

Research Design and Methodologies Summary
This chapter describes the research methods used in this study to answer the research
questions and test the stated hypotheses. This chapter includes a discussion of the research
design, the data collection process and data sources, the model variable construction, model
characteristics, and method techniques used in the analysis. Theory and prior scholarship
informed the research design, data, models, and methods employed in this analysis within a
quantitative framework. The elements of the research design and methodologies enhance the
study’s external and internal validity and strengthen confidence in the resulting inferences. The
goal of the next chapter is to present the study findings resulting from the methodologies
described in this chapter.
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Chapter 4: Analysis and Results
This section presents the results of the methods described in Chapter Three to analyze the
congressional data and to test the study hypotheses. The results are presented by social network
structures, descriptive statistics, and regression methods as related to the study hypotheses.
Patterns between each temporal model within each chamber, between regression methods used,
and between congressional chambers are examined at the appropriate sections of this chapter.
The results of the gender variable of interest are summarized at the end of the chapter.

Network Structures
Due to the large number of ties (cosponsorship acts) in each term, graphical illustrations
of the congressional social networks are visually very dense. From these dense perspectives, it
can be difficult to visualize the micro-patterns of behavior between legislators. However, by
looking at the changing patterns of the networks based solely on female cosponsorship acts over
time, a definite trend emerges. The following network representations of each chamber in the
102nd Congress and the 114th Congress (Figures 4 through 7) demonstrate the changing patterns
of female cosponsorship network representations from earlier to more current legislative terms.
The changes are largely due to the increased presence of female members of Congress over this
study period.
Figure 4 shows the female legislator cosponsorship network of ties for binding, force-oflaw bills in the House chamber during the 102nd Congress. In this figure, red (circle) nodes are
female legislators acting as cosponsors while blue (square) nodes represent both females and
males receiving cosponsorship ties (bill sponsors). Nodes not connected by ties (meaning that
females did not cosponsor these House members) are considered in network terminology as
isolates and are represented as blue nodes placed to the left of the main graph. In this graph, there
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are 29 (red) nodes (female legislators who cosponsored at least one bill during this term), 397
legislator nodes receiving at least one tie, 50 isolates, and 10,855 ties (cosponsorship acts).

Figure 4. House Chamber Female Cosponsorship Network, 102nd Congress

As female membership in the House increased since the 102nd Congress, the number of
cosponsorship ties from female legislators, in the aggregate, also increased. It is important to
note that this result does not suggest that the frequency of ties per legislator increased as will be
demonstrated in the next section. The increase in aggregate female ties results in a very dense
graphical representation of the female cosponsorship network as shown in Figure 5 (90
cosponsoring nodes, 435 legislator nodes receiving at least one tie, 11 isolates, and 25,388 ties
(cosponsorship acts). While it is difficult to derive much meaning from this illustration, the main
point of the graph comparison between the 102nd Congress and 114th Congress is to illustrate that
the female cosponsorship network becomes denser, in the aggregate, as the number of female
legislators increases, assuming the per-female legislator tie frequency does not decrease. In
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addition, the graphical representation of the 114th Congress House network shows fewer isolates
than presented in the 102nd Congress House network. As more females entered the House during
this study period, there were more opportunities for increased cosponsorship acts for femalesponsored legislation.

Figure 5. House Chamber Female Cosponsorship Network, 114th Congress

A similar pattern as that demonstrated in the House emerged in the Senate from the 102nd
Congress to the 114th Congress. Figures 6 and 7 present the female cosponsorship networks for
the Senate Chamber in the 102nd Congress and the 114th Congress, respectively. In the Senate
102nd Congress graph, there are 3 (red) nodes (female legislators who cosponsored at least one
bill during this term), 95 legislator nodes receiving at least one tie, 7 isolates, and 623 ties
(cosponsorship acts). In the Senate 114th Congress graph, there are 20 cosponsoring nodes, 100
legislator nodes receiving at least one tie, 0 isolates, and 4,689 ties. Like the House pattern, as
more females entered the Senate, the female cosponsorship network became denser. In addition,
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the 114th Congress Senate network yields no isolates, meaning that each member of the Senate
received at least one cosponsorship tie from a female Senator during this term.

Figure 6. Senate Chamber Female Cosponsorship Network, 102nd Congress
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Figure 7. Senate Chamber Female Cosponsorship Network, 114th Congress

Descriptive Statistics
Tables 5 and 6 present the descriptive statistics for the House and Senate, respectively.
These tables show the number of binding legislative proposals considered for each model time
period, the number of those proposals that passed a chamber floor action, and those that failed to
secure passage. Below the bill information is a listing of dichotomous variables categorized by
gender group and their number of observations for all terms in each study period.
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Table 5. House Chamber Descriptive Statistics – Bills and Dichotomous Variables

Variables
Total Bills
Bills Passed
Bills Failed
Dichotomous Variables
Female Sponsored Bills
Male Sponsored Bills
Female Democrat
Male Democrat
Female Republican
Male Republican
Female is Party Leader
Male is Party Leader
Female is Committee Leader
Male is Committee Leader

H102-108

H102-114

Obs

Obs

39,321
4,395
34,926

79,438
8,604
70,834

4,978
34,343
70
405
33
392
9
33
0
15

12,632
66,806
134
540
62
598
19
64
2
23

Table 6. Senate Chamber Descriptive Statistics – Bills and Dichotomous Variables

Variables
Total Bills
Bills Passed
Bills Failed
Dichotomous Variables
Female Sponsored Bills
Male Sponsored Bills
Female Democrat
Male Democrat
Female Republican
Male Republican
Female is Party Leader
Male is Party Leader
Female is Committee Leader
Male is Committee Leader

S102-108

S102-114

Obs

Obs

21,172
2,408
18,764

43,647
3,664
39,983

2,034
19,138
11
80
6
86
1
22
0
10

6,609
37,038
20
117
10
127
10
46
1
15
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Tables 7 and 8 present the descriptive statistics for the House and Senate continuous
variables, respectively. For these variables, the means, standard deviations, minimum, and
maximum values are presented.
Table 7. House Chamber Descriptive Statistics – Continuous Variables
102nd -108th Congresses
Continuous Variables
Sponsor Seniority (# of terms)
Congressional Approval
Connectedness
In-Degree
In-Beta
Clustering Coefficient
E-I Index

Mean
6.236
0.392
0.171
354.9
345291.8
0.790
-0.582

Std Dev
4.181
0.097
0.043
354.5
326078.2
0.197
0.482

Min
Max
1
27
0.25
0.55
0.00
0.276
0.00
3719.0
0.00 2118355.0
0.34
4.667
-1.00
0.927

102nd -114th Congresses
Mean
6.229
0.298
N/A
343.9
329081.1
0.815
-0.490

Std Dev
4.450
0.122
N/A
323.6
315774.8
0.196
0.488

Min
Max
1
30
0.14
0.55
N/A
N/A
0.00
3719.0
0.00 2118355.0
0.34
4.667
-1.00
1.000

Table 8. Senate Chamber Descriptive Statistics – Continuous Variables
102nd -108th Congresses
Continuous Variables
Sponsor Seniority (# of terms)
Congressional Approval
Connectedness
In-Degree
In-Beta
Clustering Coefficient
E-I Index

Mean
7.160
0.392
0.998
227.2
225548.2
1.908
-0.667

Std Dev
4.729
0.097
0.206
172.1
177979.5
0.488
0.477

Min
Max
1
24
0.25
0.55
0.00
1.613
0.00
910.0
0.00 1010154.0
0.90
3.745
-1.00
0.980

102nd -114th Congresses
Mean
6.831
0.298
N/A
234.2
232821.5
1.965
-0.518

Std Dev
4.885
0.122
N/A
161.2
172988.9
0.395
0.519

Min
Max
1
25
0.14
0.55
N/A
N/A
0.00
910.0
0.00 1010154.0
0.90
6.333
-1.00
0.980

Table 9 presents the sponsorship and cosponsorship activity categorized by gender of
legislator in the House from the 102nd Congress through the 114th Congress. The results show
that female representatives had higher mean sponsorship and cosponsorship rates than male
representatives, thus demonstrating more active legislative output and greater support and
collaboration levels within the female networks compared to the male networks in the House
during the study period. The exception to this statement is the level of sponsorship rates in the
112th Congress where male representatives sponsored at a slightly greater rate than their female
counterparts, 15.3 bills to 14.8 bills, respectively.
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Table 9. House Chamber Membership and Sponsorship and Cosponsorship Activity by Gender
Group by Term
# of Representatives
Legislative Term (Years)
102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

Female

1

29 (6.5%)
49 (11.0%)
49 (11.0%)
55 (12.2%)
58 (13.1%)
62 (13.9%)
63 (14.2%)
71 (16.0%)
79 (17.5%)
80 (17.7%)
78 (17.3%)
84 (18.8%)
90 (20.4%)

Mean Bills Sponsored
by Each Representative

2

Mean Bills Cosponsored
by Each Representative

Male

Female

Male

Female

Male

418
397
396
394
384
385
381
374
373
371
372
363
356

18.1
14.2
11.1
11.4
13.6
15.1
13.0
16.2
18.2
17.9
14.8
13.6
15.3

15.0
12.7
10.1
11.1
13.1
12.9
12.4
14.4
16.1
14.1
15.3
13.4
14.7

374.3
259.3
167.9
230.6
309.1
326.1
289.6
268.4
321.3
279.7
230.4
264.2
282.1

303.0
225.6
145.8
187.2
230.4
220.7
223.7
228.1
263.9
232.0
206.7
223.5
239.0

14.9

13.5

275.4

225.5

Mean for All Terms

1. Percentages in parentheses indicate female membership percentage in the House.
2. "Bills" includes public bills and joint resolutions. Private bills, amendments, resolutions, and concurrent resolutions
are omitted for reasons described in this paper.

Table 10 presents the sponsorship and cosponsorship activity categorized by gender of
legislator in the Senate from the 102nd Congress through the 114th Congress. Unlike the House
results, male senators sponsored at greater rates than female senators in the first three terms of
the study period (102nd Congress – 105th Congress) and cosponsored more frequently than
female senators in the 102nd and 104th Congresses. In the subsequent legislative terms, female
senators sponsored and cosponsored at greater rates than their male counterparts, thus
demonstrating more active legislative output and greater support and collaboration levels similar
to the House results.
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Table 10. Senate Chamber Membership and Sponsorship and Cosponsorship Activity by Gender
Group by Term

Using UCINet, I calculated the descriptive statistics for centrality, cohesion,
connectedness, and group-related network measures for each legislator in each legislative term
within each chamber. I used Stata to develop the aggregate functions of each measure (mean,
standard deviation, minimum, and maximum) by gender group for each term. The results of
these analyses are presented in Tables 11 through 16.
Table 11 shows the House centrality measures of in-degree centrality and in-beta
centrality. As demonstrated in the table, there are wide ranges of values and high standard
deviations for each measure by gender group within each term. These characteristics are not
surprising in social networks where relationships are constantly changing, evolving, or
devolving, particularly in legislative bodies where each election cycle may end one legislative
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career and start a new one.29 For the in-degree measure, the mean values for females were greater
than male values in each term. The overall mean for the study period for this measure was
significantly higher for the female group than for the male group. A similar pattern existed for
the in-beta measure with the exception of the 104th legislative term where the male group mean
was slightly higher, in percentage terms, than the female group mean. Like the results of the indegree centrality measure analysis, the overall mean for the female group for the in-beta
centrality measure was significantly higher for the female group than for the male group.
Table 11. House Chamber Centrality Measures by Gender Group by Term
In-Degree Centrality
Female
Legislative Term (Years) Mean

1

102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

489 (403)
282 (254)
171 (216)
227 (254)
309 (361)
319 (310)
283 (264)
292 (293)
345 (330)
300 (290)
233 (230)
252 (234)
278 (275)

Mean for All Terms

284 (288)

Beta Centrality
Male

Female

Min

Max

Mean

Min

Max

3
3
0
0
1
4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1,459
918
1,078
995
2,057
1,342
1,246
1,362
1,536
1,280
1,077
1,259
1,406

295 (339)
223 (245)
145 (165)
188 (196)
231 (229)
222 (241)
225 (220)
224 (210)
259 (260)
228 (235)
206 (191)
227 (231)
240 (222)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3,719
1,441
976
963
1,423
1,615
1,254
1,281
1,500
1,355
1,408
1,677
1,346

224 (236)

Mean

Min

Male
Max

Mean

Min

Max

526,354 (439,123) 5,218 1,548,700
304,029 (286,994) 5,579 1,175,567
144,720 (200,450)
0
1,055,503
231,969 (267,969)
0
1,164,193
314,058 (373,433) 525 2,118,355
317,257 (321,044) 2,234 1,434,265
276,802 (281,380)
0
1,347,477
285,287 (297,055)
0
1,390,503
348,723 (401,941)
0
1,917,939
305,107 (327,693)
0
1,533,300
231,864 (231,773)
0
1,022,807
248,550 (242,828)
0
1,341,822
270,775 (266,508)
0
1,408,371

283,520 (309,982)
213,786 (251,426)
149,962 (187,364)
183,133 (195,376)
228,000 (230,929)
204,154 (227,177)
200,860 (203,392)
208,111 (202,700)
214,863 (283,624)
186,708 (247,552)
186,202 (174,136)
213,137 (219,827)
221,754 (212,143)

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1,880,933
1,525,737
1,107,531
980,170
1,375,982
1,368,829
1,244,969
1,272,141
1,780,336
1,467,142
1,247,869
1,395,375
1,422,961

284,436 (308,659)

207,580 (232,018)

1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.

Table 12 presents the Senate chamber aggregate function analysis for in-degree and inbeta centrality measures. Similar to the Senate pattern of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity
levels for the two gender groups, the centrality means for female senators were lower than for
male senators in the earlier terms of the study period with females exhibiting higher mean values
than males in the mid to later stages of the study period. Like the House results, the overall mean

29

It is not surprising that the Senate standard deviations were smaller relative to the House figures as senators
enjoy longer terms than do representatives.
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of both centrality measures for the female Senate group were higher than for the male Senate
group, however the percentage differences were greater in the House than in the Senate.
Table 12. Senate Chamber Centrality Measures by Gender Group by Term
In-Degree Centrality
Female
Legislative Term (Years)

Mean

1

102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

185 (221)
130 (83)
95 (112)
91 (49)
161 (98)
186 (112)
214 (128)
192 (158)
255 (187)
190 (109)
187 (87)
181 (100)
221 (83)

Mean for All Terms

186 (122)

Min
0
44
0
11
38
50
49
25
42
32
61
49
79

Beta Centrality
Male

Max
429
249
338
192
278
399
475
539
736
481
342
422
385

Mean

Min

261 (197) 3
172 (140) 0
92 (101) 1
132 (120) 9
181 (128) 0
156 (131) 1
151 (119) 7
181 (124) 12
197 (172) 3
149 (137) 0
163 (106) 6
170 (126) 0
186 (121) 10
169 (140)

Female
Max
910
706
761
581
533
630
607
529
896
639
497
521
551

Mean

Min

197,925 (232796)
127,901 (70,020)
85,793 (109,528)
83,889 (49,488)
163,674 (103,377)
183,461 (109,127)
207,863 (114,803)
190,438 (154,702)
242,217 (205,253)
186,813 (108,740)
191,116 (108,789)
192,589 (108,787)
222,925 (91,350)

0
52,274
0
14,097
41,174
45,367
44,395
22,015
21,507
33,143
34,524
28,454
83,003

184,899 (126,036)

Male
Max
454,409
215,740
314,589
180,529
288,227
382,480
424,361
540,398
764,570
403,973
430,865
446,056
410,372

Mean

Min

258,010 (206312)
171,169 (148,308)
88,630 (105469)
133,142 (125,767)
181,611 (130,109)
149,963 (136,957)
146,894 (117,957)
173,968 (118,416)
180,546 (193,198)
139,324 (152,840)
147,199 (131,695)
158,023 (148,774)
178,556 (118,158)

4,069
0
1,073
8,087
0
227
7,872
9,254
324
0
2,160
0
9,454

Max
1,010,154
769,415
821,981
609,388
586,731
697,255
582,479
489,111
1,005,585
629,299
633,191
581,627
545,265

162,619 (148,862)

1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.

Tables 13 and 14 present the House and Senate cohesion measure of clustering
coefficient and Fowler’s centrality-based connectedness measure, respectively. Unlike the results
of the traditional network centrality measure analysis, the range of values and standard
deviations of clustering coefficient and connectedness is smaller in each term for each chamber
and gender group.30 The mean values in each term for both measures are relatively similar for
both gender groups in both chambers. In the House, the overall mean of the clustering coefficient
measure for the female group (0.90) is slightly higher than the overall mean for the male group
(0.85) and the overall mean of the connectedness measure is the same for each group (both at
0.15). In the Senate, the overall mean of the clustering coefficient measure for the female group
(1.96) is slightly lower than the overall mean for the male group (1.98) and the overall mean of

30

This difference may be due to how cosponsorship ties are measured in each network metric and the scales with
which they are measured.
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the connectedness measure is slightly higher for the female group (0.93) than for the male group
(0.92).
Table 13. House Chamber Clustering Coefficient and Connectedness Measures by Gender Group
by Term
Connectedness 2

Clustering Coefficient
Legislative Term (Years)

Mean

Female
Min

1

102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

1.00 (0.20)
0.88 (0.19)
0.65 (0.15)
0.81 (0.18)
0.87 (0.16)
0.90 (0.19)
0.87 (0.19)
0.88 (0.27)
1.07 (0.32)
0.99 (0.33)
0.84 (0.18)
0.90 (0.19)
0.97 (0.34)

Mean for All Terms

0.90 (0.26)

0.72
0.59
0.34
0.45
0.56
0.55
0.53
0.54
0.62
0.56
0.50
0.54
0.60

Male
Min Max

Max

Mean

1.45
1.21
1.10
1.46
1.33
1.26
1.49
2.77
2.05
3.17
1.47
1.91
3.50

1.03 (0.20)
0.85 (0.19)
0.65 (0.15)
0.75 (0.19)
0.85 (0.17)
0.88 (0.28)
0.82 (0.17)
0.81 (0.16)
0.94 (0.23)
0.89 (0.25)
0.81 (0.20)
0.85 (0.18)
0.87 (0.18)

0.00
0.00
0.33
0.00
0.56
0.52
0.51
0.00
0.56
0.42
0.48
0.52
0.00

1.98
1.54
1.14
1.75
1.60
4.67
1.48
1.40
2.42
3.33
2.50
1.73
1.64

0.85 (0.22)

Mean

Female
Min

0.16 (0.04)
0.13 (0.04)
0.13 (0.05)
0.13 (0.04)
0.17 (0.04)
0.15 (0.04)
0.17 (0.05)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.05
0.03
0.02
0.03
0.02
0.04
0.05
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Male
Min

Max

Mean

0.21
0.20
0.21
0.20
0.25
0.22
0.26
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.15 (0.05)
0.14 (0.04)
0.14 (0.05)
0.13 (0.04)
0.16 (0.05)
0.16 (0.04)
0.17 (0.05)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.15 (0.05)

0.05
0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.02
0.00
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Max
0.27
0.22
0.24
0.22
0.28
0.24
0.28
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.15 (0.05)

1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.
2. Connectedness data only available for the 102nd through 108th terms.

Table 14. Senate Clustering Coefficient and Connectedness Measures by Gender Group by Term
Connectedness 2

Clustering Coefficient
Legislative Term (Years)

Mean

Female
Min

1

102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

2.73 (0.14)
2.04 (0.23)
1.26 (0.34)
1.56 (0.11)
1.97 (0.19)
1.94 (0.24)
1.77 (0.13)
2.02 (0.14)
2.40 (0.29)
1.92 (0.25)
1.89 (0.19)
2.03 (0.22)
2.15 (0.17)

Mean for All Terms

1.96 (0.34)

2.63
1.77
0.96
1.43
1.78
1.63
1.60
1.83
2.03
1.61
1.68
1.74
1.94

Male
Min Max

Max

Mean

2.83
2.32
2.11
1.74
2.31
2.26
1.96
2.28
3.08
2.47
2.23
2.49
2.50

2.83 (0.22)
1.96 (0.21)
1.24 (0.22)
1.57 (0.18)
1.97 (0.18)
1.90 (0.25)
1.87 (0.18)
2.03 (0.18)
2.34 (0.30)
1.99 (0.61)
1.91 (0.21)
2.00 (0.34)
2.14 (0.22)

2.55
1.64
0.90
1.26
1.74
1.52
1.57
1.79
1.56
1.17
1.61
1.66
1.89

1.98 (0.46)

3.75
3.00
2.11
2.01
2.93
2.65
2.42
2.89
3.48
6.33
2.68
4.36
3.07

Mean

Female
Min

0.54 (0.49)
0.71 (0.07)
0.76 (0.31)
0.81 (0.18)
0.98 (0.20)
1.14 (0.22)
1.11 (0.19)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.93 (0.29)

1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.
2. Connectedness data only available for the 102nd through 108th terms.
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0.00
0.60
0.00
0.48
0.69
0.86
0.63
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Male
Min

Max

Mean

0.97
0.79
0.99
0.99
1.19
1.46
1.31
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

0.84 (0.18)
0.78 (0.18)
0.88 (0.17)
0.89 (0.18)
0.97 (0.17)
1.05 (0.21)
1.03 (0.19)
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
0.92 (0.20)

0.49
0.04
0.43
0.48
0.55
0.63
0.57
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Max
1.23
1.20
1.58
1.36
1.36
1.61
1.43
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

Tables 15 and 16 present the trends over time of the characteristics of intra- and intergroup relational ties within Congress via cosponsorships between legislators as measured by the
social network term, E-I Index. While not a variable included in the regression analyses, it is
informative to summarily examine the frequency of ties between gender groups as more females
enter Congress. In the earlier terms of this study period, the mean E-I Index for male legislators
was highly negative while the mean value for female legislators was highly positive.31 As more
females entered Congress during the study period, the positive female group E-I Index values
decreased in value toward zero while the male group E-I Index values increased toward zero.
Table 15. House Chamber External-Internal Group Index Measures by Gender Group by Term
E-I Index
Legislative Term (Years)

Female
Mean
Min
1

102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

0.83 (0.03)
0.67 (0.22)
0.69 (0.12)
0.70 (0.08)
0.67 (0.07)
0.59 (0.24)
0.64 (0.17)
0.56 (0.25)
0.56 (0.09)
0.55 (0.10)
0.59 (0.10)
0.52 (0.12)
0.50 (0.10)

Mean for All Terms

0.60 (0.16)

0.72
-0.77
0.36
0.72
0.49
-0.77
-0.59
-0.59
0.25
0.20
0.41
0.14
0.25

Male
Mean
Min

Max
0.87
0.82
0.89
0.87
0.88
0.84
0.84
0.79
0.74
0.78
0.79
1.00
0.81

-0.85 (0.03)
-0.77 (0.10)
-0.78 (0.09)
-0.76 (0.08)
-0.73 (0.07)
-0.70 (0.11)
-0.70 (0.10)
-0.65 (0.17)
-0.60 (0.17)
-0.62 (0.15)
-0.67 (0.10)
-0.62 (0.16)
-0.61 (0.14)

-0.96
-1.00
-0.94
-0.94
-0.91
-1.00
-0.87
-0.83
-0.80
-0.83
-0.90
-0.84
-0.89

Max
-0.71
0.85
-0.33
-0.50
-0.55
0.66
0.78
0.69
0.77
0.73
-0.20
0.78
0.71

-0.70 (0.14)

1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.

31

As described in Chapter 3, the E-I Index utilized in this analysis is measured on a -1 to 1 scale. As the measure
proceeds from negative to positive on a scale, the indication is that members of one group reach out more often to
members of the other group in comparison to ties formed within group. Conversely, if members were to solely
form ties within their own group, their corresponding E-I Index value would be -1.
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Table 16. Senate Chamber External-Internal Group Index Measures by Gender Group by Term
E-I Index
Legislative Term (Years)

Female
Mean
Min
1

102 (1991-1992)
103 (1993-1994)
104 (1995-1996)
105 (1997-1998)
106 (1999-2000)
107 (2001-2002)
108 (2003-2004)
109 (2005-2006)
110 (2007-2008)
111 (2009-2010)
112 (2011-2012)
113 (2013-2014)
114 (2015-2016)

0.97 (0.02)
0.86 (0.02)
0.77 (0.07)
0.80 (0.03)
0.82 (0.02)
0.72 (0.03)
0.72 (0.02)
0.73 (0.03)
0.68 (0.02)
0.61 (0.04)
0.64 (0.04)
0.56 (0.06)
0.58 (0.04)

Mean for All Terms

0.68 (0.10)

0.96
0.83
0.60
0.75
0.78
0.67
0.65
0.66
0.65
0.52
0.55
0.44
0.47

Male
Mean
Min

Max
0.98
0.89
0.85
0.84
0.84
0.75
0.76
0.77
0.71
0.68
0.73
0.70
0.64

-0.96 (0.01)
-0.86 (0.03)
-0.83 (0.05)
-0.82 (0.05)
-0.82 (0.03)
-0.72 (0.05)
-0.69 (0.03)
-0.72 (0.03)
-0.67 (0.04)
-0.61 (0.08)
-0.64 (0.07)
-0.61 (0.09)
-0.59 (0.07)

-1.00
-0.94
-1.00
-1.00
-0.91
-0.86
-0.75
-0.85
-0.84
-0.86
-0.84
-0.82
-0.75

Max
-0.92
-0.77
-0.69
-0.70
-0.74
-0.62
-0.58
-0.64
-0.60
-0.33
-0.44
-0.36
-0.36

-0.74 (0.12)

1. Numbers in parentheses indicate standard deviations.

Prior scholarship has demonstrated a connection between congressional approval ratings
and legislative activity and collaboration (Kirkland and Gross, 2014). Specifically, as
congressional approval declines, legislators tend to collaborate and support each other at greater
rates; in network terms, legislators expand outside of otherwise stable clustered networks
(Kirkland and Gross, 2014). Congressional approval ratings are not included in the regression
analyses because the unit of analysis is at the bill level rather than at the level of the entire body
of Congress and the variable of interest in this study is related to gender, not Congress as a
whole. However, I include a light, graphical treatment of the potential effects of approval ratings
on the network measures for perspective in this analysis and for stimulating further extensions of
this work and that of Kirkland and Gross (2014).
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Figures 8 through 13 present comparisons of congressional approval ratings as presented
by Gallup (2020) and the legislative cosponsorship network measures by gender group of indegree centrality, clustering coefficient, and connectedness. An interesting result of this
graphical analysis is that for each network measure in each chamber, female and male legislator
network measures generally follow the same pattern. For the in-degree measure, there seems to
be no clear relationship between in-degree values for each group in each chamber and
congressional approval ratings as demonstrated in Figures 8 and 9. The pattern of in-degree
values in the House seems to be consistent from the 106th Congress to the 114th Congress while,
in the Senate, in-degree values seem to steadily increase from the 104th Congress to the 114th
Congress. In both chambers, in-degree values sharply decline from the 102nd Congress to the
104th Congress and then proceed to levels above those found in the 104th Congress.

Figure 8. Congressional Approval Ratings and Group-based In-Degree Centrality Comparisons,
House Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses
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Figure 9. Congressional Approval Ratings and Group-based In-Degree Centrality Comparisons,
Senate Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses

Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the pattern of clustering coefficient values compared to
approval ratings for the House and Senate, respectively. Female group and male group clustering
coefficient values are roughly similar in both chambers and exhibit similarities with the indegree measure; that is, steep declines from the 102nd Congress to the 104th Congress followed
by an increasing trend from the 105th to 114th Congresses.
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Figure 10. Congressional Approval Ratings and Group-based Clustering Coefficient Comparisons,
House Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses

Figure 11. Congressional Approval Ratings and Group-based Clustering Coefficient Comparisons,
Senate Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses

Figures 12 and 13 illustrate the pattern of connectedness values compared to approval
ratings for the House and Senate from the 102nd Congress through the 108th Congress. Both
figures demonstrate that connectedness values generally rise and fall with approval ratings.
There are no remarkable differences in the female and male values over time in the House;
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however, the Senate graph shows a significant gap in connectedness values between the two
groups starting in the 102nd Congress with female connectedness values much lower than males.
The gap tends to close after the 102nd Congress and the patterns of values follow each other
through the 108th Congress.

Figure 12. Congressional Approval Ratings and Group-based Connectedness Comparisons,
House Chamber 102nd - 108th Congresses
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Figure 13. Congressional Approval Ratings and Group-based Connectedness Comparisons,
Senate Chamber 102nd - 108th Congresses

Sponsorship and Cosponsorship Activity – Testing Hypothesis 1
I hypothesized that female legislators within both chambers of Congress exhibit greater
rates of sponsorship and cosponsorship activity, on average, on binding, force-of-law
congressional measures than do their male counterparts. The previously discussed observational
data support Hypothesis 1, however, the more rigorous empirical results only partially support
this hypothesis. Further discussion and interpretation of these results are provided in the next
chapter.
Hypothesis 1 is based on studies that demonstrate that female legislators are more active
legislators than male legislators for several compelling reasons. First, their increased legislative
activity is a direct result of their minority gender group status in Congress (Barnes, 2016). In
Congress, minority group status is an incentive for individuals in these groups to sponsor and
cosponsor frequently to both establish long-term relationships within group and with majority
group members as well as to enhance their chances of legislative success on their sponsored
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legislation and of those they cosponsor (Craig et al., 2015). Second, increased legislative activity
is viewed by female legislators as a means to increase substantive representation of females in
the United States (Swers, 2005). Finally, prior scholarship has demonstrated that junior members
typically sponsor at greater rates to build reputations in specific policy areas (Swers, 2005;
Burkett, 1999). In most of the terms of the study period for this analysis, the average tenure of
female representatives and senators was smaller than for the male legislators.32
As shown in Figures 4 through 7, female cosponsorship networks grew significantly
denser in both chambers of the 102nd through 114th Congresses. Tables 9 and 10 presented the
mean sponsorship and cosponsorship rates by gender group for each legislative term in each
chamber. Based on the observational data alone, female legislators in the House on average outsponsored male legislators in every term of the study period except the 112th term. The female
mean for the entire period (14.9 sponsorships) was roughly 10 percent higher than the male mean
(13.5 sponsorships). The female cosponsorship mean in each term was higher than the male
mean in the same term and the female mean for the entire period (275.4 cosponsorships) was
roughly 22 percent higher than the male mean (225.5 cosponsorships). There were similar
patterns in the Senate with a few exceptions. Male senators on average out-sponsored female
legislators in the 101st through 105th Congress and females out-sponsored males from the 106th
Congress through the 114th Congress. The female mean for the entire period (39.1 sponsorships)
was roughly 22 percent higher than the male mean (32.1 sponsorships). Cosponsorship activity
followed a similar pattern as that found in sponsorship activity. Male cosponsorship activity was
higher on average than female activity from the 101st through 104th Congresses. For the study

32

In the 114th Congress, average female tenure in the House was slightly higher than average tenure for males, and
similar to that of men in the Senate.
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period, the female mean (212.0 cosponsorships) was roughly 28 percent higher than the male
mean (165.2 cosponsorships).
While the observational data show that females in both chambers were more active
sponsors and cosponsors than males, on average, during the study period, statistical testing
demonstrated that the gender group differences were mixed. Table 17 presents the results of an
independent sample t-test analysis to determine if the differences between gender groups in the
House were statistically significant. The sponsorship differences between females and males in
both time periods were not statistically significant (p < 0.05). Therefore, I cannot reject the null
hypothesis that the observed differences in mean sponsorship activity between gender groups in
the House are legitimate; that is, the observed differences for the study period are likely due to
random factors. However, the cosponsorship differences between the two gender groups were
statistically significant (p < 0.05). Therefore, I can reject the null hypothesis that the differences
are due to chance and can confidently conclude that the differences in the House cosponsorship
data for the study period are meaningful. In the Senate, the gender group differences in
sponsorship activity and in cosponsorship activity were found not to be statistically significant,
as shown in Table 18. Therefore, only part of Hypothesis 1 is supported; females in the House
have statistically significant differences in cosponsorship activity than do males, yet the
differences in observational data for House sponsor activity and Senate sponsor and
cosponsorship activity between the two gender groups are not significantly different and are
likely due to unobserved random factors.
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Table 17. House Chamber Independent Sample T-Test – Sponsorship and Cosponsorship Activity
Independent Sample t-test (House)

Description
Legislative Activity
Sponsorships
Cosponsorships

102nd-108th Congresses
Mean Diff
T
DF
P
(M-F)
-0.872 125.257
-2.683 126.466

0.385
0.008

-4.547
-191.749

T

102nd-114th Congresses
Mean Diff
DF
P
(M-F)

-1.082
-2.311

237.464
238.006

0.280
0.022

-6.638
-206.022

Table 18. Senate Chamber Independent Sample T-Test - Sponsorship and Cosponsorship Activity
Independent Sample t-test (Senate)

Description
Legislative Activity
Sponsorships
Cosponsorships

102nd-108th Congresses
Mean Diff
T
DF
P
(M-F)
-0.060
1.014

19.491
22.900

0.953
0.321

-1.511
95.377

T

102nd-114th Congresses
Mean Diff
DF
P
(M-F)

-1.619
-1.675

33.240
35.823

0.115
0.103

-62.691
-258.520

Network Structures – Testing Hypothesis 2
I hypothesized that female legislators within both chambers of Congress form better
networks than male legislators with respect to greater network centrality, cohesion, and
connectedness values, on average, on binding, force-of-law congressional measures than their
male counterparts. The previously discussed observational data as well as the empirical testing
results partially support Hypothesis 2. Further discussion and interpretation of these results are
provided in the next chapter.
Hypothesis 2 is based on studies demonstrating that female legislators are more
collaborative and supportive than male legislators (Barnes, 2016; Craig, et al., 2015; Swers,
2005). In the context of social networks, females form better cosponsorship networks as
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operationalized through relational cosponsorship ties as this study has shown. These ties form the
basis of the cosponsorship networks and are measured in this study through centrality and
cohesion metrics: in-degree, in-beta, clustering coefficient, and connectedness. Tables 11
through 14 presented these metrics by each legislative term in the House and the Senate.
In the House, mean female legislator in-degree and in-beta centrality measures were
higher than mean male legislator measures except for the 104th Congress where the mean male
in-beta centrality measure was slightly higher than the female one (male – 149,962; female –
144,720). The overall study period female legislator means for both the in-degree and the in-beta
centrality measures were higher than the male ones. The mean female in-degree value was at 284
and the male mean was at 224 and the mean female in-beta value was at 284,436 and the male
mean was at 207,580. According to Hanneman and Riddle (2005), network actors with high indegree centrality measures generally occupy favorable structural positions in the network in
terms of resource access and network prestige. Where in-degree centrality gives equal weighting
to all incoming ties to an actor, the in-beta centrality measure weights these ties based on the
structural position of the actor giving the tie. Ties to well-connected actors receive greater weight
than ties to less-connected actors. In this analysis, legislators with high in-beta centrality values
have a greater degree of power centrality; that is, they are directly and indirectly tied to other
well-connected (powerful) actors within the cosponsorship network. These ties afford the actor
the ability to more easily access powerful network actors compared to actors with lower in-beta
centrality values. The results of the mean in-beta centrality analysis demonstrate that, on average,
female House members have more cosponsorship ties to well-connected legislators than do male
legislators, on average.
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In the Senate, mean female legislator centrality measures were higher than mean male
legislator measures in most legislative sessions and the study period mean for the female group
was higher for both centrality measures. Female legislator in-degree values were higher than
male legislator values in 9 of the 13 terms and female in-beta values were higher in 8 of the 13
terms. In both cases, male legislator centrality measure values were higher earlier in the study
period with the trends reversing as more women became members of Congress later in the study
period. Similar to the House centrality results, as more women entered the Senate, they received
more cosponsorship ties than men, on average, and those ties were generally to more wellconnected senators than what was experienced by male senators. These results indicate that for
the majority of the study period, female senators occupied favorable structural positions in the
cosponsorship network in terms of resource access, network prestige, and power through their
ties to other well-connected senators.
In the House, there were no distinguishable differences between mean connectedness
values for female and male legislators within each term or over the aggregated study period. The
study period mean for both gender groups was 0.15. However, different results were evident in
the connectedness measure analysis for the Senate gender group during the study period. Mean
connectedness values for female legislators were higher from the 106th through 108th Congresses,
whereas male legislators in the prior Congresses exhibited higher mean connectedness values.
The aggregate mean was slightly higher for female senators than for male senators, at 0.93 and
0.92, respectively, and far surpass the means evident in the House analysis. Given that each
gender group’s connectedness measures utilized in this analysis are similar within each chamber,
it is difficult to draw the conclusion that female legislators form better networks based on the
connectedness measure alone.
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In the House, the mean female legislator clustering coefficient cohesion measures were
higher than mean male legislator measures except for the 102nd Congress, where the mean male
value (1.03) was slightly higher than the female one (1.00), and the 104th Congress, where both
male and female values were identical (0.65). For the entire study period, the female legislator
mean was higher than the male mean (0.90 versus 0.85). Senate clustering coefficient values
show a different trend compared to the House. Female values were higher than male values in 6
of the 13 terms, male values were higher in another 6 terms, and in the 106th Congress, the value
was the same for both female and male legislators. The advantages that each gender group
experienced did not fit a pattern as they were equally spread throughout the study period.
In the House, the observational data show that females had higher mean centrality and
clustering coefficient measures than did males. Statistical testing through an independent sample
t-test supports the observational data for the centrality measures but the results for the clustering
coefficient measure were mixed depending on the time period tested (see Table 19). The
differences in both centrality measure means between the two gender groups were statistically
significant (p < 0.05). Therefore, I rejected the null hypothesis that the differences are due to
chance and conclude with confidence that House females had higher centrality means than did
males. The t-test performed on the clustering coefficient measure yielded mixed results as the
means between the two gender groups were significant for the H102-114 time period (p > 0.05)
but not for the H102-H108 period (see Table 19). Testing for the connectedness measure yielded
non-significant results for the H102-108 time period, thus mirroring the conclusions drawn from
the observational data for this network measure.
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Table 19. House Chamber Independent Sample T-Test – Network Measures
Independent Sample t-test (House)

Description
Network Metrics
In-Degree Centrality
In-Beta Centrality
Clustering Coefficient
Connectedness

102nd-108th Congresses
Mean Diff
T
DF
P
(M-F)
-4.098
-4.553
-1.272
-0.504

429.138
418.360
492.309
454.276

0.000
-67.430
0.000 -78933.060
0.204
-0.014
0.615
-0.001

T

102nd-114th Congresses
Mean Diff
DF
P
(M-F)

-5.776 1046.670
-6.917 1013.980
-5.998 1052.800
N/A
N/A

0.000
-60.415
0.000 -76855.680
0.000
-0.057
N/A
N/A

Like the results found in the House, the Senate observational data show that female
senators had higher mean centrality measures than did male senators. Statistical testing through
an independent sample t-test, for the most part, does not support the observational data (see
Table 20). The results for the in-degree centrality measure indicate no statistically significant
difference in means between the gender groups, while the results for the in-beta centrality
measure are only statistically significant for the S102-114 time period (p < 0.05). For the
clustering coefficient and the connectedness measures, the observational data indicate that the
means for each measure between gender groups were similar. The t-test performed on the
clustering coefficient measure indicated no significant difference between gender groups in the
S102-108 time period but there was a meaningful difference in the S102-114 time period (p <
0.05). Like the House result, the testing for the connectedness measure for the Senate group
means yielded non-significant results for the S102-108 time period, thus mirroring the
conclusions drawn from the observational data for this network measure.
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Table 20. Senate Chamber Independent Sample T-Test – Network Measures
Independent Sample t-test (Senate)

Description
Network Metrics
In-Degree Centrality
In-Beta Centrality
Clustering Coefficient
Connectedness

102nd-108th Congresses
Mean Diff
T
DF
P
(M-F)
0.569
0.636
2.457
-0.478

84.338
87.079
87.026
69.563

0.571
0.526
0.016
0.634

8.816
9733.424
0.124
-0.018

T

102nd-114th Congresses
Mean Diff
DF
P
(M-F)

-1.647
-2.094
0.691
N/A

238.198
242.114
267.124
N/A

0.101
-16.856
0.037 -22279.680
0.490
0.020
N/A
N/A

Therefore, only part of Hypothesis 2 has been supported; females in the Senate have
statistically significant differences in the in-beta centrality measure than do males for the S102114 time period, yet the differences in the in-degree centrality measure were not meaningful for
either time period. In addition, the results of testing for the clustering coefficient and
connectedness measures yielded no legitimate differences in the means between Senate gender
groups. This result was also evident in the House; however, the testing results for the House
centrality measures demonstrated that females did have significant differences in means
compared to males for both time periods. The general conclusions drawn from these findings
indicate that females generally formed better networks than males in the House as measured
through centrality metrics, yet the same results were not evident in the Senate. In fact, when
including the clustering coefficient and connectedness measures, females did not exhibit better
networks overall compared to males in the Senate.

Regression Analysis and Results – Testing Hypothesis 3
I hypothesized that despite sponsoring and cosponsoring at greater rates and forming
better networks as measured, female legislators are less successful in passing their binding,
force-of-law bills in both chambers of the United States Congress than their male counterparts,
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considering other variables (Hypothesis 3). This section presents the House and Senate logistic
regression results for the models including the 102nd through 108th Congresses and the 102nd
through 114th Congresses. Analyses of longitudinal repeated-measures data typically use
statistical methods that include the general estimating equation method (GEE), fixed effects (FE)
modeling, random effects (RE) modeling, and mixed effects (ME) modeling (Allison, 2021;
Gardiner, et al., 2009). The statistical method used for this longitudinal analysis is logistic
regression employing the GEE method followed by a ME model as a robustness check. Further
discussion and interpretation of the results of the analyses are discussed in the next chapter.
Results of Logistic Regression Employing the General Estimating Equation (GEE) Method for
the House of Representatives

For the primary analysis of the House of Representatives, I chose the GEE method
developed by Liang and Zeger (1986) as an extension of generalized linear models when
analyzing longitudinal data. Use of the approach provides researchers with consistent estimates
of model parameters and standard errors when analyzing repeated measures with non-normal
response variables (Liang and Zeger, 1989). The GEE logistic regression model estimates the
same model as found in standard logistic regression, however, the GEE method allows for
dependence within group clusters, such as those found in longitudinal data (Allison, 2021). A
benefit of the GEE method is the ability to obtain population-averaged parameter estimates
rather than subject-specific coefficients typically modeled in FE and RE approaches. This
characteristic is important to my analysis since my primary interest are the consequences of
gender, as a group characteristic, on bill passage in each chamber of Congress. In addition to
these advantages, the GEE method accounts for correlations between binary outcomes across
time within the same individual and allows for specification of time-variant and time-invariant
variables often found in variable-rich models such as the ones for this analysis (Allison, 2021).
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When using the GEE method, the researcher must specify a working correlation structure
to estimate regression parameters more efficiently, particularly for datasets that have a larger
number of time points, generally more than five (Allison, 2021; Westgate and Burchett, 2017;
Wang and Carey, 2003; Liang and Zeger, 1986). Correct specification leads to more reliable
statistical inference. For this analysis, I specified an exchangeable correlation structure which is
suitable for repeated measures data (Allison, 2021). This type of structure allows for correlation
of observations within each subject and for clustered observations irrespective of the timing of
the observations and that the correlations between values of the response variable at any two
points in time is the same (Allison, 2021). According to Shults, et al., (2009) the exchangeable
structure is a satisfactory approach where the researcher expects little decay in the correlation of
measurements despite the increase in separation in time (Shults, et al., 2009). In this analysis, I
do not expect there to be substantial decreasing correlations within clusters between consecutive
measurements (by term) as the number of terms increase. If this were the case, I would consider
employing the AR correlation structure.
The results of the House logistic regression models using GEE methods for the 102nd –
108th Congresses and 102nd – 114th Congresses are presented in Table 21. The models include
robust standard errors to address potential problems with error terms not being identically
distributed (standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity). I report the results in terms of odds
ratios rather than the logit coefficients as the coefficients returned by logit are difficult to
interpret intuitively. Odds ratios are multiplicative which means that an odds ratio of 1.00
indicates no effect, an odds ratio that is greater than 1 indicates a positive effect, and negative
effects are indicated by odds ratios between 0 and 1 (Long and Freese, 2014).
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Table 21. Logistic Regression Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Models, House Chamber
(Dependent Variable: Bill Pass or Fail Floor Vote)
102nd -108th Congresses

102nd -114th Congresses

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

z

Sig.

Gender
Party
Majority Party
Seniority
Party Leader
Power Comm. Chair
In-Degree Centrality
In-Beta Centrality
Clustering Coefficient
Connectedness
Term
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
108th
109th
110th
111th
112nd
113th
114th

0.765
1.028
3.622
1.060
1.351
1.947
1.000
1.000
0.765
0.220

0.097 -2.12
0.086 0.34
0.256 18.23
0.009 6.52
0.216 1.88
0.434 2.99
0.000 -1.64
0.000 1.82
0.156 -1.31
0.151 -2.20

0.034
0.736
0.000
0.000
0.060
0.003
0.100
0.069
0.190
0.028

0.596
0.874
3.154
1.042
0.988
1.258
0.999
1.000
0.513
0.057

0.980
1.211
4.159
1.079
1.847
3.013
1.000
1.000
1.142
0.847

0.795
1.005
1.005
1.257
1.036
1.220

0.061
0.128
0.115
0.123
0.103
0.125

-2.98
0.04
0.04
2.34
0.36
1.94

0.003
0.968
0.966
0.019
0.722
0.052

0.684
0.784
0.803
1.038
0.852
0.998

Constant

0.055

0.015 -10.85

0.000

0.033

Variables

1

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

N (# of bills):
39,321
Model: Wald X 2 (522.25), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

1

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

z

Sig.

0.865
0.856
2.724
1.038
1.436
2.590
1.000
1.000
0.746
N/A

0.064 -1.97
0.056 -2.39
0.124 22.02
0.007 5.26
0.127 4.10
0.391 6.31
0.000 -0.59
0.000 0.67
0.153 -1.43

0.049
0.017
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.556
0.500
0.154

0.749
0.753
2.491
1.024
1.208
1.927
0.999
1.000
0.498

0.999
0.972
2.978
1.053
1.708
3.481
1.000
1.000
1.116

0.924
1.289
1.258
1.522
1.260
1.490

0.835
0.923
0.951
1.161
0.973
1.111
0.858
1.250
0.959
0.637
0.903
0.990

0.061
0.103
0.093
0.092
0.084
0.098
0.075
0.094
0.080
0.062
0.080
0.089

-2.46
-0.72
-0.52
1.89
-0.31
1.19
-1.76
2.97
-0.50
-4.64
-1.16
-0.11

0.014
0.473
0.603
0.059
0.754
0.234
0.078
0.003
0.618
0.000
0.246
0.913

0.724
0.743
0.785
0.995
0.821
0.934
0.723
1.079
0.815
0.527
0.759
0.831

0.964
1.148
1.151
1.356
1.153
1.321
1.017
1.449
1.129
0.771
1.073
1.180

0.093

0.074

0.016 -11.71

0.000

0.048

0.115

79,438
Model: Wald X 2 (982.42), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

1. Robust standard errors.

For both models presented in Table 21, gender has a statistically significant effect on
legislative success at p < 0.05, considering the other independent variables. During the 102nd
through 108th terms, the odds of legislative success for female House members were 23.5 percent
lower than the odds for male House members. During the 102nd through 114th terms, odds for
legislative success for females appear to improve compared to males but the odds were still
lower. In this model, the odds of legislative success for female House members were 13.5
percent lower than the odds for male House members. This result may suggest that female House
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members in the 109th through 114th Congresses began to enjoy more legislative success than they
did in earlier terms of the study period.
While the variable of interest in this analysis is gender, it is interesting to briefly report
the results of the other predictor variables with respect to their effects (or lack thereof) on
legislative success. Not surprisingly, majority party status, seniority, and being a power
committee chair were highly statistically significant at p < 0.01. These results support findings
from prior literature (Volden, et al., 2013; Cox and Terry, 2008; Jeydel and Taylor, 2003;
Anderson, et al., 2003; Swers, 2002). Of particular note in this analysis, the magnitude of
significance and the odds ratios for majority party status in both models were remarkable (e.g.
the odds of legislative success for House members in the majority party were 262 percent higher
than the odds for minority party House members in the 102nd through 108th Congresses). These
results are not surprising given that the majority party in the House largely controls what items
progress to the decision agenda, what items pass through committee, and what items are
considered on the House floor.
The surprising results were the lack of statistical significance of the social network
measures of in-degree, in-beta, and clustering coefficient in both models. The connectedness
measure was statistically significant at p < 0.05; however, the direction of the odds ratio in the
102nd – 108th terms model was surprising. I expected that legislators with high connectedness
values would exhibit more legislative success than those with lower connectedness values;
however, this was not the case in this model. For a one unit increase in connectedness value, the
odds of legislative success were expected to decrease by a factor of 0.22, considering other
variables in the model. This result differs from Fowler’s (2006a,b) finding that higher
connectedness scores suggested higher rates of legislative success. The contradictory findings
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may be due to differences in study focus and methodology, types of bills analyzed (Fowler
considered all measures rather than binding bills), and temporal periods examined.
House GEE Post-estimation analyses

The first post-estimation I performed was a global test of the time effect to determine if
the dummies for each term were equal to 0 or if the resulting coefficients were significantly
different from each other. For both GEE models, there was a significant difference in the
coefficients for each year in both models (House 102nd–108th Congresses: X2 = 36.66, prob >
chi2 = 0.0000; House 102nd-114th Congresses: X2 = 137.08, prob > chi2 = 0.0000). My original
assumption that each legislative term should be included in each model was supported as time
fixed effects should be included in both models.
The second post-estimation command I employed was the development of the withinsubject (legislator) correlation matrix to examine the correlation structure estimated by the model
and ultimately to detect the presence of autocorrelation. As discussed in the regression results,
the correlation structure of the GEE is exchangeable. Due to the nature of exchangeable
structures, the correlation coefficients in the correlation matrices are the same, meaning that the
correlation of observations within each legislator is constant. High coefficient values translate to
high correlations between responses within each legislator from one legislative term to the next
resulting in incorrect parameter estimates (Allison, 2021). The weighted correlation command in
Stata generates correlations between responses (legislative success) in each legislative term
within subjects, adjusting for the dependence on the explanatory variables. The correlations
estimated by the House 102nd to 108th Congresses (H102-108) GEE model and the 102nd to 114th
Congresses (H102-114) model, are 0.048 and 0.041, respectively. Both outputs indicate very low
correlations between responses in one legislative term to the next within each legislator. These
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results suggest that, in this analysis, each legislator response could be treated as an independent
observation regardless of the number of responses each legislator exhibits between terms.
The final post-estimation test for this analysis was used to test for the presence of high
collinearity among the data. High collinearity (also known as multicollinearity) can be a cause
for concern in linear and non-linear models and is commonly found in longitudinal data (Gujarati
and Porter, 2009). Models that exhibit high, or in rare cases, perfect, collinearity contain
regression coefficients with larger standard errors and wider confidence intervals thus increasing
uncertainty around the coefficient estimates (Bashir, 2015; Gujarati and Porter, 2009). However,
there are situations where high collinearity can be ignored. According to Allison (2012), high
collinearity is not a problem if one or more of the following conditions are present: 1) the highly
collinear variables are control variables rather than variables of interest, 2) if the high collinearity
is caused by the inclusion of powers or products of other variable, or 3) in the case of categorical
predictor dummy variables that contain three or more categories. For this analysis, the variable of
interest is gender (referring to point 1 above); thus, if gender is found to be highly collinear with
other predictor variables, there might be cause for concern for the gender coefficient estimates.
Fortunately, high collinearity can be diagnosed in logistic regression models in the same
manner as those utilized for linear regression models. Through the use of correlation matrix and
variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses, I tested for the presence of high collinearity in the
models. The H102-108 GEE model correlation matrix output for the main variable of interest,
gender, showed low correlation values between gender and all other control variables and the
VIF analysis output for gender was low at a 1.26 value. There was substantially high collinearity
between the in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables (0.92). The VIF analysis output
also demonstrated high collinearity for each variable (in-degree at 10.46 and in-beta at 11.44).
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However, because these variables are not of primary interest to this study, I retained them in the
model.33 The H102-114 GEE model correlation matrix output for gender also showed low
correlation values between gender and all other control variables and the VIF analysis output for
gender was low at a 1.32 value. Similar to the H102-108 model, there was substantially high
collinearity between the in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables (0.92). The VIF
analysis output also demonstrated high collinearity for each variable (in-degree at 23.20 and inbeta at 25.60). While the presence of multicollinearity does not bias the coefficient estimates, it
does cause the estimates to be unstable with large standard errors. While larger standard errors
could be a factor behind unexpected results for the estimated coefficients of variables that are
highly correlated, in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables in both models did not
have high standard errors. For this reason and the same reasons listed for the H102-108 model,
these variables remained in the H102-114 model.
House GEE Margins Analysis

A margins analysis was conducted after the logistic regression analysis to add further
information to the regression analysis and results. Margins analyses generate the average
predicted probabilities of each gender group’s legislative success during the study periods. Table
22 presents the results of the margins analyses which show that the predicted probability of
legislative success is lower for female legislators in the House than it is for male legislators.
Illustrations of the predictive probabilities and their related 95 percent confidence intervals from
Table 22 are presented in Figures 14 and 15.

33

Including each of these variables separately in the model did not have a material effect on the gender variable zscore and p-value.

109

Table 22. House Chamber GEE Model Margins Analysis, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote
102nd -108th Congresses
Gender
Female
Male

Obs
4,978
34,343

1

Margin
0.098
0.123

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.010 9.40
0.004 32.84

0.000
0.000

102nd -114th Congresses
95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.077
0.116

0.118
0.130

1

Margin

12,632
66,806

0.107
0.121

Obs

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.006 16.54
0.003 42.37

0.000
0.000

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.094
0.115

0.119
0.126

1. Number of sponsorsed bills by gender of sponsor.
2. Delta Method.

Figure 14. GEE Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, House Chamber 102nd - 108th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)
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Figure 15. GEE Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, House Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)

Results of Mixed Effects (ME) House of Representatives Models

Mixed effects logistic regression incorporates variations in independent variables in a
population when the response variable is binary and also accounts for repeated measures within
individuals when working with longitudinal data (Allison, 2021). Mixed effects modeling also
has the advantage of accounting for time-variant and time-invariant data and variables (Allison,
2021). Furthermore, mixed models allow researchers the ability to produce cluster-robust
standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated (Allison,
2021). These characteristics and advantages are reasons I chose to employ a mixed effects model
as a robustness check to the primary model (GEE) for this analysis. It is important to reiterate
here that the GEE method produces population-based coefficients whereas the ME method
produces subject-specific coefficient results.
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Table 23 presents the results of the logistic regression ME models for the House
chambers for the 102nd through 108th Congresses and the 102nd through 114th Congresses. Like
the GEE models, results are reported in the odds ratios format.
Table 23. Logistic Regression Mixed Effects (ME) Models, House Chamber (Dependent Variable:
Bill Pass or Fail Floor Vote)
102nd -108th Congresses

102nd -114th Congresses

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

z

Sig.

Gender
Party
Majority Party
Seniority
Party Leader
Power Comm. Chair
In-Degree Centrality
In-Beta Centrality
Clustering Coefficient
Connectedness
Term
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
108th
109th
110th
111th
112nd
113th
114th

0.730
0.937
3.982
1.076
1.541
1.491
1.000
1.000
0.665
0.057

0.093 -2.45
0.088 -0.69
0.314 17.50
0.011 7.08
0.234 2.85
0.416 1.43
0.000 -0.90
0.000 0.47
0.165 -1.64
0.053 -3.09

0.014
0.489
0.000
0.000
0.004
0.152
0.366
0.642
0.101
0.002

0.568
0.780
3.411
1.054
1.145
0.863
0.999
1.000
0.409
0.009

0.939
1.126
4.649
1.098
2.075
2.576
1.000
1.000
1.082
0.349

0.801
0.975
0.979
1.300
0.989
1.238

0.077
0.145
0.126
0.137
0.108
0.135

-2.30
-0.17
-0.17
2.48
-0.10
1.95

0.021
0.867
0.867
0.013
0.922
0.051

0.664
0.729
0.761
1.057
0.800
0.999

Constant

0.068

0.023

-7.97

0.000

0.035

Variables

1

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

N (# of bills):
39,321
2
Model: Wald X (524.63), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

1

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

z

Sig.

0.876
0.867
3.301
1.050
1.531
2.181
1.000
1.000
0.753
N/A

0.073 -1.59
0.062 -2.01
0.179 22.03
0.007 7.66
0.163 3.99
0.489 3.48
0.000 0.10
0.000 -1.17
0.143 -1.49

0.112
0.044
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.924
0.241
0.136

0.745
0.754
2.969
1.037
1.242
1.406
0.999
0.999
0.518

1.031
0.996
3.672
1.064
1.887
3.385
1.000
1.000
1.093

0.968
1.305
1.259
1.599
1.224
1.533

0.864
0.937
0.937
1.176
0.906
1.054
0.812
1.263
0.968
0.636
0.969
1.121

0.071
0.112
0.100
0.111
0.090
0.105
0.081
0.105
0.086
0.068
0.093
0.106

-1.79
-0.54
-0.61
1.71
-0.99
0.53
-2.08
2.81
-0.37
-4.26
-0.33
1.20

0.074
0.587
0.541
0.087
0.323
0.596
0.038
0.005
0.711
0.000
0.744
0.229

0.736
0.742
0.760
0.977
0.745
0.867
0.668
1.073
0.814
0.517
0.804
0.931

1.014
1.184
1.155
1.415
1.102
1.282
0.988
1.486
1.151
0.784
1.169
1.350

0.132

0.059

0.013 -13.22

0.000

0.039

0.089

79,438
Model: Wald X 2 (763.88), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

1. Robust standard errors.

There were mixed results in this analysis for the gender variable. In the 102nd – 108th
model, gender had a statistically significant effect on legislative success at p < 0.05, considering
other independent variables. During the 102nd through 108th terms, the odds of legislative success
for female House members were 27 percent lower than the odds for male House members. The
effect of gender on legislative success in the 102nd – 114th Congress model was not statistically
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significant at p < 0.05. Similar to the suggestion I offer for the GEE model of the 102nd – 114th
Congresses, this non-significant result may support the notion that female House members in the
109th through 114th Congresses began to enjoy more legislative success than they did in earlier
terms of the study period.
In both ME models, majority party status, seniority, and being a party leader were highly
statistically significant at p < 0.01. Being a power committee chair was not statistically
significant in the H102-108 model but was significant at p < 0.01 in the H102-114 model. Like
the results found in the GEE models, the magnitude of significance and the odds ratios for
majority party status in both ME models were remarkable (the odds of legislative success for
House members in the majority party were 298 percent higher than the odds for minority party
House members in the 102nd through 108th Congresses and 230 percent higher than the odds for
minority party House members in the 102nd through 114th Congresses).
In the ME models, the social network measures of in-degree, in-beta, and clustering
coefficient were not statistically significant. Like the GEE H102-108 model, the connectedness
measure in the ME H102-108 model was statistically significant at p < 0.05 with the direction of
the odds ratio indicating a negative effect. In the ME model, a one unit increase in connectedness
value resulted in the odds of legislative success to decrease by a factor of 0.057, considering
other variables in the model.
House ME Post-estimation analyses

I conducted a similar post-estimation testing process for the House ME models as the one
used for the House GEE models with the exception of the weighted correlation structure
analysis. Mixed-effects (ME) models in Stata allow for the use of the ‘cluster’ command to
produce standard errors that are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic and autocorrelated.
Furthermore, Stata does not support the weighted correlation structure command in ME
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models.34 I conducted the global test of the time effect to determine if the dummies for each term
were equal to 0 or if the resulting coefficients were significantly different from each other. For
both ME models, there was a significant difference in the coefficients for each year in both
models (House 102nd–108th Congresses: X2 = 34.36, prob > chi2 = 0.0000; House 102nd-114th
Congresses: X2 = 114.09, prob > chi2 = 0.0000). My original assumption that each legislative
term should be included in each model was supported as time fixed effects should be included in
both models.
The final post-estimation test for this analysis was used to test for the presence of high
collinearity within the data. For the ME model analysis, I conducted correlation matrix and
variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses similar to the GEE analyses. The H102-108 ME model
correlation matrix output for the main variable of interest, gender, showed low correlation values
between gender and all other control variables and the VIF analysis output for gender was low at
a 1.26 value. There was substantially high collinearity between the in-degree centrality and inbeta centrality variables (0.95). The VIF analysis output also demonstrated high collinearity for
each variable (in-degree at 21.17 and in-beta at 24.80). In contrast to the House GEE models, the
clustering coefficient and connectedness variables exhibited high VIF values of 12.55 and 20.68,
respectively. For reasons described in the GEE model analyses, I retained all four variables in the
model. The H102-114 ME model correlation matrix output for gender also showed low
correlation values between gender and all other control variables and the VIF analysis output for
gender was low at a 1.32 value. Similar to the H102-108 model, there was substantially high
collinearity between the in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables (0.93). The VIF
analysis output also demonstrated high collinearity for each variable (in-degree at 23.20 and in-

34

GEE models in Stata do not accept the ‘cluster’ command, thus the reasoning for employing the structure
analysis in that model.
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beta at 25.60). In addition, the clustering coefficient VIF value was 11.01. For the same reasons
listed for the H102-108 model, these variables remained in the H102-114 model.
House ME Margins analysis

A margins analysis was conducted after the logistic regression analysis to add further
information to the regression analysis and results. Table 24 presents the results of the margins
analyses which show that the predicted probability of legislative success is lower for female
legislators in the House than it is for male legislators. Illustrations of the predictive probabilities
and their related 95 percent confidence intervals from Table 24 are presented in Figures 16 and
17.
Table 24. House Chamber ME Model Margins Analysis, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote
102nd -108th Congresses
Gender
Female
Male

Obs
4,978
34,343

1

Margin
0.086
0.113

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.009 9.26
0.004 30.07

0.000
0.000

102nd -114th Congresses
95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.068
0.106

0.105
0.121

1. Number of sponsorsed bills by gender of sponsor.
2. Delta Method.
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1

Margin

12,632
66,806

0.098
0.110

Obs

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.007 14.77
0.003 38.51

0.000
0.000

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.085
0.104

0.111
0.115

.1
.09
.07

.08

Predicted Mean

.11

.12

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs

0

1
gender

Figure 16. ME Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, House Chamber 102nd - 108th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)

.1
.09
.08

Predicted Mean

.11

.12

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs

0

1
gender

Figure 17. ME Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, House Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)
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Results of Logistic Regression Employing the General Estimating Equation (GEE) Method for
the Senate

Like the House analysis, the primary model for the Senate analysis is logistic regression
utilizing the GEE method of estimation with an exchangeable working correlation structure. The
results of the logistic regression models for the Senate chamber in the 102nd – 108th Congresses
and 102nd – 114th Congresses are presented in Table 25. The models include robust standard
errors to address potential problems with error terms not being independent and identically
distributed (standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity).
Table 25. Logistic Regression Generalized Estimating Equation (GEE) Models, Senate Chamber
(Dependent Variable: Bill Pass or Fail Floor Vote)
102nd -108th Congresses

102nd -114th Congresses

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

1

z

Sig.

Gender
Party
Majority Party
Seniority
Party Leader
Power Comm. Chair
In-Degree Centrality
In-Beta Centrality
Clustering Coefficient
Connectedness
Term
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
108th
109th
110th
111th
112nd
113th
114th

1.026
0.740
1.690
1.058
1.093
0.716
0.997
1.000
0.847
0.499

0.127
0.072
0.123
0.012
0.162
0.106
0.001
0.000
0.221
0.127

0.21
-3.07
7.22
4.85
0.60
-2.25
-2.21
2.89
-0.64
-2.73

0.837
0.002
0.000
0.000
0.550
0.024
0.027
0.004
0.524
0.006

0.805
0.611
1.465
1.034
0.817
0.535
0.995
1.000
0.508
0.303

1.307
0.897
1.947
1.082
1.461
0.958
1.000
1.000
1.412
0.822

0.845
0.587
0.728
0.781
0.525
0.931

0.218
0.263
0.270
0.207
0.149
0.267

-0.65
-1.19
-0.86
-0.94
-2.28
-0.25

0.514
0.235
0.392
0.350
0.023
0.805

0.510
0.244
0.351
0.465
0.302
0.531

Constant

0.225

0.182

-1.84

0.065

0.046

Variables

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

N (# of bills):
21,172
2
Model: Wald X (308.20), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

Odds
Ratio

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

1

z

Sig.

1.024
0.071
1.682
1.051
1.113
0.769
0.999
1.000
0.792
N/A

0.107
0.065
0.109
0.009
0.111
0.097
0.001
0.000
0.137

0.23
-3.74
8.03
5.70
1.08
-2.09
-1.29
1.75
-1.35

0.818
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.280
0.037
0.199
0.081
0.178

0.835
0.597
1.482
1.033
0.916
0.602
0.997
1.000
0.564

1.257
0.851
1.910
1.069
1.353
0.984
1.000
1.000
1.112

1.401
1.413
1.507
1.312
0.915
1.635

0.830
0.504
0.642
0.681
0.429
0.764
0.500
0.344
0.270
0.241
0.315
0.325

0.154
0.157
0.166
0.128
0.091
0.016
0.096
0.055
0.057
0.052
0.062
0.057

-1.00
-2.20
-1.71
-2.04
-3.99
-1.32
-3.62
-6.71
-6.16
-6.63
-5.84
-6.39

0.317
0.028
0.087
0.041
0.000
0.188
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.577
0.273
0.386
0.471
0.283
0.512
0.344
0.252
0.178
0.158
0.214
0.231

1.195
0.928
1.067
0.985
0.650
1.140
0.728
0.470
0.410
0.367
0.464
0.459

1.100

0.161

0.083

-3.53

0.000

0.058

0.443

S.E.

43,647
Model: Wald X 2 (720.43), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

1. Robust standard errors.
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Unlike the results of the House GEE models, gender does not have a statistically
significant effect on legislative success in either of the Senate GEE models. While this finding is
contrary to the finding in the House models, the effects of majority party, seniority, and being a
power committee chair are statistically significant in both Senate GEE models, consistent with
both House GEE models. The social network measures of in-degree, in-beta, and connectedness
measures were statistically significant at p < 0.05 in the S102-108 model but in-degree and inbeta were not significant in the S102-114 model. Similar to the H102-108 GEE model,
connectedness in the S102-108 suggests a negative effect on legislative success with a high
degree of magnitude (OR = 0.499, p < 0.01), which is in contrast to Fowler’s (2006a,b) findings.
The term fixed effects in the S102-114 model yielded interesting results. In nine of the terms, the
legislative term had an effect on legislative success compared to the reference term (102nd
Congress). This result is markedly different than the findings of the H102-114 GEE model where
only three terms demonstrated a statistically significant effect on legislative success compared to
the 102nd term.
Senate GEE Post-estimation analyses

The first post-estimation I performed was a global test of the time effect to determine if
the dummies for each term were equal to 0 or if the resulting coefficients were significantly
different from each other. For both GEE models, there was a significant difference in the
coefficients for each year in both models (Senate 102nd–108th Congresses: X2 = 30.37, prob >
chi2 = 0.0000; Senate 102nd-114th Congresses: X2 = 212.26, prob > chi2 = 0.0000). My original
assumption that each legislative term should be included in each model was supported as time
fixed effects should be included in both models.
The second post-estimation command I employed was the development of the withinsubject (legislator) correlation matrix to examine the correlation structure estimated by the model
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and ultimately to detect the presence of autocorrelation. As discussed in the regression results,
the correlation structure of the GEE is exchangeable. Due to the nature of exchangeable
structures, the correlation coefficients in the correlation matrices are the same, meaning that the
correlation of observations within each legislator is constant. High coefficient values translate to
high correlations between responses within each legislator from one legislative term to the next
resulting in incorrect parameter estimates (Allison, 2021). The weighted correlation command in
Stata generates correlations between responses (legislative success) in each legislative term
within subjects, adjusting for the dependence on the explanatory variables. The correlations
estimated by the Senate 102nd to 108th Congresses (S102-108) GEE model and the 102nd to 114th
Congresses (S102-114) model, are 0.025 and 0.015, respectively. Both outputs indicate very low
correlations between responses in one legislative term to the next within each legislator. These
results suggest that in this analysis, each legislator response could be treated as an independent
observation regardless of the number of responses each legislator exhibits between terms.
The final post-estimation test for this analysis was used to test for the presence of high
collinearity among model independent variables. As discussed earlier, high collinearity is not a
concern for this the highly collinear variables are used solely as control variables rather than as
variables of interest. The S102-108 GEE model correlation matrix output for the main variable of
interest, gender, showed low correlation values between gender and all other control variables
and the VIF analysis output for gender was low at a 1.27 value. There was substantially high
collinearity between the in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables (0.97). The VIF
analysis output also demonstrated substantially high collinearity for each variable (in-degree at
104.86 and in-beta at 101.28). In addition, VIF values for the connectedness and clustering
coefficient variables were 49.34 and 15.10, respectively. However, because these variables are
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not of interest to this study, I retained them in the model.35 The S102-114 GEE model correlation
matrix output for gender also showed low correlation values between gender and all other control
variables and the VIF analysis output for gender was low at a 1.29 value. Similar to the S102108 model, there was substantially high collinearity between the in-degree centrality and in-beta
centrality variables (0.98). The VIF analysis output also demonstrated high collinearity for each
variable and were the same values as those found in the S102-108 analysis (in-degree at 68.50
and in-beta at 66.97). In addition, the clustering coefficient had a high VIF value (9.10). For the
same reasons listed for the S102-108 model, these variables remained in the S102-114 model.
Senate GEE Margins Analysis

Although gender did not have an effect on legislative success in the Senate GEE models,
I conducted a margins analysis after the logistic regression analysis to give additional perspective
to the regression analysis and results. Table 26 presents the results of the margins analyses which
indicate that the predicted probabilities of legislative success were approximately similar for
female and male legislators. Illustrations of the predictive probabilities and their related 95
percent confidence intervals from Table 26 are presented in Figures 18 and 19.
Table 26. Senate Chamber GEE Model Margins Analysis, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote
102nd -108th Congresses
Gender
Female
Male

1

Margin

2,034
19,138

0.118
0.116

Obs

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.012 9.64
0.005 22.08

0.000
0.000

102nd -114th Congresses
95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.094
0.106

0.143
0.126

1

Margin

6,609
37,038

0.088
0.086

Obs

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.008 11.44
0.003 24.71

0.000
0.000

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.073
0.080

0.103
0.093

1. Number of sponsorsed bills by gender of sponsor.
2. Delta Method.

35

Including each of these variables separately in the model did not have a material effect on the gender variable zscore and p-value.
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.09

.1

.11

.12

.13

.14

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs

0

1
gender

Figure 18. GEE Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, Senate Chamber 102nd - 108th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)

.07

.08

.09

.1

.11

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs

0

1
gender

Figure 19. GEE Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, Senate Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)
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Results of Mixed Effects (ME) Senate Models

Table 27 presents the results of the logistic regression ME models for the Senate
chambers for the 102nd through 108th Congresses and the 102nd through 114th Congresses. Like
the GEE models, results are reported in the odds ratios format.
Table 27. Logistic Regression Mixed Effects (ME) Models, Senate Chamber (Dependent Variable:
Bill Pass or Fail Floor Vote)
102nd -108th Congresses

102nd -114th Congresses

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

1

z

Sig.

Gender
Party
Majority Party
Seniority
Party Leader
Power Comm. Chair
In-Degree Centrality
In-Beta Centrality
Clustering Coefficient
Connectedness
Term
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
108th
109th
110th
111th
112nd
113th
114th

0.879
0.745
1.802
1.039
1.065
0.612
0.999
1.000
0.729
0.602

0.142
0.078
0.149
0.013
0.172
0.122
0.001
0.000
0.212
0.170

-0.80
-2.79
7.14
3.14
0.39
-2.47
-1.26
1.76
-1.09
-1.79

0.424
0.005
0.000
0.002
0.697
0.013
0.207
0.079
0.278
0.073

0.641
0.606
1.533
1.014
0.776
0.414
0.996
1.000
0.412
0.346

1.210
0.916
2.120
1.063
1.461
0.903
1.000
1.000
1.290
1.048

0.749
0.470
0.589
0.711
0.466
0.854

0.216
0.232
0.239
0.205
0.148
0.272

-1.00
-1.53
-1.30
-1.18
-2.40
-0.49

0.316
0.127
0.193
0.237
0.016
0.621

0.426
0.178
0.265
0.403
0.250
0.458

Constant

0.310

0.283

-1.28

0.200

0.052

Variables

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

N (# of bills):
21,172
Model: Wald X 2 (241.59), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

Odds
Ratio

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper

1

z

Sig.

0.981
0.751
1.824
1.051
1.061
0.639
1.000
1.000
0.714
N/A

0.114
0.073
0.136
0.011
0.112
0.095
0.001
0.000
0.148

-0.17
-2.94
8.20
4.63
0.56
-3.01
-0.48
0.59
-1.63

0.866
0.003
0.000
0.000
0.575
0.003
0.628
0.556
0.104

0.780
0.621
1.580
1.030
0.862
0.478
0.998
1.000
0.477

1.232
0.910
2.110
1.074
1.310
0.855
1.001
1.000
1.071

1.317
1.239
1.310
1.252
0.869
1.594

0.727
0.411
0.534
0.632
0.378
0.702
0.442
0.328
0.232
0.214
0.296
0.325

0.156
0.152
0.163
0.141
0.097
0.172
0.101
0.058
0.600
0.054
0.067
0.064

-1.48
-2.40
-2.06
-2.06
-3.80
-1.44
-3.57
-6.29
-5.69
-6.16
-5.35
-5.68

0.139
0.016
0.039
0.039
0.000
0.149
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.478
0.199
0.293
0.409
0.229
0.435
0.282
0.232
0.140
0.131
0.190
0.221

1.109
0.849
0.970
0.978
0.624
1.135
0.692
0.464
0.384
0.350
0.462
0.479

1.857

0.207

0.126

-2.59

0.009

0.063

0.681

S.E.

43,647
Model: Wald X 2 (620.54), Prob > X 2 (0.000)

1. Robust standard errors.

Allowing for fixed and random effects in the Senate ME models yielded similar results as
the Senate GEE models in terms of the analysis on the gender variable. In the Senate ME
models, gender does not have a statistically significant effect on legislative success. The effects
of majority party, seniority, and being a power committee chair are statistically significant in
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both Senate ME models, consistent with the Senate GEE models. Contrary to the S102-108 GEE
model, the social network measures of in-degree, in-beta, and connectedness measures were not
statistically significant at p < 0.05 in the S102-108 ME model.
Senate ME Post-estimation analyses

I conducted a similar post-estimation testing process for the Senate ME models as the one
used for the Senate GEE models with the exception of the weighted correlation structure
analysis. I conducted the global test of the time effect to determine if the dummies for each term
were equal to 0 or if the resulting coefficients were significantly different from each other. For
both ME models, there was a significant difference in the coefficients for each year in both
models (Senate 102nd–108th Congresses: X2 = 37.61, prob > chi2 = 0.0000; Senate 102nd-114th
Congresses: X2 = 203.28, prob > chi2 = 0.0000). My original assumption that each legislative
term should be included in each model was supported as time fixed effects should be included in
both models.
In the final post-estimation test for the ME model analysis, I conducted correlation matrix
and variance inflation factor (VIF) analyses. The S102-108 ME model correlation matrix output
for the main variable of interest, gender, showed low correlation values between gender and all
other control variables and the VIF analysis output for gender was low at a 1.27 value. There was
substantially high collinearity between the in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables
(0.96). The VIF analysis output also demonstrated high collinearity for each variable (in-degree
at 104.86 and in-beta at 101.28). In contrast to the Senate GEE models, the clustering coefficient
and connectedness variables exhibited high VIF values of 15.10 and 49.34, respectively. For
reasons described in the GEE model analyses, I retained all four variables in the model. The
S102-114 ME model correlation matrix output for gender also showed low correlation values
between gender and all other control variables and the VIF analysis output for gender was low at
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a 1.29 value. Similar to the S102-108 model, there was substantially high collinearity between
the in-degree centrality and in-beta centrality variables (0.97). The VIF analysis output also
demonstrated high collinearity for each variable (in-degree at 68.50 and in-beta at 66.97). In
addition, the clustering coefficient VIF value was 9.10. For the same reasons listed for the
previous House and Senate models, these variables remained in the S102-114 model.
Senate ME Margins Analysis

Table 28 presents the results of the margins analyses related to the Senate ME models. In
the S102-114 model, the predicted probabilities of legislative success were approximately similar
for female and male legislators. However, in the S102-108 model, female legislators exhibited
slightly lower predicted probabilities of success compared to males, although the confidence
interval for females is large enough to question this finding. Illustrations of the predictive
probabilities and their related 95 percent confidence intervals from Table 28 are presented in
Figures 20 and 21.
Table 28. Senate Chamber ME Model Margins Analysis, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote
102nd -108th Congresses
Gender
Female
Male

1

Margin

2,034
19,138

0.102
0.115

Obs

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.014 7.31
0.005 22.35

0.000
0.000

102nd -114th Congresses
95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.075
0.105

0.130
0.125

1. Number of sponsorsed bills by gender of sponsor.
2. Delta Method.
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1

Margin

6,609
37,038

0.083
0.084

Obs

S.E.

2

z

Sig.

0.008 10.22
0.003 24.23

0.000
0.000

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.067
0.077

0.099
0.091

.12
.1
.08

Predicted Mean

.14

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs

0

1
gender

Figure 20. ME Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, Senate Chamber 102nd - 108th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)

.08
.07
.06

Predicted Mean

.09

.1

Predictive Margins of gender with 95% CIs

0

1
gender

Figure 21. ME Model Predictive Margins Plot, Probability of Bill Passing Floor Vote by Gender of
Legislator, Senate Chamber 102nd - 114th Congresses (1 = Female, 0 = Male)
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Summary Table of Logistic Regression Results
Table 29 presents a summary of the logistic regression findings by model. The
Discussion chapter will provide an assessment of the results with respect to the study hypotheses
and interpretations of the results.
Table 29. Summary of Results of GEE and ME Models by Congressional Chamber, Odds of
Female-sponsored Bills Passing Floor Votes
House
Models
GEE 102-108
GEE 102-114
ME 102-108
ME 102-114

Senate

Odds
Ratio

S.E.

1

z

Sig.

0.765
0.865
0.730
0.876

0.097
0.064
0.093
0.073

-2.12
-1.97
-2.45
-1.59

0.034
0.049
0.014
0.112

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.596
0.749
0.568
0.745

0.980
0.999
0.939
1.031

1. Robust standard errors.
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Odds
Ratio

S.E.

1

z

Sig.

1.026
1.024
0.879
0.981

0.127
0.107
0.142
0.114

0.21
0.23
-0.80
-0.17

0.837
0.818
0.424
0.866

95% C.I. Bounds
Lower Upper
0.805
0.835
0.641
0.780

1.307
1.257
1.210
1.232

Chapter 5: Discussion
This study is the product of the concern with low levels of female descriptive and
substantive representation in the United States Congress as well as biased attitudes toward
female legislators that may limit their legislative success. Female representation in both
chambers is well below that of the population of females in the United States. Minority group
status for females in Congress presents challenges to descriptive representation but also
negatively affects substantive representation. This paper has cited prior work that women in
many organizational settings face biases that limit their productivity and success in their given
settings. In Congress, biased attitudes toward women have manifested themselves in a variety of
ways including women facing greater rates of interruption during floor debates than those
encountered by men, encountering limitations within the congressional committee selection
process, facing hostile speech patterns, and experiencing male segregation within gendered
group settings.
To attempt to overcome their marginalized status in Congress, I argue that female
legislators collaborate more and exhibit greater rates of legislative productivity than do male
legislators. This claim is supported by other scholars such as Barnes (20016), Swers (2002), and
Volden, et al. (2013). Unlike these scholars, however, I test these arguments by examining
sponsorship and cosponsorship data across many legislative terms in combination with a unique
set of variables. Furthermore, I argue that female legislators in both chambers of Congress are
less successful than men in passing their binding, force-of-law measures despite greater rates of
collaborative and legislative activity. I emphasize the study of binding measures because many
scholars of legislative behavior and relational characteristics focus on all forms of legislative
proposals, including ceremonial and rules- and procedures-based measures. I believe that studies
of legislative activity should place more emphasis on binding measures because these legislative
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proposals have the most direct and long-lasting policy impacts on the general public and this
country.

Summary of Findings
My first hypothesis (H1), that female legislators in both chambers of Congress are more
active sponsors and cosponsors than male legislators, was partially supported. In the House, the
female legislator group had higher mean sponsorship activity than males in all but one
congressional term and higher mean cosponsorship activity than males over all terms of the study
period. However, hypothesis testing demonstrated that this observation held only in the House
with respect to cosponsorship activity. In the Senate, the testing results showed no evidence that
female mean cosponsorship activity was significantly different than male cosponsorship activity.
Furthermore, hypothesis testing showed no statistically significant difference between female
and male mean sponsorship activity in either chamber. These results certainly cast a shadow on
the findings of prior literature that suggest female legislators, as a group, are more active
sponsors and cosponsors in Congress, with respect to binding legislation. Only the House
cosponsorship findings can provide this support.
My second hypothesis (H2), that female legislators in both chambers form better
networks than males, was partially supported. Hypothesis testing on the House data indicated
that the female legislator group had statistically significant higher mean in-degree centrality and
in-beta centrality measures than male legislators. In the Senate, the testing results showed no
evidence of significant mean differences in these measures except for the in-beta measure during
the S101-114 time period. Furthermore, hypothesis testing showed no statistically significant
difference between female and male mean clustering coefficient and connectedness measures in
either chamber, with the exception of the clustering coefficient measure in the House during the
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102nd-114th Congress study period. It appears that females in the House form better networks
with respect to certain centrality measures but not with respect to clustering coefficient and
connectedness measures. The Senate results seem to indicate that females, for the most part, do
not form better networks than do their male counterparts.
The results of the gender differences in terms of legislative success on binding, force-oflaw measures were split between the two chambers. My third hypothesis (H3) argued that,
despite females being more active sponsors and cosponsors than males and forming better
networks than males, female legislators were less successful in passing their binding, force-oflaw measures in both chambers of the United States Congress than their male counterparts,
considering other variables. As the primary regression analyses (GEE method for H102-108 and
H102-114) presented in the prior chapter showed, female House members were less successful
than their male counterparts in getting their bills passed. The results were mixed for the ME
models where female House members were less successful in the H102-108 model but there was
lack of statistical significance for the gender variable in the H102-114 model. All Senate
regression models indicated that gender did not have a statistically significant effect on
legislative success during the study period, controlling for other variables.

Interpretation of Results
The observational data preliminarily indicated that females sponsor and cosponsor more
than males in both chambers of Congress on binding, force of law legislation. In the period
examined for this study, female sponsorship and cosponsorship activity levels began to exceed
those of males when female membership reached near or at the 10 percent level in each chamber.
These data combined with the results of the E-I index analysis suggest that female legislators
began to increase their relationship building within their gender group as more females entered
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Congress while still maintaining, or possibly exceeding, their rates of cosponsorship activity with
male legislators. However, when the data were subjected to statistical testing, the mean
differences between females and males were only significant for cosponsorship activity in the
House. These results provide a measure of disagreement with the prior scholarship of Craig, et
al., (2015) and Swers (2002) that argued that female legislators are more active sponsors and
cosponsors than male legislators. However, it is important to note that these prior studies
considered all congressional legislation while my analysis focused solely on binding legislation.
Why are these results important for female legislators and their legislative success? They
are critical because the act of cosponsoring, in and of itself, as well as a proxy for social
relations, is meant to influence other legislators, particularly in chamber roll call voting, even
after controlling for legislative attributes (Peoples, 2008; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996).
Cosponsoring demonstrates that a legislator wishes to collaborate with other legislators, build
coalitions, and establish long-term influential relationships (Barnes, 2016; Craig, et al. 2015;
Swers, 2002; Campbell, 1982). These objectives are of utmost importance to female legislators
as means to overcome their marginalization as the minority gender group in Congress and
become more effective and successful legislators (Barnes, 2016).
Scholars of legislative behavior have demonstrated that the level of cosponsorship
activity is a general predictor of legislative success (Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996). Bills with more
cosponsors receive more consideration in committee and have greater chances of passing through
committee and achieving success in chamber floor votes than bills with few or no cosponsors
(Fowler, 2006a,b; Koger, 2003; Wilson and Young, 1997). Therefore, being more active in the
legislative process, by cosponsoring more than males and gaining more cosponsors on their
sponsored legislation, should enhance female influence in Congress and provide female
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legislators greater chances of legislative success on their sponsored legislation. However, the
results of this analysis show that greater cosponsorship activity does not work well for females,
particularly in the House of Representatives.
An important aspect of enhancing influence and achieving individual and group goals and
objectives is to develop meaningful and long-lasting relationships within one’s environment. As
presented in this paper, relational ties form networks between actors within a particular setting.
These ties can take many forms and developed for many purposes. Within the setting of the U.S.
Congress, there are a wide variety of networks. The focus of this analysis has been gender-based
cosponsorship networks within both chambers of Congress. My second hypothesis that women
form better cosponsorship networks in both chambers of Congress than men was partially
supported.
The findings confirm that females have better cosponsorship networks with respect to
centrality measures of in-degree and in-beta, but only in the House. Centrality is a good measure
of power through association with powerful others within a network (Bonacich, 1987). Referring
to the work of Hanneman and Riddle (2005), the centrality findings in this analysis suggest that
females in the House occupied favorable structural positions in the cosponsorship networks in
terms of resource access, network prestige, and power through their ties to other well-connected
legislators. As women make up a greater percentage of the House membership, the results of the
centrality means testing and the observational data provide support to the argument that women
in Congress will continue to gain more favorable structural positions as their membership in the
institution grows. However, it must be considered that high degree and beta centrality measures
suggest distinct types of positional standing. Power, resource access, and prestige are different
concepts, and each can yield different benefits to those who exhibit high centrality values. While
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females in Congress do have higher centrality measures than males, it may not lead directly to
power and influence itself. These findings may suggest that women have more connections to
powerful others, but this may only demonstrate that women in Congress have higher prestige or
easier access to resources that do not necessarily translate to influence within the legislative
process, namely in committee consideration and chamber floor action. The empirical results in
this study may support this proposition. Except for the S102-108 ME model, the results of the
regression analyses indicate that higher in-degree and in-beta centrality measures do not have a
statistically significant influence on legislative success, by either gender group. Surprisingly, the
sign on the in-degree coefficients in seven of the eight models were negative which may suggest
that higher in-degree metrics, rather than promoting legislative success, actually lead to
legislative failure.
The analysis of the sole cohesion metric, clustering coefficient, yielded different results
for the House (as compared to the House centrality analysis) but was consistent with the results
of the Senate centrality analysis. The observational data showed higher mean clustering
coefficient values for the female group in the House but not in the Senate. The House means
between the two gender groups, when tested, were not significantly different during the H102108 time period but were during the H102-114 time period. Prior literature argues that higher
clustering coefficient values indicate the presence of ‘small-world networks’ suggesting that
actors in these networks are more likely to know a majority, or all, of the other actors in the
network (Borgatti, et al., 2013; Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010; Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Watts
and Strogatz, 1998). As described earlier, in legislative and cosponsorship networks, higher
clustering coefficients, and consequently denser small-world networks, indicate the presence of
active cosponsorship transitivity in Congress (Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010). These properties
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demonstrate balanced and stable networks. The consequence of these types of networks, as
measured through cosponsorship ties, is a higher level of legislative productivity and success
(Tam Cho and Fowler, 2010).
During the study period, female House and Senate members may have exhibited high
degrees of small world properties, but their group means were not significantly different than the
male means. During the study periods, the findings suggest that the House and Senate female
networks were similarly balanced and stable compared to House and Senate male groups. For
House females, these findings suggest that female House members should enjoy legislative
success during this study period. However, the results of the regression analysis do not support
this contention, at least on binding, force-of-law legislative proposals. The regression analyses
show that higher clustering coefficient metrics do not have a statistically significant influence on
legislative success in both chambers, by either gender group. Furthermore, the signs for the
clustering coefficient variable in all models were negative which may suggest that higher
clustering coefficient metrics hurt both gender groups when trying to get sponsored legislation
successfully through chamber floor votes.
Fowler (2006b) argues that his derived connectedness measure outperforms other, more
established centrality measures in terms of predicting legislative productivity and success. I
tested this measure in the same manner as the other centrality measures and the cohesion
measure of clustering coefficient. In the House, there were no distinguishable or statistically
significant differences between mean connectedness values for female and male legislators
within each term or over the aggregated study period. The study period mean for both gender
groups was 0.15. Based on the observational data for the Senate, the ean connectedness values
for female senators were higher from the 106th through 108th Congresses, whereas male
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legislators in the prior Congresses (102-105) exhibited higher mean connectedness values. The
aggregate mean was similar for female senators than for male senators, at 0.93 and 0.92,
respectively, and far surpass the means evident in the House analysis. Statistical testing of the
mean differences yielded no support that the differences are meaningful. Given that each gender
group’s connectedness measures utilized in this analysis are similar within each chamber and are
not significantly different, it is difficult to draw the conclusion that female legislators in both
chambers form better networks based on the connectedness measure alone. And given the
regression results, it appears that forming better networks as measured through the
connectedness measure has either no positive influence on legislative success or it may stifle it.
Prior studies demonstrate that greater legislative activity, measured through sponsorship
and cosponsorship efforts, and better networks, measured in terms of centrality and cohesion
metrics, enhance the chances of legislative success. The findings of this study confirm that
female members of the House are more active than males with respect to cosponsorship activity
and form better networks with respect to centrality measures utilized in this analysis when
considering binding, force-of-law legislation. Therefore, the inference could be made that female
House members should be more successful in having their legislation pass House chamber floor
votes. However, in this case, the hypothesis that female House members would be less successful
than male House members despite these traits was confirmed. The same hypothesized
association was made for females in the Senate; however, the results of my analysis could not
support this hypothesis. Why would this be the case? Perhaps, these results suggest that the
institutional designs of the chambers of Congress matters when it comes to legislative success.
This notion certainly has merit for the Senate given its smaller size relative to the House and its
longer electoral terms. These institutional characteristics promote more collegiality among
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senators and may help minority groups integrate with the dominant group quicker and easier than
may occur in the House.
Volden, et al. (2013) found that women are more effective lawmakers than men but only
when females are in the minority party in their respective chamber. While this analysis did not
specifically test minority party female legislators and includes a smaller subset of legislation than
that considered in Volden, et al. (2013), the House findings in the analysis suggest that, when
considering other variables, including majority party and party status, females are not more
effective lawmakers than men. The House regression findings suggest that high centrality
measures for women do not influence legislative success despite prior scholarship suggesting
that higher centrality connotes greater influence and power within a network. Furthermore, the
small world network property of clustering coefficient is not indicative of legislative success as
offered by Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) if the networks are analyzed by gender grouping.
Finally, despite scholarship indicating that higher levels of cosponsorship connotes legislative
success (Barnes, 2016; Fowler, 2066a,b; Koger, 2003; Wilson and Young, 1997; Kessler and
Krehbiel, 1996), females in the House were less successful than their male counterparts despite
their greater cosponsorship activity than men.
The results of the Senate analyses yielded no statistically significant gender differences in
sponsorship and cosponsorship activity, network characteristics, and legislative success. So, the
inference of the hypotheses testing is that women are less successful at getting their bills passed
in the House but the findings do not support the same inference in the Senate. A logical followup question is why are there differences for female legislative success, or lack thereof, between
the two legislative chambers of Congress? The following section addresses this question with
several potential reasons.
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Could the inter-chamber differences relate to differences in the number of women in both
chambers, and furthermore, will electing more women to Congress help close the success gap
evidenced in the House analysis? During the study period of this analysis, female membership
rates in both chambers were approximately similar to each other in each legislative term. In
reviewing Tables 9 and 10, the reader will notice that these percentages for each chamber were
not substantially different from each other. Tables 9 and 10 illustrate that each term experienced
an increasing trend of female membership in roughly the same percentage point proportion.
Therefore, the differences in legislative success findings between the two chambers likely cannot
be explained by significant differences in female membership profiles.
Will electing more women to Congress affect their legislative success rates? Electing
more women will not only enhance descriptive representation in Congress but it could stimulate
more collaboration in both chambers and, by increasing membership, could make substantive
impacts to current patterns of legislative behavior, activity, and outcomes. During the study
period, as more women began to occupy Congress, the characteristics of the female
cosponsorship networks changed in both chambers (see Figures 4 and 5). The network graph
representations of the House of the 114th Congress House network shows fewer isolates36 than
those evident in the 102nd Congress House network. As more females entered the House during
this study period, there were more opportunities for representatives to secure cosponsorship acts
for their legislation. The findings were similar in the Senate (see Figures 6 and 7) except that
there were no isolates evident in the 114th Congress whereas there were several in the female
Senate network within the 102nd term. A lack of isolates in the Senate 114th term network is

36

In this analysis, an isolate refers to a legislator, male or female, who did not receive a cosponsor tie from a
female legislator. A cosponsorship network with no isolates indicates that each legislator received at least one
cosponsorship tie from a female legislator during the term.
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likely the result of more female senators reaching out to all senators and being able to reach out
to all senators due to the smaller size of the chamber membership.
Ibarra (1992) has shown that females in organizations dominated by males tend to form
more heterophilous ties than do males. The results of the E-I Index analysis shown in Tables 15
and 16 provide some measure of support for this finding. In both the House and the Senate, E-I
values of women became less negative (which demonstrates greater rates of relationship building
within group) and male E-I values became less positive (which demonstrates greater rates of
relationship building outside of group) over time in a convincing trend. As more females entered
Congress during the study period, the negative female group E-I Index values increased in value
toward zero while the male group E-I Index values decreased toward zero. These results suggest
that, as female membership in Congress increased rather significantly in percentage terms from
the 102nd Congress to the 114th Congress, female within-group ties (more homophily) increased
in the aggregate (with a likely corresponding decrease in the rate of ties with male members).
Conversely, as more females entered Congress, male members increased their number of ties
with female legislators (more heterophily) corresponding with a likely decrease in the number of
ties within group. These findings, coupled with the network measure analyses presented in this
paper, suggest that women in the House and Senate, on average, collaborate with and support
both women and men to a greater degree than do men. In addition, as more females entered the
House during this study period, there were more opportunities for representatives to secure
cosponsorship acts for their legislation, thus developing more complete networks and leaving
potentially fewer isolates in the network.
More Women in Congress Does Matter

Electing more women to Congress has the potential of impacting current patterns of
legislative behavior, activity, and outcomes, to the benefit of women in Congress. As discussed
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earlier in this paper, critical mass theorists posit that increasing the presence of women in
organizations changes the operating dynamics of the organizations themselves; similar results
occur in legislative bodies. Paxton, et al., (2007) contend that female membership in the 15 to 30
percent range is the threshold required for women to make substantive impacts in legislative
bodies. The female legislative success results of the House regression analyses found in Table 21
may support this finding. As more women entered the House in the latter terms of the study
period, the magnitude of the odds of being less successful for female representatives decreased.
During the 102nd through 108th terms, the odds of legislative success for female House
members was 23.5 percent lower than the odds for male House members. During the 102nd
through 114th terms, the odds for legislative success for females improved compared to males;
that is, the odds of legislative success for female House members was 13.5 percent lower than
the odds for male House members. This result may suggest that female House members in the
109th through 114th Congresses began to enjoy more legislative success than they did in earlier
terms of the study period. The combination of these findings provide support to the claims that
increasing the presence of women in Congress will lead to greater frequency of collaboration
between the gender groups and may enhance the chances of female legislative success (at least in
the House based on the results of the regression analysis).
Another suggestion for the inter-chamber differences in findings for female legislative
success is the difference in characteristics of the chambers themselves. Differences in rules and
procedures, party constraints, effect of seniority and member access to powerful others, and the
size of both chambers may be obstacles to female success in one chamber but not the other.
According to Barnes (2016), female legislators are more likely to collaborate when there are
weak party constraints. This notion is particularly true in the Senate where party constraints are
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weaker compared to in the House. Party constraints have been particularly evident in the House
during the study period, most notably during the 104th Congress when Republicans took control
of the House after 40 years of Democratic rule. According to Swers (2002), a significant number
of conservative female and male freshmen representatives joined the House in 1994 which
changed the direction of the institutional agenda from being moderate to a more conservative
one. One major effect of this change was that moderate Republican women who were promoting
female-oriented legislation and working with other moderates on both sides of the aisle in the
103rd Congress were now constrained by the new conservative agenda in the 104th Congress
(Swers, 2002). Moderate Republican women were disincentivized by conservative party leaders
from pursuing policy interests beyond the conservative party platform (Barnes, 2016). These
party constraints were muted in the Senate so that female Senators had more autonomy to work
across party lines and to collaborate on and advance a wide variety of policy issues, particularly
women-oriented legislation (Barnes, 2016). This is not surprising as other researchers have
demonstrated that senators tend to form strong bonds with each other, despite party and gender
differences (Uslaner and Zittel, 2011; O’Connor, et al., 2004).
Another substantive difference between the House and the Senate is the effect that
seniority has on legislator relationships. Based on the findings of the regression analyses in this
study, seniority had a statistically significant effect on legislative success in both chambers for
all years, however the effect was slight. The statistically significant result supports the findings
of Peoples (2008) and Swers (2002) but contradicts that of Campbell (1982). In this analysis, the
average tenure of females in both chambers increased as the number of women entering
Congress increased. In the 102nd Congress, the average tenure for female representatives was 4.6
terms and for female senators the average tenure was 3.7 terms. In the 114th Congress, female
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representative average tenure was 5.3 terms and female senator average tenure was 5.5 terms.
Male legislators had longer average tenures in both chambers in the 102nd Congress but by the
114th Congress, average female tenure was longer than that of men in the Senate, and the same in
the House. By this simple analysis, it seems that as more women enter Congress, their seniority
levels increase.
Legislator seniority is closely associated with ascension to power positions in Congress.
According to Swers (2002), greater seniority can translate to party leadership positions and
committee chair positions. Longer tenure affords legislators the opportunities for power positions
in Congress, either as party leaders or as committee chairs. Seniority is also a key factor in terms
of access and influence, at least in the Senate. According to Campbell (1982), junior senators
have an easier time connecting to senior senators as compared to junior representatives’ access to
senior representatives in the House. The reason for this, according to Campbell (1982), is due to
the size of the Senate. It is easier to meet and collaborate with senior senators when faced with a
body of 100 rather than a body of 435 as found in the House. With respect to female senators,
Barnes (2016) found that senior women in the Senate facilitate collaboration with junior
colleagues both within their party and within the opposition party. Senior female senators
collaborate through mentoring, informal meetings, and joint efforts to develop legislation; these
efforts are not as commonplace with longer tenured male senators (Barnes, 2016). These Senate
dynamics, that is, greater collaboration between senior and junior members and easier access to
more senior and influential senators than that found in the House, suggest why there was no
finding of a gender effect on legislative success in the Senate.
A final consideration for the differences in legislative success is the simple fact that the
Senate is a smaller institution than the House and senators enjoy longer terms than
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representatives. Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) emphasized these characteristics in their findings
on the effects of small-world networks on legislative success. These fundamental differences
between the two legislative bodies may explain why gender had a significant effect in the House
models but not in the Senate models. The Senate has a smaller membership body and member
terms are three times as long as representative terms. The intimate size of the Senate and the
greater service term length are conducive to developing stronger, more intimate relationships
than legislators in the House enjoy. The Senate characteristics facilitate access to a greater
percentage of the Senate body for idea transfer, legislative support, and collaboration. These
characteristics may overcome gender differences and potential biases that are inferred in the
House.

Implications of Results
Within the context of cosponsorship activity and social network analysis, this study
broadens existing knowledge of female group legislative support and collaboration processes and
their influence on legislative outputs in the U.S. Congress. Furthermore, the research design and
statistical analyses described in this paper present a new understanding of the relationship
between gender and legislative success in the U.S. Congress measured through cosponsorship
ties and resulting networks. The research design is unique to the field given the combination of
the network metrics employed as control variables along with more traditional measures found in
prior studies of legislative behavior in order to measure female legislative success in Congress
over 13 legislative terms.
The purpose of using cosponsorship data in this analysis stems from prior scholarship
findings that a cosponsorship act is a mechanism for women to gain influence in the
policymaking process and to increase substantive representation for females in the United States
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(Barnes, 2016; Swers, 2005, 2002). This paper and prior research referenced in the paper do
provide evidence of highly active female sponsoring and cosponsoring efforts in Congress, and
with respect to cosponsoring activity, more so than demonstrated by men. And yet, according to
this analysis, greater levels of legislative activity do not necessarily translate to legislative
success. This paper has offered that one potential obstacle leading to this outcome is that there
are simply not enough females in Congress. The results of this analysis, at least in the House
where females are less successful than males, provide support to the claim that more women in
Congress will improve legislative success rates for female sponsors.
These research findings and interpretations have broad implications for how we think
about the passage of female-specific legislation such as wage equality and reproductive rights.
Others’ research shows that female legislators are more aggressive advocates for female
interests; they sponsor and cosponsor female-oriented legislation at much higher rates than male
legislators (Rouse, et al., 2013; Volden, et al., 2013). Therefore, the inference derived from this
analysis is that diminished legislative success experienced by female congressmembers, at least
in the House, leads to fewer opportunities for the passage of female-oriented legislation. What is
the impact of this inference with respect to female equality, and other forms of equality, in the
United States? Carroll and Sanbonmatsu (2013) suggest that women’s political equality may be
needed to achieve equality in other domains. Can we then draw the conclusion that if women are
more successful in passing legislation in Congress that gains will be made in women’s equality?
And what is the impact of women’s equality on the state of democracy in the United States?
According to Barnes (2016), “collaboration improves democracy by better representing the
views of out-of-power groups.” (p. 216). Therefore, the implication of Barnes’ statement is that,
as more women enter Congress, and by extension of my analysis achieve more legislative
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success, particularly for female-oriented legislation, greater collaboration within Congress will
further promote democratic principles. However, as Barnes (2016) has cautioned, weak party
constraints may be the key context for women to succeed in overcoming their marginalization
and thus stimulating collaboration among gender groups. So, it seems that the House of
Representatives, if it were to demonstrate weak party constraints as has been found in the Senate,
would promote greater collaboration across party lines and greater female legislative success
which would lead to greater female substantive representation, thus promoting equality and
enhancing democracy in the U.S. What is not clear is whether or not both weak party constraints
and more women in Congress have to exist for democracy to improve through greater
collaboration. Further research in these areas may provide more information.

Limitations of the Study
Like most studies in social science, there are limitations and qualifications associated
with this analysis that should be described. This analysis considers 13 terms of Congress. This
number of terms is positioned between the number of terms analyzed in the related studies cited
in this paper; some studies examine 1 to 2 terms while others look at 30 or more. The 13 terms
incorporated periods of majority party change in both chambers, changes in the party of the
President (although not measured in the analysis), changes in the intensity of party polarization
in Congress (also not measured), varying degrees of congressional approval ratings, and changes
in the economic, political, and societal condition in the United States. Furthermore, employing
13 terms of sponsorship and cosponsorship data provided the opportunity to assess the degree to
which cosponsorship acts and the resulting network dynamics influenced legislative activity and
effectiveness by gender group. Despite these benefits, which give me confidence that the
findings are generalizable with respect to many of the variables included in the regression
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models, the primary variable of interest in this analysis is gender of the legislative proposal
sponsor and the related effect that gender has on legislative success. It is in this focus where
there is a limitation to the generalizability of the findings of gender’s effect on success in
Congress. The simple fact is that this analysis was limited by the small number of females in
Congress during the study period (10 percent to a maximum of 20 percent). Clearly, future
similar studies will benefit from a larger female presence in both chambers, in terms of
confidence levels in the inferences generated. Furthermore, the findings of this analysis and prior
research show that influential positions in powerful committees and party leadership posts are
associated with greater rates of legislative success. During this study period, no females occupied
power committee chair positions and relatively few party leadership posts compared to men.
These characteristics provide support to my initial claim that females face prejudices by the male
dominant group which manifest themselves in many different ways. For purposes of this
analysis, until women begin to occupy these posts, the true effects of the female legislator on
success rates cannot be fully measured.
Data management was a difficult task for this study. Even though the analysis focused on
binding legislation (public bills and joint resolutions), 13 terms of congressional bill data
produced over 120,000 pieces of binding legislation complete with bill data and member
information. The data sources used in the analysis and referenced in this paper contained
mistakes. The mistakes in the published data were not substantial in number; where they were
identified I researched and corrected them. Despite my best efforts, it is likely that some
mistakes still remain and should be considered as noise within the datasets.
Finally, there is a fundamental challenge of applying traditional inferential formulas (in
this case, logistic regression) to network measures as these measures are typically based on
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interdependence of relational ties and, depending on how they are used, can often be scale-free
(Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). These characteristics may result in poor estimation of the true
sampling variability (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005). This final limitation is not as concerning in
this analysis as it would be in models that apply network measures as the primary variables of
interest or as the response variable. This analysis includes network measures as one test of the
study hypotheses, but in the regression analyses they are used as control variables rather than as
main variables of interest.

Future Research and Analysis
To elucidate the implications of these results, future research should consider similar
studies when female membership in both chambers exceeds the 30 percent threshold discussed
by Paxton, et al., (2007). The authors claim that female membership in the 15-to-30-percent
range is the threshold required for women to make substantive impacts in legislative bodies. The
results of my analysis suggest that as more women entered the House in the latter terms of the
study period the magnitude of the odds of being less successful for female representatives
decreased. By employing the same analysis for the House as female membership exceeds 30
percent, results may show that the gap narrows further or even that there is no significant
difference between the two gender groups with respect to legislative success.
Adding to this suggestion, future studies could focus on the success rates of women of
different races and ethnicities as more women in different racial and ethnic groups become
members of Congress. As Swers (2002) correctly notes, all women have some shared
experiences and interests; however, women of different races and ethnicities also have their
separate and distinct experiences and policy interests. Their backgrounds and experiences help
form their individual and group-based legislative behaviors, interests, and activities; from a
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social-network perspective, these influence their network relationships and activity levels within
network.
From a substantive representation perspective, future studies could focus on legislative
success rates of women’s legislation in both chambers, rather than on all binding legislation as
analyzed here. Prior scholarship has shown that success rates on female-oriented legislation are
paltry compared to legislation in other policy areas (Barnes, 2016; Volden, et al., 2013; Swers,
2002). As more women enter Congress, the results may show an improvement in success rates
for specifically female-based legislation. A further nuance for such an analysis would be to
compare success rates for this type of legislation sponsored by female legislators and those
sponsored by male legislators.
As more females increase their influential positional standing in the House and the
Senate, particularly in influential positions within party leadership and influential committees
like those included in this analysis, future studies should consider these variables as well as their
interactions with gender. Few women during the study periods of this analysis were members of
the powerful positions in their respective parties and no women were chairs of the power
committees included. Standing in institutional positions is influential to policymaking process
(Cox and Terry, 2008; Swers, 2002). If women increasingly occupied powerful committee chair
seats and party leadership posts, there may be more positive impacts on female legislative
success rates and potentially on female-specific legislation.
Finally, future research in legislative behavior that is concerned with policy implications
should consider data related to binding, force-of-law legislation. The literature reviewed for this
analysis is void of disaggregated legislation types apart from Mayhew (1974) and Tam Cho and
Fowler (2010) who focused solely on landmark legislation. This is an important distinction as
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legislators are concerned about their reputations, chamber standing and prestige, and their
chances for re-election (Fenno, 1973). Reputations and electoral security are based on legislative
activity on measures that have significance for home states and districts as well as the country.
Non-binding ceremonial and procedure-based legislative efforts often have ephemeral impacts,
and, in the case of rules-based legislation, most citizens have little to no interest. With respect to
studying legislative activity and policy impacts, what useful inferences can the research
community glean from studies of non-binding legislation? Furthermore, studies using relational
data should only consider binding legislation because it can provide strong measures of the
strength of the legislator-to-legislator relationship. Finally, future research in legislative behavior
that is concerned with policy implications should consider data related to binding, force-of-law
legislation. The literature reviewed for this analysis is void of disaggregated legislation types
apart from Mayhew (1974) and Tam Cho and Fowler (2010) who focused solely on landmark
legislation.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This study extends our knowledge from the questions and findings of past studies using
intersections of several domains such as cosponsorship/legislative activity and success, gender/
legislative activity and success, and social network analysis/cosponsorship/legislative activity
and success. This study is unique in that it examines gender-based cosponsorship networks in
Congress through the lens of social network analysis over thirteen relatively recent terms of
Congress. Within the context of cosponsorship activity and social network analysis, this study
broadens knowledge of gender, the value of network theory, legislative support and collaboration
processes, and their influence on legislative outcomes. Equally unique is that the cosponsorship
data and the networks and results derived from an analysis of these data are based solely on
binding legislation; this feature is important because binding, force-of-law legislative proposals
are the products that directly affect large segments of the US population, and, in many cases,
affect the entire country.
The findings described in this paper suggest that female legislators in the House of
Representatives were less successful than their male counterparts at getting their sponsored
legislation passed during floor votes from 1992 through 2016. These difficulties were evident
despite female House members exhibiting significantly higher cosponsorship activity levels than
men as well as better network centrality metrics than men. However, as more women entered
Congress during the study period, the gap in success rates between female and male House
members narrowed suggesting that as more women take seats in the House, female legislative
success rates will improve. In the Senate, females also were active legislatively but not
significantly different than males and their network formation statistics were similar to their male
counterparts. Unlike the House, there were no statistically significant differences in legislative
success rates between the two gender groups in the Senate. These results suggest that the
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institutional characteristics of the Senate chamber matter and perhaps they matter more so than
the House characteristics when examining the intersection of legislative success and gender.
Despite these inconsistent inter-chamber findings, there are key elements to consider
from this research that I hope will benefit future studies in this area. The House findings suggest
that as more women enter the House, and, presumably, occupy more influential positions within
the chamber, the gap in legislative success rates will likely diminish over time. The research
findings of Barnes (2016) and Swers (2005, 2002) support this projection and I am certain future
scholarship will bear out these results. A change in legislative success rates may not be the only
outcome we experience as more women enter Congress. There are likely to be dynamic shifts in
other aspects of legislative behavior that reflect the characteristics of female legislators. One
such potential change could be an institutionalization of collaboration among and between all
gender groups and even racial groups within Congress as suggested by Barnes (2016). I am
looking forward to these future contributions to expand our knowledge of women’s legislative
experiences and continued research into the relational aspects of legislative behavior.
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Appendix A. Social Network Analysis Glossary
Actors
Entities that make up a social system of relationships among the actors. Actors may be individual
persons or collectivities such as informal groups and formal organizations. Also known as nodes.
(Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013; Knoke and Yang, 2008).
Attribute data
Data relating to the attitudes, opinions, and behavior of agents. (Scott, 2013).
Average Path Length
An average of the geodesic path lengths in a network as an indicator for how close together
actors are to one another. (Prell, 2012)
Centrality
A property of a node’s (or group of nodes) position in a network. Centrality can be considered in
many ways, such as the contribution the node makes to the structure of the network or the
advantage that accrues to a node by virtue of its position in the network (Borgatti, Everett, and
Johnson, 2013).
Centrality (Beta; In-Beta)
A measure of the total amount of potential influence a node can have on all other nodes via direct
and indirect channels, where indirect channels are weighted (inversely) by their length. The beta
(β) parameter in the beta centrality equation controls how much the longer walks in the network
are counted. In-beta centrality only considers the in-degree centrality measures. (Borgatti,
Everett, and Johnson, 2013).
Centrality (Degree; In-Degree)
A simple measure of centrality which is the number of ties of a given type that a node has in a
network. In-degree centrality focuses on the ties received by an actor from other network actors.
(Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013).
Centrality (Eigenvector)
A variation of degree centrality in which the number of nodes adjacent to a given node is
counted but each adjacent node is weighted by its centrality. A node with high eigenvector
centrality is connected to nodes that are themselves well connected. (Borgatti, Everett, and
Johnson, 2013).
Clustering Coefficient
A measure of the density of ties in each node’s own, or ego, network; that is, the density of ties
among nodes connected to a given node. (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013).
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Cohesion
A concept of dense intimate relations among members embedded in a social group or closed
social circle. A cohesive subgroup consists of actors connected through many direct reciprocated
choice relations that enable them to act collectively. (Knoke and Yang, 2008).
Connectedness
A centrality-based measure that accounts for the weighted number of bills cosponsored and the
number of cosponsors per bill to estimate the strength of each tie. (Fowler, 2006a,b).
Density
The number of ties in a network, expressed as a proportion of the number of ties possible in the
network. (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013).
Directed/Undirected Graph
Graphs may be directed or undirected. In a directed graph, the ties or relations between nodes
have a sense of direction. In undirected graphs, the ties or relations have no direction; that is, the
direction does not make sense or logically must always be reciprocated. (Borgatti, Everett, and
Johnson, 2013).
E-I Index
A measure of group embedding based on comparing the numbers of ties within groups and
between groups. The E-I (external - internal) index takes the number of ties of group members to
outsiders, subtracts the number of ties to other group members, and divides by the total number
of ties. (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).
Isolate
A node with no connection to other nodes. (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013).
Network
A way of thinking about social systems that focus our attention on the relationships among the
entities that make up the system. The entities are called actors or nodes. (Borgatti, Everett, and
Johnson, 2013).
Path
A path is a walk in which each other actor and each other relation in the graph may be used at
most one time. The single exception to this is a closed path, which begins and ends with the same
actor. (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).
Relational Data
Concerning the contacts, ties, and connections, and the groups attachments and meetings that
relate one actor to another and that cannot be reduced to the properties of the individual actors
themselves. (Scott, 2013).
Small World Networks
A type of network structure where the mean shortest path length in the network is significantly
smaller than the mean-shortest path length in a random graph of the same size, and the average
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level of clustering is significantly higher than it is in a corresponding random graph. (Tam Cho
and Fowler, 2010).
Social Network Analysis
A method with foundations in network and graph theory used to describe the structure of a
network or capture aspects of an actor’s position in the network. (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson,
2013; Scott, 2013).
Ties
The relational connections between actors or nodes. Ties are also known as links, edges, arcs, or
lines. (Borgatti, Everett, and Johnson, 2013).
Valued Data/Binary Data
Numerical measurement of relational data. Values indicate the strength of a relation whereas
binary data describes the mere presence of a relation. (Scott, 2013).
Walk
The most general form of connection between two actors in a network. A walk is an unrestricted
sequence of actors and relations that begins and ends with actors. A walk can involve the same
actor or the same relation multiple times. (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).
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